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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Many countries claim that foreign cultural goods threaten their national identities and 
culture and engage in protectionism. Protectionism takes various forms, beginning with direct 
involvement of the state in framing cultural policies and building cultural environment of the 
country, such as funding of specific cultural projects the regulator deems valuable 
(exhibitions, media forums, festivals, etc.), and ending with economic policies, such as tax-
cum-subsidy policies and minimum quota on the proportion of domestic content. In this 
dissertation I focus on the latter,- I analyze the economics of trade protection in cultural 
services, concentrating on domestic cultural content protection in terrestrial television and 
radio broadcasting, and cultural tariffs in the movie industry.  
Trade in media goods is a multi-billion dollar and one of the fastest-growing 
industries and policy restrictions may lead to large distortions in the flow of trade as well as 
have substantial impact on the ability of governments to maintain their budgets. There exist a 
large body of literature that discusses content protection policies in private goods but 
virtually no discussion of content protection of public goods,- media goods in particular. In 
this dissertation I fill this gap.  
My first essay considers the impact of cultural quota imposed on radio stations in 
increasing consumption of domestic programs. Governments around the world believe that 
there exist domination of foreign music, American in particular, on the radio broadcasting. 
Such domination is viewed as a threat to national domestic interests, therefore, is believed to 
require government intervention. Radio broadcasting is a non-excludable public good 
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therefore direct regulation of the consumption of broadcasting is not feasible. Due to this 
governments turn to broadcasters and require that they maintain a minimum fraction of the 
domestic music/programs in their broadcasting. The regulator believes that such requirement 
would induce higher consumption of the domestic music and bring, as it is in some countries, 
domestic music from the verge of extinction. I show that such simple understanding of the 
issue is naïve as it ignores the fact that there does not exist a clear mapping between relative 
proportion of the domestic programs in the total volume of broadcasting and the absolute 
consumption of domestic programs by the public. The answer very much depends on the 
preference structure of the society,- when people prefer foreign music to domestic music or 
have high opportunity cost of time then policy restriction may be counterproductive. 
My second essay analyzes direct regulation of the proportion of the domestic 
programs in the total volume of broadcasting and tax-cum-subsidy policies on television. 
Television is considered to be one of the largest components of international trade in  media 
goods. Turning on a TV set in any place in the world immediately demonstrates that the 
American and, to lesser extent, British media have undisputed domination over the TV 
market. American TV series, educational and science programs, and especially movies fill in 
peoples’ screens all over the world. Such domination is considered to be a grave threat to 
national identity. Policymakers are afraid that access of domestic producers to domestic 
market is restricted and as a result, domestic culture is diluted. In order to correct this 
situation government turn to two main instruments. I find that marginal changes in content 
requirement increase (decrease) consumption of domestic shows when individuals are 
sensitive (insensitive) to the provided content. Tax-cum-subsidy polices have negative (no) 
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effect on consumption of the domestic content when preferences of individuals of the country 
subject to regulation are highly sensitive (insensitive). Finally, I find that capping advertising 
increases consumption of domestic programs. 
The last essay addresses the question of whether a cultural tariff is a proper policy to 
raise consumption of domestic movies, especially artistic ones, as opposed to foreign 
blockbuster movies. “Hollywood” blockbuster movies allegedly have low-cultural value yet 
command more than eighty percent of the world movie market. and cultural tariff intends to 
increase the average cultural level in the country implementing the policy. Starting from free 
trade, a small cultural tariff decreases the average blockbusterness of the domestic market as 
intended although the number of local producers willing to enter the blockbuster market 
increases and reduces the number of local producers specializing in the production of artistic 
movies. The cultural tariff introduces a distortion into the relative price of movies. Aggregate 
consumption of artistic movies that are locally made increases and so does the self-
sufficiency ratio of local producers. 
2. Thesis Organization 
Thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 discusses domestic content 
protection on radio broadcasting. In the first section of the chapter I review literature and 
discuss issues raised by introduction of domestic content requirement. In the second section I 
build a model of international trade in radio broadcasting services and describe equilibrium 
before any content restrictions are imposed. In the third section I analyze the effects of 
domestic content requirement and in the fourth section I provide numerical simulations to 
assert analytical conclusions derived in the preceding section. Finally, in the fifth section I 
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provide conclusions and directions for future research. Chapter concludes with the list of 
references and appendices. 
Chapter 3 discusses issues pertaining to protectionism on television. I begin with a 
thorough literature review and discuss the current state of affairs in cultural protectionism. In 
the second section I build a theoretical framework for analysis, describe unconstrained 
equilibrium and its properties. In the following section, I consider marginal changes in the 
content requirement starting from just-binding level. I also consider the effects of tax-cum-
subsidy policies and impact of regulation of advertising on consumption of domestic 
programs. In the fourth section I provide results of a numerical analysis to support analytical 
results derived earlier in the Chapter 3. Lastly, in the fifth section state main conclusions and 
policy recommendations. Paper concludes with references’ list and appendices. 
The final paper, presented in Chapter 4, I focus on impact of taxes on the structure of 
the movie production, in particular, whether taxes induce domestic firms to switch from 
production of auteur movies to production of blockbuster movies. In the first section I 
provide literature review and discuss, in general terms, the validity of regulator beliefs when 
imposing constraints on entry of foreign filmmakers. In the second section, I build a model 
used to demonstrate the main results and provide comparative statics for main parameters of 
the model. In the third section I investigate the impact of cultural tariff on consumption of 
domestic movies and production structure of local studios. In the fourth section I conclude 
and provide some policy recommendations. In addition, I provide directions for future 
research. Chapter ends with the list of references and with appendices. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ECONOMICS OF DOMESTIC CULTURAL CONTENT 
PROTECTION IN RADIO BROADCASTING 
A paper to be submitted to The Canadian Journal of Economics 
Mukhtar Bekkali1 and John Beghin2 
Iowa State University 
Abstract 
Many countries claim foreign cultural goods threaten their national identities and 
engage in protectionism against foreign cultural goods with various policy interventions. We 
analyze the economics of domestic cultural content protection in terrestrial broadcasting, the 
most widespread policy instrument used in broadcasting. Using the love-of-variety approach, 
we model a representative consumer deriving utility from broadcasting services net of 
advertising, and allocating scarce time between consuming the various broadcasting services 
and leisure. Advertising is a nuisance; it costs time yet brings no utility. Broadcasting is a 
pure public good; broadcasters make profit in the monopolistic competition environment by 
bundling advertising with valuable cultural content. We impose a discrete domestic content 
requirement and then investigate the effects of its marginal changes on consumption of 
domestic broadcasting. Domestic content requirement may reduce (increase) consumption of 
domestic programs when consumer’s demand is highly elastic (inelastic), the degree of 
preference for foreign content over domestic content is high (low) and opportunity cost of 
listening time is high (low). The reduction occurs because the consumer reshuffles her 
consumption bundle towards leisure away from high domestic-content stations thereby 
                                                          
1 Graduate student, Department of Economics, Iowa State University; primary researcher and author. 
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reducing the overall aggregate consumption of broadcasting, and subsequently, the overall 
aggregate consumption of domestic programs.  
 
1. Introduction 
Despites its numerous benefits, globalization is alleged to be a serious threat to 
countries’ national identities, especially by policymakers and mercantilist interests.3 A 
perceived tradeoff between increasing economic integration and diminishing national identity 
is at the center of trade and cultural debates4 as evidenced by the current negotiations on trade 
in services mandated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Trade in services has been expanding remarkably, especially in 
entertainment services, such as music and movie industries, exacerbating this controversy on 
the loss of cultural identity. Many countries use exemption clauses of GATS in order to cope 
with “cultural externality” of economic integration.5 They engage in “cultural protectionism” 
favoring and implicitly subsidizing domestic producers of cultural goods over their foreign 
competitors. Television broadcasting and movie industries have been particularly targeted. 
Decreasing domestic-programming content in the broadcasting industry and the increasing 
dominance of (American) blockbusters in the movie industry are example of the perceived 
threats.6 Only a handful of countries, including the United States, have refrained from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Professor, Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 
3 For example, a large gathering this fall in Paris discussed a “Preliminary Draft Convention on the Protection of 
the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions“ for the 33rd UNESCO general convention. 
4 See Cowen (2002) for an excellent review of the cultural issues brought up by globalization as well as columns 
by Bernier (2003-2004). 
5 For example, articles XIV(a) of GATS and Annex on Communications to GATS 2(b).  
6 As an anecdote, Frenchman Gerard Depardieu is a vociferous and prominent opponent of U.S. blockbusters’ 
dominance in France yet he does not mind casting in such or being exported to foreign markets. 
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adopting such policy. The European Union (EU) requires broadcasters in member states to 
reserve a majority proportion of their transmission time for EU work.7 Within the EU, the 
most active proponent of content regulations is France where, for example, at least 40% of all 
songs played on the radio should be in French after the infamous “Loi Toubon”.8 Similarly, 
Canadian regulation stipulates that each week at least 35% of popular musical selections by 
commercial stations are Canadian and 65% of the popular vocal music selections French-
language stations broadcast are in French.9 For television, the Canadian requirement is 
stricter and requires that 60% of all programming be of a local origin. Even in states that are 
viewed as culturally conservative with little threat to domestic culture, like South Korea, 
legislators passed laws limiting foreign content.10 The regulation takes an extreme form on 
some of the countries of the former Soviet Union. For example, in Kazakhstan, the Russian 
language vastly dominates the official language of the state, the Kazakh language, but the 
government requires that half of all programming to be done in Kazakh.11  
However, despite the predominance of these regulations, it is unclear that they work 
as intended, as Acheson and Maule [2002] noted for the Canadian cultural protection 
initiatives. Two key stylized facts to note is that the actual regulations is are a round-about 
instrument to increase the absolute consumption of domestic programs by imposing a relative 
restriction on production (broadcasting), and that broadcasted content is often a public good.  
Quantifying cultural loss from trade in cultural goods is a daunting task involving 
                                                          
7 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 adopted by the European Union, Chapter III, Article 4.1. 
8 Minister Toubon was nicknamed Mr. Allgood after he imposed his cultural policy (The Economist (1996)). 
9 Canadian Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., 1991, c. 11, Article 10.1.  
10 Article 71(1) of the Republic of South Korea’s Broadcasting Act. 
11 The law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 23 July 1999, #451-1 “About Means of Mass Information”, article 
3.2. 
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some arbitrary metric of culture. We aim more realistically to look at the allocative 
implications of the predominant domestic cultural content policy used by governments to 
“protect” domestic culture. In the case of terrestrial broadcasting, policymakers typically 
choose linguistic erosion as an indicator of the cultural loss and regulate the domestic 
linguistic content of programming. Market failures are often used to motivate domestic 
cultural protection. The most prevalent alleged failure is abuses of market power by providers 
of entertainment (Francois and van Ypersele (2002), Farchy (1999), Sapir (1991), and Shao 
(1995)). The second one is the failure of consumers to endogenize the positive externalities 
generated by higher domestic cultural content (Cwi (1980), Globerman (1983), Sapir (1991), 
and Shao (1995)). The first rationale applies primarily to the movie industry where domestic 
(non US) movie producers are marginalized by vertically integrated Hollywood studios.12 
The second type of failure applies to radio and television broadcasting. The latter is usually 
non rival and lacks direct pricing. Our analysis addresses this second important case and 
looks at domestic cultural/linguistic content requirement in terrestrial broadcasting.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on the economics of cultural policy in an open 
economy context hence to the international trade literature. The latter has elucidated the 
economics of domestic content protection of private goods in various contexts (Grossman 
(1981), Mussa (1984), Hollander (1987), Vousden (1987), Krishna and Itoh (1988), Beghin 
and Sumner (1992), and others). Our paper fills a void in this content literature by analyzing 
the effects of a domestic content requirement (DCR) on public goods. We investigate the 
allocative effects of domestic cultural protection policies in terrestrial broadcasting 
                                                          
12 Francois and van Ypersele (2002)show that restrictions on trade in the movie industry may help resurrect 
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industries.13 The context of expanding trade in entertainment services re-enforces the 
pertinence of our analysis. 
Using the love-of-variety approach, we model a representative consumer deriving 
utility from consuming broadcasting services net of advertising, and allocating scarce time 
between consuming the various broadcasting services and leisure. Advertising is a nuisance; 
it costs time yet brings no utility. Broadcasting is a pure public good; broadcasters make 
profit in the monopolistic competition environment by bundling advertising with valuable 
cultural content. Each broadcaster provides a unique mix of domestic and foreign contents. 
We impose a discrete DCR and then investigate the effects of its marginal changes on 
consumption of domestic broadcasting.  
We find that the effectiveness of DCR policies depends crucially on consumer 
preferences. A DCR may reduce (increase) consumption of domestic programs when 
consumer’s demand is highly elastic (inelastic), the degree of preference for foreign content 
over domestic content is high (low) and opportunity cost of listening time is high (low). The 
reduction occurs because the consumer reshuffles her consumption bundle towards leisure 
away from high domestic-content stations thereby reducing the overall aggregate 
consumption of broadcasting, and subsequently, the overall aggregate consumption of 
domestic programs. The implication of this result is that a minimum DCR may be an 
effective policy is some EU countries or Canada but likely to fail in countries where language 
is the main obstacle for consumption of domestic programming. The latter might be some of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
production of valuable cultural genres by both the exporter and importer and may increase welfare under 
increasing returns to scale technologies and discrete valuations of domestic and foreign movies by consumers. 
13 The few empirical analyzes of the effect of cultural content protection on welfare (e.g., Anderson, 
Swimmer and Suen (1997)) do not consider the public good nature (nonrivalness) of broadcasting. 
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the Baltic States and Central Asian where consumers strictly prefer foreign music to domestic 
music.  
 
2. The model 
We define consumer preferences over various radio broadcasting genres (e.g., rock, 
pop, rap, classical music or their combination) so that each genre is covered only by one 
station.14 Each genre represents a unique mix of domestic and foreign content. Since the 
broadcasting industry is characterized by increasing returns to scale technology we assume 
that broadcaster face only fixed costs and derive revenue by selling air time to advertisers. 
Advertising is modeled as a nuisance - it brings zero utility but costs scarce time. However, 
broadcasters bundle advertising with real content in fixed proportions “forcing” the consumer 
to consume advertising whenever she consumes broadcasting services. This feature of our 
model allows us to derive the price of consumption of broadcasting in term of time units.15 
For any broadcaster, we define the ratio of its domestic content to total cultural content as β . 
We use β  to characterize genres16 and assume that [ ]0,1Uβ ∼ .  
                                                          
14 To avoid the problem of non-existence of equilibrium in the Bertrand games we require that each station 
serves its genre exclusively. this could be achieved two ways. Either, one assumes that the policymaker assigns 
each genre to each station through licensing of radio and television frequencies with large penalties for violation. 
Then, firms simultaneously choose their strategies. Or, each station is assumed to face fixed startup costs. Then, 
firms sequentially choose their strategies; and no firm enters the same market (genre) as stations before it. 
Therefore, each genre is served by a single station We innocuously assume the former case. A mixture of any 
two genres constitutes a new genre and the number of stations is finite excluding two stations choosing a similar 
genre. 
15 The original formulation of broadcasting industries in continuous setups is found in Berry and Waldfogel 
(1999) and Anderson and Coate (2003). In the latter, private companies derive revenues from pure public goods 
despite absence of direct pricing of the good. 
16 For the case of radio broadcasting, one may assume that there exist two types of music,- popular music (high 
in foreign content) and folklore (low in foreign content). Then, the ratio of folklore music to the sum of folklore 
and popular music defines a genre. A positive monotonic mapping between proportion of folklore in the total 
music content and proportion of domestic content in the total cultural content leads to β  as a genre parameter.  
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A representative consumer derives utility from consumption of broadcasting and 
leisure where the utility is quasi-linear with respect to leisure. Define the triplet of variables 
( ) ( )( ), ,d fq q lβ β  as the consumption of domestic programs of genre β , foreign programs of 
genre β  and leisure, respectively. Then, the utility function takes the following form:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
11
1
0
1
,
1
d fq q
U d l
σ
λσ σ
β β σ
ββ
γ β β β
β
λ β β
− −
−
−
 
  
 ≡ +  −  
 
∫  (1), 
where 1σ >  is the elasticity of substitution between genres and λ  is the concavity parameter 
that regulates the aggregate expenditure on consumption of broadcasting. Function ( )γ β  is 
the weight of each genre. We assume that preferences over foreign and domestic content for 
each genre follow Cobb-Douglas specification. We further assume that 
1
0
σ
λ
σ
−
< < , which 
guarantees that this utility function satisfies all the regularity conditions (increasing utility, 
and negative semi-definite Hessian matrix of the second-order derivatives of the utility 
function with respect to choice variables). We also impose negative off-diagonal elements of 
the Hessian matrix that guarantee gross substitutability of the genres.17  
A key feature of the above utility function is that a representative consumer derives 
utility from consumption of only foreign and domestic content. However, because stations 
bundle advertising with broadcasting the former costs time and advertising is a nuisance. This 
specification allows us to “price” broadcasting and generate revenues for broadcasters.  
The Consumer maximizes her utility function subject to the constraint that the total 
                                                          
17 This utility specification can be generalized to heterogeneous consumers as long as heterogeneity comes from 
different valuation of sub-utility from broadcasting to allow tractable aggregation of individual demands. 
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time spent on consumption of broadcasting and leisure does not exceed her time endowment, 
which we normalized to unity. Denote ( )b β  as the consumption of broadcasting that consists 
of domestic content, foreign content, and advertising, and ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,d f aβ β β  as their 
respective shares in total volume of broadcasting for genre β . Further, define consumption of 
advertising of genre β  as ( )aq β . Then, we have the following identities: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d f aq q q bβ β β β+ + ≡ , and ( ) ( ) ( ) 1d f aβ β β+ + ≡ . Hence, the utility function can be 
restated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
11
1
0
1
.
1
b d f
U d l
σ
λσ σ
ββ σ
ββ
β γ β β β
β
λ β β
− −
−
−
 
  
= +  
−   
 
∫  (2) 
Inspection of utility function (2) reveals that each broadcasting demand is weighted 
by genre-specific function 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
d f
ββ
ββ
γ β β β
β β
−
−
−
. It is convenient to define its inverse as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
11
1
1
d f
z
ββ
ββ
γ β β β
β
β β
−−
−
 
 ≡
 − 
 to which hereunder we refer as its virtual price. The higher 
the proportions of both foreign and domestic content are (or lower proportion of the 
advertising) and the higher the weight of a genre in the utility function compared to other 
genres is, the lower is the virtual price faced by consumer.  
Substituting ( )z β  into (2) leads to the utility maximization problem expressed as:  
 
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
0 0
1
max . . 1.
b
b
d l s t b d l
z
σ
λσ σ
σβ
β β β
λ β
− − 
   + + =     
 
∫ ∫  (3). 
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For brevity define 
1
1
1 1
λ
φ
λ σ
 
≡ −  − − 
. Restrictions on the concavity parameter λ  
guarantee that 0 1φ≤ ≤ . Solving the utility maximization problem yields broadcasting 
demands  
 ( ) ( )1 ,b z Vσ φβ β − −=  (4), 
where ( )
1
1
0
V z d
σβ β−≡ ∫  is an aggregate virtual price index. Even though the aggregate price 
index is independent of each individual virtual price, it does depend on the aggregate level of 
prices. This implies that marginal shocks in prices have no marginal effect on the aggregate 
price level, however, discrete fluctuations in prices lead to changes in the aggregate price 
index.  
We assume that all stations (or firms) have identical cost structure, namely, given the 
public nature of broadcasting, each firm face the same fixed cost. Without loss of generality 
we normalize fixed costs at zero. Combined with the assumption that each station has 
exclusive rights to its genre, the market has the attributes of monopolistic competition. 
Stations derive their revenues by bundling together “real” content and advertising and 
consumers cannot un-bundle them.18 The price of advertising, ( ).p , is assumed to be linearly 
increasing in the firm’s share of the broadcasting market, or ( ) ( )
b
p b
B
β
≡ , where 
( )
1
0
B b dβ β≡ ∫  is the aggregate demand for broadcasting. The broadcaster’s problem is 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
,
max *1, . . 0,
d f
p B a s t
β β
pi β β β pi β≡ ≥  (5), 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )( )*1 1 *1a d fβ β β= − −  is the total amount of advertising during the time period, 
in minutes. Broadcasters behave strategically and the industry reaches best-reply equilibrium. 
For simplicity, we assume that each station broadcast all the time. This assumption is 
motivated by zero variable cost and because broadcasters my not know exactly when the 
consumer will tune in.  
Then, the first-order conditions for an interior solution for profit maximization for 
station serving genre β  are: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 0,
d f
d d
pi β β β
σ β
β β
 ∂ − −
∝ − − =  ∂  
 and (6), 
 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1 0.
d f
f f
pi β β β
σ β
β β
 ∂ − −
∝ − − − =  ∂  
 (7). 
Solving equations (6) and (7) yields optimum ( )* 1d σβ β
σ
− =  
 
 and 
( ) ( )* 11f σβ β
σ
− = −  
 
, where the asterisk denotes the unconstrained equilibrium levels. 
Thus, the virtual prices are given by ( ) ( )
1
* 1z
σ
β γ β
σ
−
 − =   
  
.19 Parameters β  and ( )1 β−  
are respectively the most-preferred by consumer proportions of domestic and foreign 
programs in the total provided broadcasting bundle. However, broadcasting is provided only 
when it brings profits to a station, in our case, by means of advertising. Therefore, provided 
content is always worse than the most-desirable content. As elasticity of substitution between 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 We abstract from cases where consumers can suppress advertising, such as when using recording devices like 
TiVo. 
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genres approaches infinity, the disparity between the two vanishes.  
The second-order conditions of profit maximization require the Hessian of the 
second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the choice variables to be 
negative semi-definite. Since 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2
1
1 0
f
d d
pi β β
σ β
β β
∂ −
= − − ≤
∂
, 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2
1
1 1 0
d
f f
pi β β
σ β
β β
∂ −
= − − − ≤
∂
, and 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
0
d f
d f d fd f
σ β β β βpi β pi β pi β
β β β ββ β
− − − − ∂ ∂ ∂
− = ≥  ∂ ∂∂ ∂  
, these second-order 
conditions hold. 
By aggregating over all broadcasting firms, the aggregate market consumption of 
domestic programming in unconstrained equilibrium is given by 
( ) ( )
1 11 1
*
0 0
1 1 1
*D d d
φσ σ
σ σ σ
β γ β β γ β β
σ σ σ
−− −      − − −        =                       
∫ ∫  (8). 
 
3. Effects of the domestic content requirement.    
As broadcasting is a public good that lacks direct pricing, the policymaker attempts to 
reach his cultural consumption objective by imposing the cultural policy on broadcasters. We 
assume the policymaker forces producers to incorporate higher shares of domestic 
programming in their broadcastings by imposing a minimum level on the share of domestic 
content in total broadcasting time. Presumably, the consumer will increase her consumption 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 When the consumer values genres equally, the model yields equal virtual prices, and all genres yield the same 
utility. It is why we have normalized the weight parameter ( )γ β by ( )11 βββ β −− .  
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of domestic broadcasted culture as well. We now assess the validity of this conjecture that 
imposing a cultural DCR on broadcasters leads to higher consumption of domestic 
programming. To account for feedback effects between stations to changes in DCR we first 
impose a discrete DCR and then derive the effects of marginal changes in DCR around its 
initial level on the aggregate consumption of domestic programming as in Mussa (1984). The 
most common form of DCR in broadcasting is to require that domestic programming 
constitutes a minimum fraction of aggregate broadcasting. Formally, defining a policy 
instrument as δ  we have DCR requiring ( )dδ β≥ . 
When the policy maker imposes the DCR policy, the constraint binds for all stations 
with genres β  such that ( )*d β δ≤ , i.e. for all 
1
σ
β δ
σ
 ≤  − 
. Therefore, each of these 
stations,20 instead of solving equations (6) and (7), now solves:  
 ( ) ,d β δ=  (9), 
and 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1 0.
d f
f
β β
σ β
β
 − −
− − − =  
 
 (10). 
The solution is ( )dˆ β δ=  and ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
1 1 1ˆ
1 1 1
f
σ β δ
β
σ β
− − −
=
+ − −
. We denote constrained 
solutions and functions with over-hats. Combining solutions yields constrained virtual price 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
11 1
1 1 1
ˆ .
1 1 1 1
z
β β βσ β δ δ
β γ β
σ β β β
−− −  − −    − =        + − − −     
 We see that 
( )
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ 1
z
z
β δ δ β
β δ δ
∂ ∂ −
=
−
. The 
proportional change in the virtual price to changes in the DCR has an ambiguous sign 
17  
because only the stations serving genres β δ≤  experience a drop in prices. Other constrained 
stations with their genre such that 
1
σ
δ β δ
σ
 < ≤  − 
 actually increase their prices when the 
DCR policy is imposed. This happens because for firms that find themselves strictly 
constrained ( β δ≤ ), the attractiveness of the genre decreases (“content effect”). The fall in 
the advertising level21 (and lower virtual price) is not sufficient to offset the fall in the 
attractiveness caused by the provision of the sub-optimal content. On the other hand, stations 
that operate genres 
1
σ
δ β δ
σ
 < ≤  − 
 experience a net drop in virtual prices because the lower 
advertising level (“advertising effect”) dominates the effect caused by provision of sub-
optimal content. As the elasticity of substitution between genres goes up, the range of stations 
that raise prices in response to the policy shrinks. This is attributed to the fact that, ceteris 
paribus, the consumer values the composition of desirable content higher than the nuisance 
caused by advertising. The constraint becomes binding for all stations once δ  increases 
passed 
1
σ
σ
 
 − 
. We do not, however, consider such cases in our analysis due to lack of their 
appeal in the real world.  
The interaction of the “content effect” and “advertising effect” introduces ambiguity 
to the effect of DCR on the consumption of domestic content. Since the focus of our paper is 
the distortion of the consumption of domestic programs brought about by the DCR, we 
assume, for analytical tractability, that the representative consumer always values low-
domestic-content genres higher than high-domestic-content ones so that virtual prices of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 We assume that the penalty for non-compliance with the DCR is prohibitive.. 
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low-domestic-content stations remain higher than high-domestic-content stations even after a 
DCR is imposed. It is tantamount to ( )γ β  falling sufficiently fast in β , or mathematically, 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
1 11
log 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
γ β σ β δ
γ β σ β δ σ β
 ′ − −
− − ≤ 
+ − − + − −  
.22 By imposing this restriction 
we mitigate the “advertising effect” in favor of  the “content effect”. We concentrate on 
sufficient conditions therefore further restrict our attention on cases where 2σ ≥ . In the 
numerical analysis section, we relax this assumption and show that the results are robust 
under milder conditions. 
We define an aggregate price index for all stations as *Vˆ V+  where 
( )
1
1
0
ˆ ˆV z d
σ
δ
σ
σβ β
− 
 
 
−
≡ ∫  and ( )
1
1* *
1
V z d
σ
σ
δ
σ
β β−
− 
 
 
≡ ∫ . When the DCR constraint is binding, the 
aggregate demand is given by *Bˆ B+ , where ( )
1
0
ˆBˆ b d
σ
δ
σ
β β
− 
 
 
≡ ∫  and ( )
1
* *
1
B b d
σ
δ
σ
β β
− 
 
 
≡ ∫ . 
Having defined the aggregate broadcasting demand, the aggregate consumption of domestic 
programming is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
* *
0
1
ˆ ˆˆ .D d b d d b d
σ
δ
σ
σ
δ
σ
β β β β β β
 
 − 
 
 − 
= +∫ ∫  (11). 
Next, define ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1
0 0
ˆ ˆz d z d
σ σ
δ δ
σ σ
σ σβ β β β β β
−
   
   − −   
− −
  
  
≡   
  
  
∫ ∫  and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1 1 0a u u aδ δ β β δ= − − − − + − ⇒ ∂ ∂ ≤ .  
19  
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1* *
1 1
.z d z d
σ σ
σ σ
δ δ
σ σ
β β β β β β
−
− −
   
   − −   
  
  
≡   
  
  
∫ ∫  The former is the expected value of β  over 
interval 0,
1
σ
δ
σ
  
  −  
 and probability density function 
( )1ˆ
ˆ
z
V
σβ −
. The assumptions of ( )γ β  
falling sufficiently fast and 2σ ≥  were required for δ β≥ 23 which implies that, on average, 
representative consumer is made worse off by the policy due to higher average virtual price 
of constrained stations. Parameter β  is the expected value of β over interval ,1
1
σ
δ
σ
  
  −  
 
and probability density function 
( )1*
*
z
V
σβ −
. Similarly, it represents the weighted-average 
most-preferred proportion of domestic content over unconstrained stations. Further, define 
*
ˆ
ˆ
B
B B
µ ≡
+
 as the share of the constrained aggregate demand in the total aggregate demand 
for broadcasting services. Then, the marginal effect of tightening the DCR on aggregate 
consumption of domestic broadcasting is given by  
 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
ˆ 1 1 1 1
ˆ 1
1 1
D φµ σ δ β φβ µ σ δ β
δ δ δ δ
 − − − − − −∂  = Β − +
∂ − −  
. (12). 
We are now able to state our analytical results: 
Proposition 1  
Under the assumptions of Sections 2 and 3, the effect of marginal changes in the 
DCR around an initially binding level on consumption of domestic programs consists of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 The derivative of ( )zˆ β  with respect to β  is proportional to the given expression. 
23 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1ˆ ˆ0 0 1 2 1 2z z σβ β β β β δ σ σ δ σ−∂ ∂ ≥ ⇒ ∂ ∂ ≤ ⇒ ≤ − ≤ ∀ ≥  
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three effects: (i) a direct increase in the share of domestic programs in the total volume 
of broadcasting, Bˆ ; (ii) a reduction in the consumption of broadcasting of constrained 
stations, 
( )( )( )ˆ 1 1
1
B φµ σ δ β
δ
− − −
−
−
 (negative if 2σ ≥ ); and (iii) an increase in the 
aggregate consumption of broadcasting of unconstrained stations, 
( )( )( )
( )
ˆ 1 1
1
Bφβ µ σ δ β
δ δ
− − −
−
 (positive for 2σ ≥ ). The sum of these effects has an ambiguous 
sign.  
Proposition 2 
Under the assumptions of Sections 2 and 3, there exists a non empty set of 
parameters ( ( ),σ λ and functional forms of genres distribution function ( )γ β  leading 
to positive and negative effects of the DCR policy on aggregate consumption of domestic 
programs. There exist parameter values and functional forms of ( )γ β  under which 
consumption of domestic programming can be maximized with respect to the DCR, and 
for which levels of constrained consumption of domestic programs is lower than the 
unregulated consumption (overshooting).  
Proof of propositions. The fact that the direct effect is always positive is trivial. The 
signs of indirect effects depend on the sign of δ β−  through our assumption on the curvature 
of the weight function ( )γ β  and 2σ ≥ . Both guarantee that 0δ β− ≥ . By inspecting 
equation (12) we observe that for just binding policy, 0δ = , marginal changes in DCR have 
no effect on the consumption of the domestic programming because ˆ 0B =  by construction 
and 
0
lim 1
δ
β δ
→
= . Ultra-marginal increases in δ  increase Bˆ  making the direct effect strictly 
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positive. At small values of DCR 0µ ≈  and 0δ β− ≈  so that indirect effects, 
( )( )( )1 1
0
1
φµ σ δ β
δ
− − −
≈
−
 and 
( )( )( )
( )
1 1
0
1
φβ µ σ δ β
δ δ
− − −
≈
−
 (again, we’ve used 
0
lim 1
δ
β δ
→
= ). 
Hence, for small values of δ , 
ˆ
0
D
δ
∂
>
∂
. Further, Dˆ  evaluated at a DCR at which it is binding 
for all stations, 
1σ
δ
σ
− =  
 
, yields 
( )
( )( )
( )( )11 1 1
1 1
10
1ˆ
1
D d
λ
σ λ σ
λ
ββ
γ βσ
β
σ β σ β σ
− − −
−
−
  −    =       − −   
∫  
while ( )( )( )( )
1
1 1 1 1 1*
0
1
D d
λ
λ σ λ σσ βγ β β
σ
− − − −− =  
  ∫
. To show that there exist parameter values of 
( ),σ λ  and functional forms of ( )γ β  such that *Dˆ D≤  we set ( ) 1 2γ β =  and set 6σ = . 
This yields *ˆ 0D D− < . Therefore, given that the set of δ  is compact and that function Dˆ  is 
continuous in δ , there exist at least one maximum and at least one point where constrained 
and unconstrained consumptions of domestic programs are equal. Given that the set of δ  is 
compact and convex, there exist a range of values of δ  where (i) the discrete DCR policy 
increase (decreases) consumption of domestic programming and/or (ii) DCR policy yields 
consumption of domestic programs higher (lower) than in the unconstrained economy■ 
The effect of DCR on aggregate consumption of domestic programming consists of 
three effects. The first effect, Bˆ , is a direct effect, the second effect, 
( )( )( )ˆ 1 1
1
B φµ σ δ β
δ
− − −
−
−
, is the indirect effect of change in consumption of domestic 
programs of constrained stations, and the third effect, 
( )( )( )
( )
ˆ 1 1
1
Bφβ µ σ δ β
δ δ
− − −
−
, is the indirect 
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effect of change in consumption of domestic programs of unconstrained stations. Assume we 
have the set of parameters that guarantee β δ≤  and Dˆ  reaches a unique global maximum. 
When the initialδ  is small, the positive change in consumption of unconstrained stations is 
the dominating effect because this is where most of the consumption of broadcasting is 
concentrated prior to the policy change. However, as policyδ  increases further, its rate of 
increase slows down and at the same time the negative effect of change in consumption of 
constrained stations becomes noticeable. Share parameter µ  is large (closer to 1) for strictly 
binding levels of DCR by the assumption that the consumer favors low-domestic-content 
stations to high-domestic-content stations. Therefore, an important requirement for the 
second effect having an impact on the overall sign of the equation (12) is φ  being small. The 
latter is achieved at either small values of elasticity of substitution between genres or/and 
large value of the concavity parameter. In a sense, in societies with poor substitution among 
various genres, consumers do not change they consumption habits despite unfavorable virtual 
prices brought about by DCR policy. High value of the concavity parameter implies that the 
policy pushes the consumer to switch away from broadcasting altogether rather than switch to 
stations that offer different mix of foreign and domestic content. As the policymaker sets the 
DCR subsequently at higher larger levels, at some point, the indirect effect of decreased 
consumption of constrained stations overcomes both the positive direct effect and positive 
indirect effect of change in consumption of unconstrained stations. This is the point where 
consumption of domestic programs reaches its maximum. Denote this point as 
( ){ }0 ˆ 0Dδ δ δ≡ ∂ ∂ = . Any increase in δ  past this point lowers the consumption of domestic 
programs below its maximum. At such level of DCR, the share of constrained demand in 
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total demand for broadcasting is substantial which makes the impact of the indirect, third 
effect pale in comparison with the indirect, second effect. If the policymaker chooses a DCR 
larger than 0δ (overshooting), the indirect effect of decrease in consumption of constrained 
stations may become so severe that the amount of consumption of domestic programs 
attained under such policy may be no larger than the amount where policy is not in place. We 
denote such point as { }*1 Dˆ Dδ δ≡ = . Any DCR policy setting δ  beyond 1δ  is then totally 
counterproductive in inducing an increase in domestic-program consumption above its 
unconstrained level D*.  
 
4. Numerical analysis  
We use numerical analysis to overcome the analytical intractability of the two second-
order effects in equation (12), to investigate the effect of different parameters on the 
effectiveness of the DCR policy. We consider three hallmark cases of the distribution of 
preferences over stations (parameter ( ( )γ β ): (1) the case where individual preferences over 
genres are uniformly distributed, (2) the case where individuals preferences are skewed 
towards stations with low domestic content (say popular music); and (3) the case where 
individual preferences over genres are concentrated in the middle, which we denote as 
“balanced.” Case (1) is indicative of countries where there is no language barrier to 
consumption of domestic program and people are more “liberal” in terms of accepting 
foreign cultures and traditions. That, for example, could be the case of Far Eastern countries 
or Latin American countries. On the other hand, case (2) is assumed to characterize countries 
with strong language barrier while case (3) can be attributed to countries where people prefer 
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balanced programming, in terms of foreign and domestic contents. Countries that fit the 
second case are former Soviet republics and Canada while EU member-countries and 
Oceania may fit the third case. We choose distribution of function ( )γ β  such that it 
integrates to 1 2  over β  over the unit interval. 
4.1. Uniform distribution of preferences over genres 
We set ( ) 1 2γ β =  for all β  and assume that 0.9λ = . Then, aggregate consumption of 
domestic programming as a function of DCR δ is depicted in Figure 1.1. 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
d
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
D Uniform Distribution of gHbL
D
`
Hs=20L
D
`
Hs=15L
D
`
Hs=10L
D*Hs=20L
D*Hs=15L
D*Hs=10L
 
Figure 1.1: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values of the 
elasticity parameter 
 
As shown in Figure 1.1, under uniformly-distributed preferences, the higher is the 
elasticity of substitution between genres the more effective the DCR policy is to increase the 
domestic-program consumption beyond its unconstrained level (red dashes) . Constrained 
stations become less competitive by offering a less attractive mix of foreign and domestic 
content. A higher elasticity of substitution eases switching towards stations that are not 
restricted by the policy and which offer a more attractive content mix (better “priced”). Since 
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the latter stations also provide relatively higher domestic content ratio, the overall 
consumption of domestic programs increases. Consumption only starts to fall at very large 
policy levels of DCR when the lion’s share of consumption is directed towards leisure.  
By solving for two critical points of interest 0δ  and 1δ  as a function of the elasticity 
of substitution between stations we obtain Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Critical points 0δ  and 1δ  as a function of σ . Note that 0δ  and 1δ  are indicated 
by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
Since critical points ( )0 1,δ δ  are unique, they provide the following intuition. If the 
goal of the policymaker is to achieve the maximum consumption of domestic shows/music 
then the range of the size of the DCR policy that leads to overshooting is wider the larger is 
the elasticity of substitution between genres. Therefore, it may pay to reduce an initially large 
DCR policy as in “cultural” Laffer curve. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 together lead to further policy 
implications. If the goal of a policymaker is to increase consumption of domestic programs 
over unconstrained level then the DCR policy is more likely to succeed in societies where 
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stations are close substitutes. Even if the policy overshoots it still may increase consumption 
above its unconstrained level as the elasticity of substitution gets larger. 
Next, we assume 10σ =  and let λ  the concavity parameter between aggregate 
expenditure and leisure vary. Figure 1.3 shows the consumption of domestic programming as 
a function of the DCR policy. 
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming and DCR for different values 
of the concavity parameter 
 
The concavity parameter regulates the ease of substitution between consumption of 
broadcasting and consumption of leisure. The larger is the concavity parameter the more 
eager is the consumer to switch between broadcasting and leisure. When concavity parameter 
approaches one then broadcasting and leisure become perfect substitutes. Therefore, one may 
deem the concavity parameter as a proxy for the opportunity cost of time consuming 
broadcasting. Figure 1.3 shows that for small concavity parameter values, the consumer 
reshuffles her portfolio away from broadcasting slower than the proportion of domestic 
programming increases. Therefore, consumption of domestic programs is monotonically 
increasing in the DCR conditioned on small values of λ . At higher concavity parameter 
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values, the consumer consumes less of (domestic) broadcasting and as the DCR increases, it 
eventually overshoots as the consumer switches away from radio listening to leisure and the 
effectiveness of the DCR falls. Figure 1.4 shows how critical value 0δ  evolves with changes 
in concavity parameterλ . When the concavity parameter increases, the DCR is more likely to 
overshoot the optimal level of the DCR because 0δ  falls. The intuition remains the same. As 
λ  increases, leisure becomes a better substitute for broadcasting and the consumer is less 
reluctant to tolerate suboptimal mix of domestic and foreign content. Figureically, the higher 
is the concavity parameter the faster the constrained consumption of domestic programs 
curve bends down. Therefore, both, the critical point where the constrained consumption of 
domestic programs is maximized, 0δ , and the point where DCR overshoots the unconstrained 
level, 1δ  (if such point exists), are reached sooner.  
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Figure 1.4: Critical consumption points and concavity parameter. Note that 0δ  is indicated 
by the dashed. Critical values of 1δ  do not exist. 
 
 4.2. Distribution of preferences skewed towards low-domestic-content genres. 
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In this second case the distribution of genres takes a very simple form ( ) 1γ β β= −  . 
We further assume that 0.9λ = . Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate consumption of domestic 
program as a function of the DCR for different values of the elasticity of substitution between 
genres. In contrast to the case of uniform distribution of preferences, the difference between 
constrained and unconstrained consumptions of domestic content is more pronounced. 
Furthermore, the two critical points ( )0 1,δ δ  are reached at smaller values of DCR policies 
under the skewed distribution of genres in comparison to the case with uniform distribution 
of genres. The range of policy for which overshooting still leads to an increase in 
consumption relative to the unconstrained level gets larger as the elasticity of substitution 
increases. This is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values of the 
elasticity parameter. 
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Figure 2.2: Critical consumption points under skewed distribution. Note that 0δ  and 1δ  
are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
In contrast to the case of uniform distribution of preferences over genres, when the 
consumer prefers low-domestic-content genres to high-domestic-content stations, the larger is 
the elasticity of substitution the smaller is the optimumδ . The intuition for this result is the 
following. With skewed distribution at hand the consumer finds low-domestic-content 
stations more attractive than high-domestic-content stations. Skewed distribution of genres 
yields different prices, therefore, the higher elasticity of substitution between genres leads to 
higher desirability of leisure for any given concavity parameter. Therefore, when DCR is 
imposed, the relative lack of desirability of high-domestic-content stations is lessened, yet 
people are more prone to switch to leisure, and the larger is the elasticity of substitution 
between genres the larger is the keenness to do that. This implies that the indirect effect of 
falling consumption of broadcasting is large and overcomes the direct effect of increasing the 
share of domestic programs. In other words, when elasticity of substitution is high then 
people like blockbusters more or can tolerate higher prices caused by suboptimal content. 
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Therefore, the range of content requirement over which policy increases domestic content is 
higher.  
To plot consumption of domestic programs as a function of the concavity parameter 
we fix 10σ = . This is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming as a function of DCR for 
different values of the concavity parameter. 
 
Again, from Figure 2.3 we observe that the higher is the concavity parameter the more 
concave the constrained consumption of domestic programming becomes. As opposed to the 
uniform case, the constrained consumption of domestic programming folds back down and 
for large value of the concavity parameter it falls below the unconstrained level. Further, by 
inspecting Figure 2.3 we notice that the larger is the concavity parameter the smaller are the 
critical points ( )0 1,δ δ , if they exist. This information is summarized in the Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Critical consumption points and concavity parameter. Note that 0δ  and 1δ  are 
indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
4.3.Dome-shaped  distribution of preferences over genres 
In this last case, we assume that distribution of genres is given by 
( ) ( )4 1γ β pi β β= − . We further assume that 0.8λ = . Aggregate consumption of domestic 
programs is shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values of the 
elasticity parameter. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that at small values of DCR the policy has essentially no effect on 
the consumption of domestic programming. Once the level of DCR approaches the 
“balanced” genres preferred by the consumer, constrained consumption starts to pick up. 
This, however, does not last for long since further increases in DCR lead to sharp drop in 
consumption of domestic programs as the policy seriously constrains stations with the 
formerly most attractive content. The policy drives the wedge between the most preferred and 
available bundle of programming wider. Given that consumption of genres on the extreme is 
not desirable the consumer prefers to switch away from broadcasting to leisure.  
Plotting critical points ( )0 1,δ δ  as a function of the elasticity of substitution between 
genres yields Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2: Critical points ( )0 1,δ δ  as a function of σ . Note that 0δ  and 1δ  are indicated 
by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
Both critical points increase in the elasticity of substitution, which means that the 
margin for error is larger for societies characterized by high degree of substitution between 
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genres for increasing consumption of domestic program over unconstrained level and for 
reaching the maximum domestic programs’ consumption. 
Fixing elasticity of substitution at ten we then plot the consumption of domestic 
programs as a function of the concavity parameter. This is shown in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming as a function of DCR for different 
values of the concavity parameter. Note that concavity parameter values are 
(0.1125,0.45,and 0.7875); The lower values shift the plot higher. 
 
Figure 3.3 retains some properties of Figure 3.1 in which the elasticity of substitution 
varied. Namely, at small values of the DCR, the policy has almost no effect. Once the DCR 
reaches the level of the stations most preferred by the consumer, consumption of domestic 
programs increases. For small values of the concavity parameter, domestic-program 
consumption increases steadily while for large concavity parameter it eventually falls down 
once policy goes far past the most-popular “balanced” genres. Figure 3.3 also shows that the 
larger is the concavity parameter the smaller are the critical points ( )0 1,δ δ , if they exist at all. 
We combine this information in the Figure 3.4 
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Figure 3.4: Critical consumption points and concavity parameter. Note that 0δ  and 1δ  are 
indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions and extensions 
We have established that a marginal DCR increment in the neighborhood of an 
initially strictly binding policy increases proportions of domestic content across all markets in 
which firms are constrained. However, by the nature of being constrained, it also increases 
average virtual prices over constrained stations. This leads to a decrease in consumption of 
constrained stations’ output and increase in unconstrained stations output. The increment in 
DCR may lead to an average decline in the consumption of broadcasting services, when 
preferences are such that the consumer tends to substitute leisure for less-desirable 
consumption rather than other stations  because of high opportunity cost of time (better 
leisure opportunities) or large linguistic barriers. This, in turn, may lead to decline in the 
aggregate consumption for domestic programs despite the increase in their relative share of 
total radio listening.  
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Using numerical analysis, we have shown that, for uniform distribution of genre 
preferences, the consumption of domestic programs peaks at large values of DCR when 
leisure alternatives to radio-listening are good. The consumption of domestic program may 
not peak if leisure alternatives are relatively less attractive (low concavity parameter λ). 
Therefore, a policymaker is likely to achieve an objective of increasing consumption of 
domestic programs above the unconstrained level in such situation (uniform taste across 
genres). Finding the maximum level may be an elusive pursuit, however. When consumer 
preferences are skewed toward stations with low-domestic content, then critical values (δ0, 
δ1) are reached at relatively small values of the DCR. In this case it is important that a 
policymaker exercises caution in his choice of DCR level. Finally, when people prefer 
balanced consumption of domestic and foreign content then small values of DCR have 
virtually no effect on consumption of domestic programming. The level of the DCR in the 
neighborhood of the most-preferred “balanced” genres (ranges of β  with the largest density 
of ( )γ β  function) increases consumption of domestic programs. A slight DCR overshooting 
however, leads to fall in consumption of domestic programming below its maximum 
attainable level or even below its unconstrained level.  
The irony of the DCR policy is that it is normally imposed on societies that have 
small unconstrained consumption of domestic programming either due to high language 
barrier or high opportunity cost of time. We have shown that the policy might not work in 
exactly the economies that are characterized by these two factors. Countries that fall into the 
first category are some of the countries of the former USSR (countries that are dominated by 
the Russian language), Canada (there are Canadians that do not speak French), and New 
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Zealand (support of Maori language). The latter might be developed countries where leisure 
opportunities abound, like Australia and European Union. The uniform distribution case is 
more identifiable with Latin-American countries in which demand for both foreign and 
domestic programs is strong without intervention. In fact, there are some countries where 
enforcement of the DCR policy is triggered only when the estimates of the past domestic 
content consumptions falls below certain threshold, and such thresholds have not been 
breached. Our numerical analysis implies that policies in these countries are the most 
effective yet, apparently, government intervention is least required in these very countries. 
For uniform and balanced distributions of preferences for genres, we have shown that 
as the elasticity of the substitution between genres increases and the concavity parameter 
decreases, the range of values increases for which the DCR boosts aggregate consumption of 
domestic programs above its unconstrained level. Similarly, reaching the maximum 
consumption of domestic programming, is more likely to succeed the higher the elasticity of 
substitution between genres and the smaller is the concavity parameter for the cases of 
uniform and balanced distribution of genres. However, for the case of preferences skewed 
toward stations with low-domestic content, reaching the maximum consumption level is 
more likely to succeed for societies with both low elasticity of substitution between genres 
and concavity parameter. 
Our analysis understates the potentially negative effects of a DCR policy as firms do 
not leave the market. When fixed costs of production are high then severely constrained 
stations may be forced out of the market. This will aggravate the counterproductive results of 
DCR policy. A promising extension of our model would be solving the social planner’s 
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problem and finding a tax-cum-subsidy arrangement that replicates the objective of 
increasing consumption of domestic programs under less distortionary instruments. Another 
potential extension would be to consider the effects of the DCR in a general equilibrium 
setup. We have taken the price of advertising as given, however, it is possible to build a 
model where preferences of individuals reflect both the time and income constraint and 
derive price of advertising by modeling explicitly the behavior of advertisers. 
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CHAPTER 3. CULTURAL PROTECTION POLICIES IN TERRESTRIAL 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN GENERALIZED HORIZONTAL PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION FRAMEWORK 
A paper to be submitted to The Journal of Cultural Economics 
Mukhtar Bekkali 
Iowa State University 
Abstract 
Many countries around the world view trade in cultural goods,- terrestrial 
broadcasting, movie industry, cable television - to undermine their national identity as such 
use various tools to protect the national cultural heritage. In this paper we analyze the two 
most widely tools,- direct regulation of the proportion of the domestic programs in the total 
volume of broadcasting and tax-cum-subsidy policies,- policies where government taxes 
stations with low domestic content and uses the proceeds to subsidize high-domestic content 
stations. We find that marginal changes in content requirement increase consumption of the 
domestic content when individuals are sensitive to the provided content. When individuals 
are nearly indifferent then marginal content requirement may have an adverse effect on 
consumption of the domestic content. Further, tax-cum-subsidy polices have negative effect 
on consumption of the domestic content when preferences of individuals of the country 
subject to regulation are highly sensitive to domestic content and have virtually no impact 
when individuals are insensitive to domestic content. Finally, we find that putting a cap on 
proportion of advertising in the total volume of broadcasting always increases consumption 
of domestic programs. 
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1. Introduction 
Regulation of broadcasting industry is a sensitive issue because there exist essentially 
two polar views regarding the role of terrestrial broadcasting,- a commercial view in which 
broadcasting is just an ordinary business activity as such should be left to its own devices24 
and a cultural view in which the key role of broadcasting is to preserve the cultural heritage. 
Proponents of the former, especially the United States, have long argued that all services bear 
some social function, as such, excluding audiovisual services from free trade may jeopardize 
the whole General Agreement on Trade in Services. On the other hand, the proponents of the 
cultural view, especially France, argue that the regulation is necessary to preserve cultural 
identity and cultural diversity as well as to keep open an avenue for expression of opinions by 
all layers of society,- a quintessential element for survival of democracies25. Both camps 
provide valid points, however, precisely because it is impossible to put an objective monetary 
metric on cultural heritage, trade negotiations with respect to the status of cultural goods have 
stalled. In light of the aforementioned we do not attempt to validate the points of each side 
                                                          
24 It appears that the US focus in the WTO has shifted to seeking standstill commitments in audiovisual services, 
i.e. an agreement to keep existing cultural measures without any ability to alter these in the future.  Many 
countries, however, oppose this position and desire to keep their ability to change the level of cultural protection 
depending on the condition of the domestic audiovisual sector. 
25 Canada's former Prime Minister Kim Campbell noted that "For Americans, cultural industries are industries 
like any others. For Canadians, cultural industries are industries that, aside from their economic impact, create 
products that are fundamental to the survival of Canada as a society. The globalization of the world economy 
and communications has been a vehicle for the Americanization of the globe. For Canada and other countries, 
globalization has been a phenomenon within which their distinct, non-American cultures must struggle to 
survive." 
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but rather focus on the analysis of effectiveness of the cultural protection policies on 
preserving the cultural identity26 in the case of terrestrial TV broadcasting.  
The arsenal of tools available to regulators in regulating terrestrial broadcasting is 
quite large and ranges from setting quotas on foreign content, to subsidizing production of 
domestic content to financing public stations broadcasting domestic content by either taxing 
commercial stations directly or through levying license duties. 
The most popular tool used to battle the “invasion” of foreign content is direct 
regulation of the proportion of domestic content as a fraction of total broadcasting, or simply 
a quota on the proportion of the foreign content.  This tool is so common that perhaps only a 
handful of countries, including the United States, have not passed a legislation limiting 
foreign content. For example, Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 adopted by 
the European Union, Chapter III, Article 4.1 says that “Member States shall ensure…that 
broadcasters reserve for European works…a majority proportion of their transmission 
time…”. Similarly, Canadian Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., 1991, c. 11, Article 10.1 says that 
“The Commission [Canadian broadcasting authority] may make regulations respecting the 
proportion of time that shall be devoted to the broadcasting of Canadian programs”. 
Presently, such commission requires that 60% of all programming be of a Canadian origin. In 
the more culturally conservative states, like South Korea, Article 71(1) of Broadcasting Act 
says that “A broadcasting business operator shall program, among the total programs of the 
relevant channel, domestically produced broadcast programs in excess of a specified ratio … 
prescribed by Presidential Decree”. The regulation takes an extreme form on some of the 
                                                          
26 There exist an empirical work on the effect of content protection on welfare by Anderson, Swimmer and Suen 
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countries of the former Soviet Union like Baltic and Central Asian states. For example, in 
Kazakhstan, a country in which the Russian language dominates the official language of the 
state, the Kazakh language, the government requires, by the law of the RK of 23 July 1999, 
#451-1 “About Means of Mass Information”, article 3.2, that “The volume of broadcasting on 
television and radio channels… on the language of the state, in terms of time, exceeds that of 
all other languages combined”.   
The key to the analysis of content protection is the recognition of the fact that 
government content regulation is an attempt to increase the absolute consumption of 
domestic programming (which we use as a proxy for the cultural identity) by imposing a 
relative restriction on production (broadcasting) of its content, where content is a public 
good. In our analysis we use the generalized model of horizontal product differentiation 
developed by Lancaster (1979) in which two stations compete on a single genre (for example, 
news for TV stations) over viewers who are uniformly distributed over their most-preferred 
domestic content ratio. Since by assumption the broadcasting industry is characterized by 
increasing returns to scale technology all individuals are not provided with their most 
preferred domestic content. Therefore, the consumption by individuals depends on the 
magnitude of the mismatch between available and the most-preferable domestic content and 
the degree of sensitivity of preferences to such a mismatch, to which we hereon refer as 
simply sensitivity.  
We show that the success of domestic content protection policies depends on 
consumer preferences and the form of regulation. When preferences are highly sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1997), however, it does not provide a sufficient theoretical framework for analysis of various content protection 
initiatives. 
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domestic programs then a quota on proportion of foreign programs have small positive effect 
on aggregate consumption of domestic content. This situation is typical for countries in 
which the main obstacle for consumption of domestic programs is the language barrier, for 
example, for countries that promote minority languages. When, however, preferences are not 
very sensitive to domestic programs (that is the case of Europe or Australia for example) then 
domestic content protection may have negative effect on aggregate consumption of domestic 
programs.  Moreover, when stations operate under strictly binding regulation of advertising, 
marginal domestic content requirement always raises consumption of domestic programs. 
In addition, many countries have minority language regulation in which governments 
put levies on commercial stations (in our case we assume that commercial stations provide 
low domestic programming content) and use the proceeds to subsidize stations that have a 
smaller audience (for example, a minority) or target a specific market (in our model they 
correspond to high domestic content stations). For example, in New Zealand the government 
taxes all commercial broadcasters and uses the proceeds to subsidize stations broadcasting in 
Maori language.  The results of our analysis indicate that marginal taxes and subsidies have 
very little effect on the consumption of domestic content in societies with low sensitivity of 
preferences to domestic content ratio while substantial undesired effect in societies in which 
sensitivity to domestic content is large. 
Finally, advertising is often subject to regulations27 and represents the main source of 
revenue for commercial terrestrial broadcasters. Even though governments regulate 
                                                          
27 Usually there exists a ceiling on the proportion of advertising, for example, Chapter 4, Article 18 of Council 
Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 of EU says that Article 18 “The amount of advertising shall not exceed 
15 % of the daily transmission time… the amount of spot advertising within a given one-hour period shall not 
exceed 20 %”. 
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advertising to promote the “quality” of broadcasting rather than to increase consumption of 
domestic content, we also consider it effects as an alternative instrument of domestic content 
protection. We show that instituting a marginal restriction of advertising always raises 
consumption of domestic programs, and the larger is the sensitivity of preferences to 
domestic content ratio the smaller is the effect of advertising on consumption of the domestic 
programs. 
This chapter might be viewed as an extension of the first chapter in the sense that it is 
built around the same motivation,- investigating the economics of cultural protectionist 
policies.  However, the key point of departure is that this paper primarily concerns television 
terrestrial broadcasting28 where domestic content requirement takes the form of a minimum 
fraction of domestic programs in the net-of-advertising broadcasting as opposed to radio 
broadcasting where domestic content requirement is often imposed on domestic programs as 
a fraction of advertising-inclusive broadcasting.  For this reason, it is more convenient to 
model it in the generalized horizontal product differentiation framework.  Further, in this 
paper we assume that two stations operate in a single genre and individuals view stations are 
perfect substitutes, whereas in the first essay we have many genres and in the eyes of 
consumers, programming provided by stations have varying degrees of substitutability.  
Lastly, we do an analysis of regulation of advertising and tax-cum-subsidies on the 
consumption of domestic programming. 
                                                          
28 It may apply to radio terrestrial broadcasting of countries where regulation takes the form of a fraction of net 
broadcasting rather than gross broadcasting we have investigated in chapter 1. 
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The limitations of some of our results hinges upon the fact that we use marginal 
content protection policies. Furthermore, we have employed a duopolistic setup.  Changing 
either of these assumptions breaks the symmetry and renders analytical analysis unfeasible. 
 
2. The model 
We assume that the real world has only one genre and two stations compete on this 
genre. Individuals derive utility by either tuning to a particular station or by doing something 
else. Thus, each consumer has preferences given by 
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consumption of the most-preferred programming of domestic content provided by station, l is 
leisure and ε  is a preference parameter greater than one. The additive preference 
specification tells us that programming of different stations are perfect substitutes and that a 
consumer tunes to only one station within his time constraint. We also assume that 
broadcasting technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale29 which automatically 
implies that not all consumers will be provided with their most-preferred content. In order to 
have consumers consume broadcasting that does not match their most-preferred domestic 
content specification we introduce, a la Lancaster (1979), a compensation function ( ),ih v ζ  
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ζ  is some curvature parameter of the compensation function (or what we refer to as 
sensitivity parameter ). This compensation function must satisfy the following properties: 
( ), 1ih v ζ > , ( ), 0iv ih v ζ >  , ( ), 0i iv v ih v ζ > , when 0, 0iv ζ> > , 
( )0, 1h ζ = , ( )0, 0ivh ζ = , ( )0, 0i iv vh ζ > when 0ζ > .  
This set of properties is taken directly from Lancaster’s model. Further we assume 
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29 Given the public nature of broadcasting we observe in the real world that fixed costs represent a lion’s share 
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Each individual spends his entire time endowment on either leisure or watching 
television, therefore, normalizing his time endowment to one the budget constraint can be 
written as ( )
2
1
1i i
i
q a l
=
+ + =∑ , where iq  refers to available programs and ia  to advertising (in 
absolute units, say hours). The fact that we show ( )i iq a+  together reflects the fact that 
stations bundle advertising and real content together and that consumers cannot separate the 
two. 
Therefore, the utility maximization problem of each individual is  
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The fact that advertising does not show up in the utility function reflects our 
assumption that advertising is a nuisance30 and does not provide any utility to individuals. 
Then, by defining 
ib  to be the total consumption of broadcasting of station i  in hours, we can 
rewrite consumer’s problem as  
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Let us define i
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normalized price and normalized demand for broadcasting we can restate the consumer’s 
utility maximization problem as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of costs. 
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This is a standard utility maximization problem that gives us normalized demands ˆib  
as function of normalized price ˆiα  to which causally refer as price of broadcasting. There are 
two sources that negatively affect consumption of broadcasting,- advertising and provision of 
sub-optimal programming in terms of domestic content. Our setup allows us to incorporate 
both of these factors into a single term, ˆiα , our normalized price. This normalized price is a 
relative price that consumer effectively has to pay in order to consume a unit of normalized 
broadcasting rather than leisure. 
By solving this problem we get ˆ
i ib
εα −=  where ε  is the elasticity of broadcasting 
demand with respect to normalized price. In the analysis of the equilibrium and its properties 
we have a situation where the existence of the equilibrium depends on the properties of the 
elasticity of demand ε .  
Given that terrestrial broadcasting is a public good, advertising is the sole source of 
revenue for commercial broadcasters and the larger is the audience the higher is the price they 
are able to charge to advertisers. In our model the size of audience depends on proportion of 
advertising and proportion of domestic programming in the total volume of programming. 
We assume that individuals are distributed uniformly over their most-preferred domestic 
content ratio on the unit interval. Let us denote ( )ip B , ( ) 0iB ip B ≥
31, the price of advertising 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30 Tirole (1997) gives a summary of arguments why advertising can be considered a nuisance. 
31 Hereafter we denote partial derivatives as superscripts. 
49  
per unit of time32, in monetary units, where ( )
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 is the aggregate consumption of 
broadcasting of station i  over its market: ( ),i iδ δ

 refers lower and upper boundary of the 
market of station i . Then, by assuming that stations have only fixed costs ic
33, the stations’ 
problem can be stated as follows: 
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where 
it  refers to tax or subsidy given to station i
34.  
The profit is a product of the (i) sum of price of advertising and tax/subsidy and (ii) 
the total amount of advertising during the time period35, 
iα , where we set the time constraint 
of each station equal to that of individual, or 1,- this makes the total amount of advertising 
and the fraction of advertising during the time period coincide. It is convenient to work with 
increasing monotonic transformation of proportion of advertising, ( ) 11i iα α
−
≡ −  where 
( )1,iα ∈ ∞  rather than the proportion of advertising. Then, the normalized price can be stated 
as a product of advertising and monotonic transformation of compensation function, 
ˆ
i i ihα α= . Assuming that ( )i ip B Bβ≡  is a constant elasticity function, 0β > , stations’ 
objective function can be restated as 
                                                          
32 There exist an argument which says that price should be concave in aggregate demand partially because the 
more consumers watch television or listen to radio the less time, presumably, they spend working, as such, the 
less income they have, therefore, the less they worth to advertisers. A more precise relationship between price of 
advertising and aggregate demand can be derived by explicitly modeling advertisers, however, curvature of the 
price function does not bear on the results. 
33 It can be argued that fixed costs represent the lion’s share of costs faced by broadcasters as such the 
broadcasting industry is characterized by the increasing returns to scale technologies. Therefore, we assume that 
stations have strictly positive fixed costs yet small enough not to give rise to discontinuities of the best reply 
functions. 
34 Please note that in our model small ad valorem taxes and subsidies have not effect. 
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To have a symmetric and tractable solution we concentrate on a duopoly case.  We 
assume, as it often observed in the real world, that the government regulates entry into 
broadcasting market by issuing a limited number of licenses. This could allow stations to 
make positive profits in equilibrium. Without loss of generality we assume that station 1 
locates to the left of station 2 on the unit domestic content ratio interval. Given uniform 
distribution of consumers we can rewrite the aggregate demand for broadcasting as 
( ) ( )
0 0
i iu u
iB b v dv b v dv≡ +∫ ∫  where i iu δ≡ ∆ − , i iu δ≡ − ∆  are the distances to the lower and 
upper boundaries of market i , 1,2i = .   
Lemma 1: When 1 2u u=  then (a) 1u  is linearly increasing in 1∆  at the rate of one 
and is independent of ( )2 1 2, ,α α∆ , (b) 1u  is linearly decreasing in 1∆ and linearly increasing 
in 2∆  at the rates of one-half, and is decreasing and convex in 1α  and is increasing in 2α , 
(c) 2u is linearly decreasing in 1∆ and linearly increasing in 2∆  at the rates of one-half, and 
is increasing in 1α  and is decreasing and convex in 2α , (d) 2u  is linearly decreasing in 1∆  
at the rate of one and is independent of ( )1 1 2, ,α α∆ . Further, 
2 2
1 2
1 2 2 1
0
u u
α α α α
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 and 
( )2 1 2
20 0 0
1 1
1
lim 0 lim lim 0
r d d
d dζ ζ ζ
ε α α
η ψ→ → →
− +
− = ⇒ = =
∆ ∆
. 
Proof: See Appendix 1■ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
35 We assume that stations broadcast all the time and listeners randomly tune in during that time. 
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Our assumption of quasi-linear preferences allows us to write aggregate broadcasting 
demand as i i iB H
εα −= , where ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
, ,
i iu u
i iH u u h v dv h v dv
ε εζ − −≡ +∫ ∫  can be viewed as a proxy 
for aggregate satisfaction; small (large) 
iH  be the case where consumers, on average, are not 
very satisfied (very satisfied) with provided domestic content ratio.  
Substituting for explicit expression of aggregate demands into profit function the 
objective function of each station is given by  
 ( )( )
,
1
max 1 ,s.t. 0, 1,2
i i
i i i i i i
i
p H t c iε
α
pi α pi
α
−
∆
 
= + − − ≥ = 
 
 (22). 
The first order-conditions for an interior solution are given by: 
 
1
1 0, 1,2i ii i i
i
p H iεpi α
α
∆ ∆− ′= − = = 
 
 (23), 
 ( )( )2 1 1 0, 1,2i i ii i i
i i
p t
i
p
αpi β α ε η
α
 
= − − + + = = 
 
 (24), 
where 0
i
i i
i
i
H
H
αα
η ≡ − ≥ 36 is the elasticity of aggregate satisfaction with respect to advertising.  
Taking derivative of 
iH  with respect to i∆  yields ( ) ( )i i ii i i
i i
u u
H h u h u
ε ε− −∆ ∂ ∂= +
∂∆ ∂∆
, which for 
firm 1 reduces to ( ) ( )11 1 1
1
2
H h u h u
ε ε− −∆ = −  and for firm 2 to ( ) ( )22 2 2
1
2
H h u h u
ε ε− −∆ = − 37.  By 
solving simultaneously the set of first-order conditions (23) and (24) we find a Nash 
equilibrium ( )1 2 1 2, , ,α α∆ ∆ .   
                                                          
36 Properties of aggregate satisfaction function and its elasticity are given in Appendix 2. 
37 Derivation of properties of market boundaries are given in Appendix 1. 
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Lemma 2: In symmetric equilibrium the aggregate compensation function has the 
following derivative properties: 1 21 2 0H H
∆ ∆= = , 1 1 2 21 2 0H H
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆= ≤ , 2 1 11 2 2H H h
ε∆ ∆ − −= − = , 
( )1 2 1 2 111 2 2 1 2H H H H h hα α α α ε α
−− ′= = − = − = − , 1 2 2 2 1 11 2 4H H h h
εε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ − − − ′= = , 
( )( )1 1 2 2 11 21 2 2 4H H h hα α α α ε ε α
−− − ′= = − − , ( )( )1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 1 2 2 1 4H H H H h rα α α α ε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ −− = = − = = − + . 
Proof: See Appendix 2■ 
Given that equilibrium advertising levels are the same, each station maximizes 
aggregate satisfaction of its market. In the neighborhood of equilibrium aggregate 
compensation function is decreasing in own advertising level at the increasing rate and 
increasing in the advertising level of the competitor. Other properties of compensation 
function are not so obvious however are extensively used in the analysis that follows. 
Since both firms have identical costs structure then the equilibrium is symmetric. In 
such an equilibrium an indifferent consumer is located in the middle of the unit line. We 
focus on the first-order conditions of the first firm. In symmetric equilibrium results for the 
second firm are identical.  
The first-order conditions of the first firm can be restated as 
( ) ( )1 11 2 1 2 0h h
ε ε− −
∆ − − ∆ = . It is more convenient to work with the degree of content 
differentiation 2 1m ≡ ∆ − ∆ . We can write the first-order condition as ( ) 12m εξ =  where 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2m h m h mξ ≡ − . By inspecting this equation we observe that 0 1 2m≤ ≤  so that 
each station positions itself closer to the middle of the unit interval. Intuitively, consumers in 
the interior markets have a choice between tuning to station 1 or station 2. Consumers on the 
corner markets however have the ability to switch only to leisure. Therefore, consumers in 
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the interior markets are more picky that those in the corner market. In this situation firms find 
it beneficial to cater the needs of the former group by locating closer to the middle of the 
market. 
Lemma 3: ( )mξ  is decreasing and convex in m  with ( ) ( )
0
lim 1 2
m
m hξ
→
= , and 
( )
1 2
lim 1
m
mξ
→
=  . 
Proof: See Appendix 3■ 
To show that the equilibrium exists we need to show that for any pair of parameters 
( ),ζ ε  there exist m  that satisfies equation ( ) 12m εξ = . Since ( )mξ  is decreasing in m  until 
( )mξ  reaches its minimum at 1 while ( )12 1,2ε ∈  because ( )2,ε ∈ ∞ , the sufficient and 
necessary condition for the symmetric equilibrium to exist is to have ( ) 11 2 2h ε≥ . Given the 
set of parameters ( ),ζ ε  this condition can easily be satisfied. Further, by virtue of the fact 
that ( )mξ  is monotonic in m  the symmetric equilibrium is unique.   
  
Figure 1: Equilibrium in location where ζ ζ′ ′′< . 
 
( ),mξ ζ ′′  
( ),mξ ζ ′
 
m
 
● ● 
1 
12 ε  
 
54  
 ½ 
 
1∆
 
2∆
 
0 
 
1α  
 
1 2  1 4  3 4  1 
2α  
 
Having solved for the equilibrium locations we solve for equilibrium advertising 
levels. In the symmetric case firms choose different locations on the domestic content unit 
interval because choosing the same location reduces this game into a Bertrand game with 
increasing returns to scale technologies, where advertising levels plays the role of prices, and 
such a game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies38.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Symmetric equilibrium of the game. 
 
In Figure 2 we show the effective price paid by individuals whose most-preferred 
content coincides with the available content. The height of the leg corresponds to the 
advertising rate (or mill price as described in Hoteling model of product differentiation) while 
the U-shaped curve corresponds to convex compensation function. The indifferent consumer 
locates at the intersection of such U-shaped curves, which in symmetric setup is equal to 1 2 .  
Lemma 4: The elasticity of aggregate satisfaction with respect to advertising is 
increasing in its own advertising level, decreasing in the advertising level of the 
competitor.  Moreover, it increases when own domestic content ratio and decreases when 
competitor’s domestic content ratio approach the middle of the market. 
Proof: See Appendix 4■ 
                                                          
38 The equilibrium may have a mixed strategy equilibrium (Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)). 
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Intuitively, as the own price increases then listeners that belong to the own market 
become more sensitive to advertising and are more prone to switch to competitor. However, 
when the competitor increases its advertising then the own market grows more attached to the 
own station therefore elasticity of aggregate satisfaction falls. Further, when own location 
shifts towards the competitor, the average satisfaction of the own audience falls, therefore, 
consumers become more sensitivity to advertising. Hence, elasticity of aggregate satisfaction 
with respect to advertising increases. The exact opposite happens when the competitor moves 
towards the middle of the market in an attempt to capture more consumers. 
Derivatives of the first-order conditions with respect to endogenous variables form a 
stability matrix of the system, S  given by 
 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
S
α α
α α
α α α α α α
α α α α α α
pi pi pi pi
pi pi pi pi
pi pi pi pi
pi pi pi pi
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
∆ ∆
 
 
 ≡
 
 
  
 (25). 
Lemma 5: The Stability matrix has negative trace and positive determinant. 
Proof: See Appendix 5■ 
The system is stable if eigenroots of stability matrix have negative real parts. A 
sufficient condition for this are negative trace and positive determinant which is true by 
lemma 539.   
For the second-order conditions we need 0i iipi
∆ ∆ ≤ , 0i ii
α αpi ≤ , which are shown to be 
true in Appendix 4, and the determinant of Hessian, ( )2 0i i i i i ii i iα α αpi pi pi∆ ∆ ∆− ≥ . Evaluating the 
latter at equilibrium we have 
                                                          
39 See Dixit (1986) for detailed discussion of stability conditions. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
2 2 11
1 2 2 1
1
i i i i i i c c
i i i
h h
h h r
α α α ε η β ε ηpi pi pi ε ε η
ε η
∆ ∆ ∆
 + + + ′   − ∝ + + + −       ′ − +     
 (26). 
Generally, the sign of determinant is ambiguous. For infinitely large sensitivity to 
domestic content, ζ →∞ , we have ( )lim , 1r v
ζ
ζ
→∞
= , by assumption, therefore, the determinant 
of Hessian is positive. On the other hand, when individuals exhibit low sensitivity to 
domestic content ratio then the answer depends on the interaction between ζ  andε . 
Assuming that elasticity of demand parameter, ε , dominates derivative functions of 
compensation function that are driven by the sensitivity parameter,ζ , equation (26) is 
positive. Therefore, the second-order conditions hold. 
The system has three exogenous parameters, (i) sensitivity parameterζ , (ii) elasticity 
of demandε , and (iii) elasticity of price of advertising with respect to audience’s size β . 
Comparative statics can then be summarized in the following lemmas. 
Lemma 6. In symmetric equilibrium content differentiation and advertising levels 
increase with ζ . Further, (i) ( )2 1lim 1 2ζ→∞ ∆ −∆ = and ( )
1
1 2lim lim 1ζ ζα α βε
−
→∞ →∞
= = +  and (ii) 
( )2 10lim 0ζ→ ∆ −∆ =  and 1 20 0lim lim 1ζ ζα α→ →= = . 
Proof. See Appendix 6■ 
In equilibrium the firm finds a location where it balances the average compensation 
that needs to be provided to individuals located in the corner market against average 
compensation for individuals located in the interior market while also taking into account the 
ability of consumer(s) located on the boundary between station 1 and 2 to switch between 
firms. When sensitivity to content rises, the compensation to individuals located in the corner 
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market increases faster than compensation that needs to be given to individuals located in the 
interior of the market. This happens because the compensation function is convex.  
Therefore, firm moves towards the corner of the market to equalize the value of average 
compensation between its two markets. In the limit as ζ →∞ , compensation that needs to be 
given to the indifferent consumer explodes to infinity and since no such compensation exists 
consumption by the indifferent consumer drops to zero. In this case each firm positions itself 
in the middle of its market. In the polar case where 0ζ → , consumption of individuals 
becomes independent of the distance between the available and the most-preferred domestic 
content, therefore, competition between stations in terms of locations reduces to capturing the 
indifferent consumer. Since such consumer locates in the middle of unit interval both stations 
locates as close to the middle of interval as possible40. 
Recall that the price facing a consumer is a product of the advertising and the degree 
of  mismatch between available and the most-preferred domestic content.  The latter is 
expressed in terms of the compensation function.  Therefore, increase in ζ  puts more weight 
on compensation function component of the actual price paid by consumer than on 
advertising, giving stations ability to raise prices. When ζ  falls to zero the content 
differentiation vanishes and the game converges to “cutthroat” competition in advertising41. 
On the other hand, when ζ →∞  we have H  becoming arbitrarily small, say 0H , and 
                                                          
40 In the analysis that follows we use an assumption that both stations choose to locate arbitrarily close the 
middle of the interval. As stated before, to have an equilibrium in the case where preferences are insensitive 
requires an arbitrary large value of elasticity of demand, however, it is shown in lemma 7 that rising elasticity 
forces firms to move away from each other. The final result is determined by the interplay of these two 
parameters and specific form of compensation function. 
41 Since fixed costs are strictly positive then advertising level are strictly greater than one. However, for the easy 
of analysis we assume that fixed costs are small enough as to allow us to approximate the advertising levels to be 
unity. 
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essentially irresponsive to changes in advertising. In this case the problem converges to 
( )( )10max 1
i
i i ip H
ε
α
pi α α− −≡ −  s.t. 0ipi ≥ and the solution converges to
1 11α β ε− −= + . 
Lemma 7. In symmetric equilibrium content differentiation, m ,  rises with ε  while 
its effects on advertising are ambiguous. 
Proof. See Appendix 7■ 
As broadcasting demand becomes more elastic, individuals become more sensitive to 
the effective price they face, or become more selective in their consumption, therefore, firms 
move towards the middle of their respective markets to balance compensation that needs to 
be provide to individuals in the corner market against compensation for individuals located in 
the interior market. The effect of elasticity of demand on equilibrium advertising levels can 
not be asserted with a general form of compensation function. However, we expects that rise 
of elasticity triggers a fall of advertising levels because individuals become sensitive to 
broadcasting and more prone to switch to leisure. 
Lemma 8. In symmetric equilibrium, content differentiation, m ,  is independent of 
β . Advertising levels fall in β . 
Proof. See Appendix 8■ 
The intuition for lemma 8 is straightforward,- in symmetric equilibrium firms choose 
the same advertising levels therefore the indifferent consumer always locates in the middle of 
the interval.  Therefore, the size of the market of each station for any value of parameter β  is 
the same, - one half.  In other words, the equilibrium content differentiation is independent of 
β . However, advertising levels do depend on parameter β .  Recall that advertising enters 
firm’s profit function in two ways, (a) directly and (b) indirectly through broadcasting pricing 
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function where broadcasting demand is a function of advertising itself. Parameter 
β essentially plays the role of an amplifier or dampener of the effects of advertising on 
aggregate broadcasting demand. When 1β >  then negative effects of advertising on aggregate 
broadcasting are further amplified by the pricing function, thus, firms have smaller ability to 
“charge” consumers high advertising rates . In the opposite case, when 1β < , the negative 
effects that advertising has on aggregate broadcasting are debilitated which gives firms ability 
to bundle higher advertising proportions in their broadcastings. 
 
3. Policies of the domestic content protection 
We assume that the rationale behind government imposing a content restriction is to 
increase the aggregate consumption of domestic programs. The two most popular instruments 
are minimum quota on the proportion of domestic content (or domestic content requirement) 
and tax-cum-subsidy policies. Often however minimum quotas on domestic content go hand 
in hand with quota on the proportion of advertising, therefore, we also analyze the effects of 
regulation of advertising on consumption of domestic programs even though, we believe that 
governments do not intentionally use such regulations it as to stimulate consumption of 
thereof.  
3.1. Domestic content requirement on the proportion of domestic content  
The central question of this section is the effect marginal domestic content restriction 
has on consumption of the domestic content. Given that station 1 is the one with the low 
domestic content we assume that policy maker imposes a just-binding domestic content 
restriction of 1δ = ∆ , therefore, infinitesimal changes in δ  are equivalent to infinitesimal 
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changes in 1∆ . Imposing marginal content requirement allows us to rip the benefits of the 
symmetric setup without sacrificing the essence of impact the domestic content requirement 
has on consumption of domestic programming.  
The aggregate consumption of the domestic content is given by ( )
2 2
1 1
j j j j
j j
D B α
= =
= ∆∑ ∑ . 
By inspecting this expression we expect to see that changes in domestic content requirement 
have a direct effect on the aggregate consumption of the domestic programs and indirect 
effect though best-responses of the remaining variables of the system of equations (23) and 
(24). By differentiating aggregate consumption of domestic content with respect to 1∆ we can 
write the proportional change in aggregate consumption of domestic programs as follows 
 
2 22
21
1 11 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1
j j j j j j j ji i
j
j ij j j j i i
j j
j
j
j j
B B B B
D
B
D
α α
α α α α
α
= ==
= =
 ∂∆ ∆ ∂ ∆ ∂ ∂   ∂∆ ∂
− + +∂ ∂∆      ∂∆ ∂∆ ∂∆ ∂∆ ∂ ∂∆    =
 ∆
  
 
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
 (27). 
By imposing symmetry,- 1 21 2 0B B
α α= ≤ , 2 11 2 0B B
α α= ≥ , 2 11 2 0B B
∆ ∆= − ≥ ,- invoking the 
first-order conditions and noting that 1 2 1∆ + ∆ = , (27) is written as  
 
( ) ( )
2
1 2
2
1
1 2
2
1
1
2 2
1 1
1
1 1
j
j
j
j
D
D
α α
ω χ ω
χ η ε η χ η ε η
=
∆
=
 
∂ ∂∆ 
  ∆  = − + +  
∆  
    ∆ ∆
+ − + + + + − + + +    ∆ ∆    
∑
∑  (28), 
where we denote best-response elasticities of endogenous variables as 
2
1 2
2 1
χ∆
∆ ∂∆
≡
∆ ∂∆
, 
1
1 1
1 1
α
α
χ
α
∆ ∂
≡
∂∆
, and 
2
1 2
2 1
α
α
χ
α
∆ ∂
≡
∂∆
. Parameter ( )22 1 1 0,1 2B Bω ∆≡ ∆ ∈  refers to elasticity of 
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aggregate demand of station i  with respect to location of station j , i j≠ , 0 1ω≤ < .  We refer 
to the first term of equation (28) as the “location effect”, ∆Σ , and to the second term as the 
“advertising effect”, αΣ .  
To obtain ( )
2 1 2
, ,α αχ χ χ∆  we totally differentiate the set of first order conditions and 
evaluate the result at equilibrium. Therefore, we have: 
( )
( )
5 2 3 42
1 5 1 3 4
d
d
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
− +∆
= −
∆ + +
, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )
5 5 2 5 3 4 1 3 5 41
1 5 1 3 4 3 4
2 1 1d
d
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λα
λ λ λ λ λ λ
+ − + + + + +
= −
∆ + + −
, and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )
5 5 1 5 3 4 2 3 5 42
1 5 1 3 4 3 4
2 1 1d
d
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λα
λ λ λ λ λ λ
+ + + + − + +
= −
∆ + + −
, where jλ , 1,2,3,4,5j = , are defined 
in Appendix 4. 
In the analysis below we consider two polar cases, (i) the case where individuals have 
high sensitivity to domestic content ratio, ζ →∞ , and (ii) the case where individuals are 
nearly insensitive to domestic content ratio, 0ζ → .  
When preferences are sensitive to domestic content then we have 1lim 1 4ζ →∞∆ = , as 
shown in Lemma 6. Therefore, using the fact that in symmetric equilibrium the indifferent 
consumer locates in the middle of the domestic content ratio unit interval we 
have
( )
( )
1
1
1 2 ,
lim 0
1 2 ,v
h
hζ
ζ
ζ→∞
 − ∆
=  − ∆ 
, 
( )
( )
1
1 1
1 2 ,
lim 0
2 ,1 2 ,
h
H
ε
ζ
ζ
ζ
−
→∞
 − ∆
  =
 ∆ − ∆ 
, hence, ( )1 1lim ,1 2 , 0ζ η ζ→∞ ∆ − ∆ = . 
Intuitively, ζ →∞  implies that the importance of the provided content in the choice of 
consumption of individuals is very high relative to importance of advertising, therefore, the 
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aggregate satisfaction, H , becomes insensitive to changes in advertising yet highly sensitive 
to changes in location.   
In the opposite case where consumers are insensitive to domestic content ratio we 
have locations of each firm converging towards the indifferent consumer located in the 
middle of the unit interval, or 1
0
lim 1 2
ζ →
∆ = . Therefore, 
( )
( )
1
0
1
1 2 ,
lim
1 2 ,v
h
hζ
ζ
ζ→
 − ∆
= ∞  − ∆ 
 and 
( )
( )
1
0
1 1
1 2 ,
lim 1
2 ,1 2 ,
h
H
ε
ζ
ζ
ζ
−
→
 − ∆
  =
 ∆ − ∆ 
 imply that ( )1 1
0
lim ,1 2 ,
ζ
η ζ
→
∆ − ∆ = ∞ . The intuition for this result is 
the following,- once domestic content ratio is irrelevant the only factor capable of affecting 
broadcasting demand (and the level of satisfaction with domestic content) is advertising. 
Essentially, as sensitivity to content drops to zero stations become perfect substitutes (in 
terms of domestic content ratio), as such, the game converges to a Bertrand game where 
advertising levels play the role of prices. Undercutting competitor in advertising level means 
gaining the whole market, thus, infinitesimal changes in the level of advertising bring about 
all-or-nothing levels of satisfaction provided by station which undertakes the change. 
Lemma 9.  In symmetric equilibrium the effect of quota on foreign content on the 
location of firm with high domestic content depends on the compensation function. When 
compensation function is very sensitive to domestic content ratio, ζ →∞ , the elasticity of 
best-response function of location of station with high domestic content ratio, 
2
χ∆ , 
approaches 1 9 . When compensation function is insensitive to domestic content ratio, 
0ζ → , the elasticity of best-response function of location of station with high domestic 
content ratio approaches 1− .  
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Further, the elasticity of advertising with respect to domestic content requirement 
of a firm with low domestic programming content is generally ambiguous; the elasticity of 
a firm with high domestic content is negative. In the limiting cases where preferences are 
either extremely sensitive to domestic content or totally insensitive to domestic content both 
elasticities of advertising approach zero. Moreover, the absolute value of elasticity of 
advertising with respect to the quota of a firm with high domestic content is always larger 
than the absolute value of the elasticity with respect to the quota of the firm with low 
domestic content. 
Proof. See Appendix 9■ 
The intuition for the above result is as follows,- for any given advertising level the 
optimal domestic content differentiation is the one that maximizesH . It can be shown that 
such differentiation requires 1 1 4∆ = and 2 3 4∆ = . Since content protection policy reduces 
the distance between two stations on the domestic content ratio scale then an average price 
faced by individuals raises (or H  falls), therefore, stations need to compensate individuals 
for such an increase of price. The only way to do that is to lower the average level of 
advertising for the market. 
The response of the station with high domestic content ratio to increase in content 
ratio of station with low domestic content ratio is composed of two effects,- firstly, when 
station 2 moves away from station 1 it loses an indifferent consumer, however, without this 
consumer station 2 no longer optimizes its location since the average compensation to the 
right of its location is larger than the average compensation to the left of its location, 
therefore, by moving towards individuals located to the right it equalizes the average 
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compensation. Secondly, by decreasing its advertising level, firm 2 may capture back the 
indifferent consumer and therefore reduce or eliminate altogether the need to adjust its 
location. Mathematically, ( )
2 2 1
1 2
2 1
α α
λα
χ χ χ
λ α∆
∆ 
= + − ∆  
.  ( )( )
2 1 5 1 2 3 4
0α αχ χ λ λ λ λ λ− ∝ − + − ≤ , 
therefore, the sign of 
2
χ∆  is determined by the interaction of the two terms in the square 
brackets. When 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
0 , ,
2
u d h u h u h u h u
ε εε α α
− −−  ∆ ↑⇒ ↓ ∆ = ⇒ ↓⇒ ↑⇒ ∆ − ∆ ↑ 
 
. In the 
equilibrium the last expression is given by ( )( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
, ,
2 2
h u h u
ε
ε
α α
−
−  ∆ − − ∆     
. Since 
this expression comes from unconstrained profit maximization of station 2, station 2 changes 
its location and advertising levels as to rebalance this equation. First of all, for a given 
advertising level, the only way to rebalance it is to shift 2∆  up. Alternatively, for fixed 2∆  
station 2 may rebalance this equation by lowering its advertising level (
2 1
0α αχ χ− ≤  implies 
that response of station 1 to capture back the indifferent consumer by lowering its advertising 
level is smaller than the response of station 2) which leads to recapture of the indifferent 
consumer and return of status quo to the first-order condition with respect to location. There 
two effects move in opposite direction and that is what makes the sign of 2 1∂∆ ∂∆  
ambiguous.  
With the rise of sensitivity, the importance of the indifferent consumer in relation to 
the density of consumers who belong to station’s 2 market falls, therefore, we observe that 
the elasticity approaches 1 9 . On the other hand, when sensitivity of preferences to domestic 
content is very small then competition becomes all about the indifferent consumer. In this 
65  
case a movement by station 1 towards the indifferent consumer makes such a consumer 
switch to station 1, therefore, to prevent this from happening station 2 moves towards station 
1 by the exactly the same amount. For all intermediate values of ζ  the sign of elasticity of 
location is generally ambiguous. In the simulation section it is shown that the effect is 
negative for small values of ζ  and raises with the rise ofζ .  
Lemma 10. The sign of location effect depends on the sensitivity of preferences to 
domestic content ratio. When preferences are highly sensitive to content then the location 
effect converges to 4 3 , when preferences are insensitive to content the location effect 
converges to 1− . 
Proof. See Appendix 10■ 
The location effect can be decomposed into a direct effect, which is proportional to 1, 
and indirect effect, which is proportional to ( )
2 2 1
1ω χ∆− + + ∆ ∆ . With uniform preferences 
and perfect substitutability of normalized broadcasting demands the interaction between 
stations goes through indifferent consumer and advertising. When preferences are highly 
sensitive to domestic content ratio then the value of the indifferent consumer becomes 
negligible since his/her consumption is virtually zero, therefore, the indirect effect becomes 
small. This is what is reflected in both ω  and 
2
χ∆  being small. Therefore, the positive direct 
effect is the dominating one, as such, the location effect is positive. On the contrary, when 
preferences are insensitive to domestic content then the competition becomes all about the 
indifferent consumer. In this case the absolute value of the impact of location on indifferent 
consumer becomes very large which makes location effect negative. Intuitively, if policy 
forces station 1 to move its location closer to the indifferent consumer then the only way for 
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station 2 to keep such a consumer indifferent is to move towards him by the exactly the same 
amount.  
Lemma 11. The sign of the advertising effect is positive. When preferences are 
either highly sensitive to domestic content ratio or insensitive to domestic content ratio 
then the effect vanishes. 
Proof. See Appendix 11■ 
Since content protection policy reduces domestic content differentiation further away 
from the optimal content differentiation, consumers demand higher compensation. The only 
way for firms to compensate consumers is to lower their advertising levels. Lower advertising 
raises the aggregate broadcasting demand, therefore, the fraction of the demand that 
corresponds to domestic programs. When sensitivity of preference is large then advertising 
has little effect because H  essentially becomes independent of advertising. When sensitivity 
to domestic content is extremely small then location does not matter anymore since 
consumers are willing to buy from any station that charges lower advertising rates. Then, 
advertising levels become insensitive to location and the advertising effect converges to zero.  
When preferences are infinitely sensitive to domestic content ratio then, from 
advertising point of view, the markets of station 1 and 2 become independent of each other. 
In such case any change in location has no impact on optimal choice of advertising. However, 
when preferences are insensitive to content then the overall effect of content depends on the 
interplay of two factors,- (i) low sensitivity to content forces stations to locate as close as 
possible. Locating as close as possible converges the game into a Bertrand game in prices and 
intensifies competition in advertising.  Thus, advertising becomes extremely sensitive to 
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content. On the other hand, (ii) when stations locate right next to the indifferent consumer 
then location stops playing any role in the choice of advertising, therefore, advertising 
becomes independent of location. These two effects move in opposite directions and it has 
been shown that in the limit the second effect dominates the first effect.  
The sum of location and advertising effects gives total effect. Therefore, the effect of 
minimum quota on the proportion of domestic content can be summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1. The effect of marginal content protection policies on consumption 
of domestic programs depend on the sensitivity of preferences to domestic content ratio. 
When sensitivity is large then policy has a positive effect on the consumption of 
domestic programs. Further, when sensitivity is low then the policy has an adverse 
effect on the consumption of domestic programs. For intermediate values of sensitivity 
to content the effect is ambiguous. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows directly from lemmas 10 and 11■ 
When sensitivity to content is extreme then the equilibrium converges to the case 
where markets of each stations are essentially independent of each other, therefore, the effect 
of domestic content requirement of station 2 is zero.  Further, since the weight of advertising 
in the price faced by consumer is virtually nil as opposed to the weight of loss due to 
mismatch of specification, the effect of content requirement on advertising is zero as well. 
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Hence, the overall effect of content requirement is equivalent to the direct effect of content 
requirement which is always positive42.  
On the contrary, when consumers are basically indifferent to domestic content then 
competition between stations boils down to capturing the indifferent consumer. In this case 
firm 2 changes its location as to exactly offset any changes in location by station 1. Further, 
since the location and advertising choices become independent of each other, the advertising 
effect converges to zero. In this case, the overall effect of content protection policies leads to 
the reduction in consumption of aggregate domestic programs.  
This bears direct link to the content protection policies of some of the European and 
former Soviet Union countries,- marginal content protection policies in countries where 
population considers low domestic content not to be an issue, such as some western European 
countries, domestic content requirement reduces product differentiation in the broadcasting 
market and reduce the overall satisfaction with broadcasting programming. For marginal 
changes in domestic content requirement this translates into lower consumption of the 
domestic programs. On the other hand, in countries with significant language barrier marginal 
content protection policies essentially becomes ineffective since individuals whose 
preferences slightly differ from available content consume virtually no broadcasting, as such, 
policy has an impact only on individuals with most-preferred domestic content ratio in the 
vicinity of available content. Since the density of such consumers is very small then the effect 
of domestic content requirement is negligible.  In the elasticity terms, however, the effect of 
such policies is positive, i.e. an infinitesimal change in consumption of the domestic 
                                                          
42 The absolute value of the change in the consumption of domestic programs is zero because the only consumer 
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programs is large if one is to weigh it against an equally infinitesimal original consumption of 
domestic programs.  Summarizing, if individuals consume very little of broadcasting demand 
due to high sensitivity to domestic content ratio then imposing a content requirement 
certainly increases consumption of domestic content but by very small amount that such 
policy may not worth the effort. On the other hand, when individuals’ consumption of 
broadcasting is sizable because such individuals are nearly insensitive to the ratio of domestic 
programs in the total volume of broadcasting then content protection policy may have a 
significant counterproductive effect on the aggregate consumption of domestic programs. 
One important aspect of the above analysis is the absence of exit strategies. If one is 
to assume that one station has a certain cost advantage over the other station then content 
restriction may lead to negative profits by less efficient station and subsequent exit from the 
market. In this situation the overall domestic content falls dramatically because the survivor 
positions itself at either the middle of market or content restriction limit, whichever is greater. 
This leads to increase in the aggregate compensation which is equivalent to a drop in 
broadcasting demand, thus, a drop in the consumption of the domestic content. This effect is 
further amplified by the increase in advertising levels due to monopolistic position of the 
station and further fall in the broadcasting demand.  
3.2. The effect of subsidies and taxes on consumption of domestic programming 
An alternative vehicle used by governments around the world to resist the offensive of 
foreign programs into domestic market is to employ tax-cum-subsidy policies in which 
stations with low domestic content are taxed and proceeds are distributed to high domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that matters for each station is the one whose most-preferred content coincides with the available content. Such 
consumer, however, has zero mass as such the aggregate demand is essentially non-existent. 
70  
content stations. This regulation often takes the form where (i) commercial stations (often 
low domestic content stations) pay the fraction of their license fees to a special fund which 
supports public stations (often high domestic content stations) or (ii) where government 
imposes a direct tax on the price of advertising of commercial and redistributed the proceeds 
to high domestic content stations. The former corresponds to increases in fixed costs while 
the latter corresponds to increases in the price of advertising. In this paper we focus on the 
latter because in our model costs have no impact on decisions of stations with respect to 
either location or advertising.  
Often in the real world stations that get subsidized are public stations rather than 
commercial stations.  Commercial advertising for these stations is not the main source of 
financing.  We, however, can still fit them inside the framework of our model by thinking 
about the time spent thanking sponsors and contributors as a proxy for advertising. 
We assume that stations and the government operate in a general equilibrium 
framework in the sense that all tax/license proceeds collected from the low domestic content 
ratio station are distributed to the high domestic content ratio station. In a symmetric 
equilibrium the government budget constraint reduces to station 2 receiving subsidy exactly 
equal to the tax levied upon station 1.  We assume that the government issues license to 
station 1 to provide low domestic content television and to station 2 to provide high domestic 
content station in an omnipotent manner. 
To obtain the effects of marginal taxes on the consumption of domestic programs we 
differentiate aggregate consumption of domestic programming with respect to t  and evaluate 
at small tax.  Thus, we have 
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Since, in order to preserve symmetry, we evaluate comparative statics at small tax, 
0t = , the only new terms added to the analysis from the previous section are 1 21 2 0
t tpi pi∆ ∆= =  
and 1 21 2 2
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α
= − = − . 
The solution to (29) is 
( )( )
61 2
1 2 3 4 5
2
2
y
t t
λ
λ λ λ λ λ∆
∂∆ ∂∆
≡ = =
∂ ∂ − + +
, 
( )
( )( )
1 2 61 2
1 2 4 3 52
y
t t
α
λ λ λα α
λ λ λ λ λ
−∂ ∂
≡ − = =
∂ ∂ − + +
, where 
( )( )6
4
1 1
H
ph rε
λ
β α ε−
≡
− − +
. By expanding 
y∆  and yα  we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
12 1
2
1
H
y
ph rε
ε η β ε ηε η ε ψ
ε η η
ε η
−
∆ −
  + + ++ − 
= + + +   − +   
, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
11 1
2
2 1 1
y
p r r
α
ε η β ε ηε η ψ ε ψεα
ε η η
η ε ε η
−
  + + ++ − − 
= + + +   − + − +   
, where we have 
imposed our assumption that 0t = . 
Lemma 12. Marginal taxes/subsidies raise domestic content ratio of each station. 
For high sensitivity to content the effect of taxes/subsidies on equilibrium locations is 
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high. On the other hand, when sensitivity to content is low the effect of taxes/subsidies is 
minimal.  
Proof. See Appendix 12■ 
Lemma 13. Marginal taxes/subsidies reduce advertising levels of the taxed station 
and increase advertising levels of the subsidized station. For high sensitivity to content the 
effect of taxes/subsidies on equilibrium advertising levels goes to infinity. On the other 
hand, when sensitivity to content is infinitesimally small then the effect of taxes/subsidies 
converges to zero. 
Proof. See Appendix 13■ 
The intuition for this result is convoluted. On the one hand, by taxing station 1 
government puts pressure on its advertising rates, therefore, to compensate for the loss of 
revenue station 1 moves towards station 2 in order to capture an indifferent consumer. On the 
other hand, station 2 receives a subsidy and can afford to “charge” its customers higher 
advertising levels. Further, it alleviates the pressure on competition by moving away from 
firm 1. 
By putting lemma 12 and 13 together we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. In symmetric equilibrium the effect of tax-cum-subsidy policies on 
consumption of domestic content depends on the sensitivity of preferences to domestic 
content ratio. When sensitivity is high then a tax-cum-subsidy policy has large negative 
effect on consumption of the domestic content. When sensitivity is low domestic 
consumption remains unchanged following the introduction of a policy. 
Proof. See Appendix 14■ 
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Similarly to results of a quota on broadcasting of foreign content, the effects of tax-
cum-subsidy policies on consumption of domestic programs depends on the sensitivity of 
preferences to domestic content ratio. For societies in which there exist a significant language 
barrier such policies may be counterproductive because the fall of the aggregate demand can 
not be compensated by the increase in relative proportion of domestic content due to high 
sensitivity to content ratio. For societies in which the language by itself does not preclude 
consumption of domestic programs the effects of subsidies is minuscule because locations 
and advertising levels remain unchanged as people are indifferent to domestic content ratio. 
3.3. The effect of regulation of advertising on consumption of domestic 
programs  
Governments often limit competition in broadcasting market by issuing a limited 
number of broadcasting licenses. This is especially true for terrestrial television. Limited 
competition normally leads to increase in both the price of advertising and proportion of 
advertising in the total volume of broadcasting. Given that advertising is more likely to be 
viewed as a nuisance, one way to deal with it is to impose a ceiling on the proportion of 
advertising. In this section we consider the effect of such regulation on the consumption of 
domestic programs, even though, we believe, that governments do not impose advertising 
ceilings to regulate consumption of domestic programming. To do so we differentiate the 
aggregate consumption of the domestic programs  
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By imposing the first-order conditions and symmetry (30) can be restated as 
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Proposition 3. Marginal quotas on proportion of advertising increase 
consumption of domestic programs.   
Proof. See Appendix 15■ 
This result should not come as a surprise,- any reduction in advertising raises demand 
for broadcasting, and therefore, consumption of domestic programs.  
3.4. The effects of domestic content requirement in the presence of binding 
regulation of advertising 
Regulation of advertising and domestic content requirement often go hand in hand. In 
fact, many firms find themselves twice constrained by the regulation of advertising and by 
quota on proportion of foreign content. In this section we investigate the effect of domestic 
content requirement in the presence of the binding advertising regulation.  
We start by deriving the effect of domestic content requirement on the choice of 
domestic content ratio of the second firm. By differentiation the first-order condition of 
location choice of firm two with respect to location of the first firm we have 
2 1
2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2
0
pi
χ
pi
∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆
 ∆ ∂∆ ∆
≡ = ≥ 
∆ ∂∆ ∆ − 
. In the absence of interaction through advertising, the only 
option station 2 has to respond to change in location of station 1 is to move up on the 
domestic content ratio scale.  
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Proposition 4. A quota on proportion of foreign content in the presence of 
binding advertising constraint increases the aggregate consumption of domestic 
programs. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The effect of quota under constrained advertising levels is 
equal to location effect, however, now 
2
0χ∆ ≥ . Given that 1 2ω ≤  the location effect is 
positive■
 
The location effect is decomposed into a direct effect and indirect effect.  The direct 
effect is given by change aggregate consumption of domestic programs for fixed broadcasting 
demand. The indirect effect is associated with the change in the broadcasting demand. 
However, the magnitude of the indirect effect is small relative to the direct effect, which 
causes the overall effect to be positive. The implications of this result is that in countries 
where stations find the advertising constraint to be binding, marginal increases in content 
requirement do indeed lead to higher consumption of domestic programming. 
 
4. Simulation results 
In order to assert the main qualitative results of this paper for intermediate values of 
parameters of the model we perform simulation analysis using the compensation function of 
the form ( )
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 . This compensation function is flexible 
in the sense that it allows us to consider cases where individuals’ sensitivity to content ranges 
from insensitive ( 0ζ = ) to infinitely sensitive (ζ = ∞ ). We set parameter values of 0.01β =  
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and 1J =  since they do not bear on any qualitative results. We consider three cases: (i) 2ε = , 
(ii) 16ε =  and (ii) 32ε = . We consider cases (ii) and (iii) in order to have a sensible 
comparison of cases with large and smallζ 43. 
4.1.  Domestic content requirement on the proportion of domestic content in the 
total volume of broadcasting 
(i) 2ε =  
ζ  2 1∆ − ∆  α  2χ∆  1αχ  2αχ  ∆Σ  αΣ  α∆Σ +Σ  
0.2 NE44 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.3 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.4 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.5 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.6 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.7 NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE 
0.8 0.1606 3.6006 0.0381 -0.4309 -0.5001 0.9489 3.4163 4.3651 
0.9 0.1820 3.8990 0.1310 -0.2245 -0.3053 1.0829 2.0490 3.1319 
1 0.1944 4.0836 0.1687 -0.1365 -0.2215 1.1417 1.4458 2.5876 
1 0.3249 4.7163 0.1435 -0.1280 -0.1931 1.1073 1.5643 2.6715 
2 0.4173 5.3438 0.1298 -0.1186 -0.1540 1.1148 1.4944 2.6093 
3 0.4600 5.8115 0.1228 -0.0551 -0.0618 1.2027 0.6673 1.8700 
4 0.4772 5.9712 0.1179 -0.0129 -0.0132 1.2963 0.1505 1.4468 
5 0.4840 5.9975 0.1159 -0.0015 -0.0015 1.3287 0.0173 1.3460 
6 0.4871 5.9999 0.1150 -0.0001 -0.0001 1.3330 0.0012 1.3342 
7 0.4889 6.0000 0.1144 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0001 1.3334 
8 0.4902 6.0000 0.1140 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
9 0.4912 6.0000 0.1137 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
10 0.4920 6.0000 0.1135 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
 
Table 1:  The effects of domestic content requirement on the consumption of the domestic 
programs in the case of small elasticity of demand. 
 
(ii) 16ε =  
                                                          
43 Recall that due to uniform distribution of preferences over the most-preferred domestic content ratio for small 
values of ζ the equilibrium exists only for large enough ε . 
44 NE refers to No Equilibrium. 
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ζ  2 1∆ − ∆  α  2χ∆  1αχ  2αχ  ∆Σ  αΣ  α∆Σ +Σ  
0.2 0.0106 1.0000 -0.9789 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0117 0.0005 -0.0112 
0.3 0.2766 1.1937 -0.4054 -0.6918 -0.6933 0.0155 32.6035 32.6190 
0.4 0.3941 1.4773 0.0810 -0.1271 -0.1396 0.9411 7.6998 8.6409 
0.5 0.4321 1.5591 0.1209 -0.0515 -0.0597 1.1111 3.4577 4.5688 
0.6 0.4474 1.5913 0.1244 -0.0284 -0.0321 1.1906 1.9166 3.1072 
0.7 0.4548 1.6062 0.1240 -0.0171 -0.0187 1.2404 1.1415 2.3818 
0.8 0.4587 1.6136 0.1234 -0.0110 -0.0116 1.2712 0.7198 1.9910 
0.9 0.4609 1.6176 0.1229 -0.0074 -0.0077 1.2903 0.4799 1.7702 
1 0.4621 1.6198 0.1226 -0.0052 -0.0054 1.3022 0.3374 1.6396 
1 0.4783 1.6246 0.1176 -0.0007 -0.0007 1.3288 0.0484 1.3772 
2 0.4897 1.6250 0.1142 -0.0001 -0.0001 1.3329 0.0049 1.3378 
3 0.4950 1.6250 0.1126 -8.7437 -8.7437 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
4 0.4972 1.6250 0.1120 -13.3496 -13.3496 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
5 0.4980 1.6250 0.1117 -22.4199 -22.4199 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
6 0.4984 1.6250 0.1116 -34.7612 -34.7612 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
7 0.4986 1.6250 0.1115 -45.5408 -45.5408 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
8 0.4988 1.6250 0.1115 -57.5439 -57.5439 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
9 0.4989 1.6250 0.1114 -72.9405 -72.9405 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
10 0.4990 1.6250 0.1114 -81.0229 -81.0229 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
 
Table 2: The effect of domestic content requirement on consumption of domestic 
programs in the case of medium elasticity of demand. 
 
(iii) 32ε =  
ζ  2 1∆ − ∆  α  2χ∆  1αχ  2αχ  ∆Σ  αΣ  α∆Σ +Σ  
0.2 0.1333 1.0009 -0.7643 -0.0239 -0.0239 -0.1405 1.8181 1.6775 
0.3 0.3786 1.2029 -0.0233 -0.1663 -0.1715 0.6636 18.1544 18.8180 
0.4 0.4468 1.2865 0.1185 -0.0321 -0.0359 1.1170 4.1776 5.2947 
0.5 0.4660 1.3055 0.1207 -0.0109 -0.0116 1.2432 1.4105 2.6537 
0.6 0.4737 1.3105 0.1190 -0.0037 -0.0038 1.3000 0.4689 1.7689 
0.7 0.4774 1.3119 0.1179 -0.0013 -0.0013 1.3213 0.1593 1.4807 
0.8 0.4794 1.3123 0.1173 -0.0005 -0.0005 1.3288 0.0580 1.3868 
0.9 0.4805 1.3124 0.1170 -0.0002 -0.0002 1.3315 0.0231 1.3546 
1 0.4810 1.3125 0.1168 -0.0001 -0.0001 1.3325 0.0102 1.3427 
1 0.4892 1.3125 0.1143 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0002 1.3335 
2 0.4949 1.3125 0.1126 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
3 0.4975 1.3125 0.1119 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
4 0.4986 1.3125 0.1115 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
5 0.4990 1.3125 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
6 0.4992 1.3125 0.1114 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
7 0.4993 1.3125 0.1113 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
8 0.4994 1.3125 0.1113 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
9 0.4995 1.3125 0.1113 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
10 0.4995 1.3125 0.1113 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 0.0000 1.3333 
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Table 3: The effects of domestic content requirement on the consumption of the domestic 
programs in the case of high elasticity of demand. 
 
Simulations support our model’s prediction that an increase in sensitivity of demand 
causes stations to locate as far as possible and decreases advertising levels. Further, we 
observe that the elasticity of location of firm 2 with respect to location of firm 1 is negative 
for small values of ζ  and positive for large values of ζ . We also notice that for all 
intermediate values of ζ  there exist a positive monotonic relationship between the elasticity 
of location and the sensitivity to domestic content ratio. Further, as expected the sign of 
elasticity of advertising of firm 2 with respect to location of firm 1 is always negative and the 
elasticity of advertising with respect to location of firm 2 is large, in absolute value, than the 
elasticity of advertising with respect to location of firm 1. We also observe that elasticities of 
advertising approach zero in both cases, when sensitivity raises or sensitivity falls.  
Finally, location effect is monotonically increasing in sensitivity and has its 
minimum, a negative value, at the lowest level of sensitivity to domestic content. At the same 
time, advertising effect is not monotonic,- for small values of sensitivity parameter 
advertising effects is increasing in sensitivity. However, after some point the advertising 
effect goes down and approaches zero. The most important result is that for small values of 
sensitivity parameter and moderate elasticity of demand the total effect of content protection 
polices may have negative effect on consumption of domestic programs.  For intermediate 
and large values of the sensitivity parameter domestic content protection is effective.  
Comparison of tables 1,2, and 3 supports our assertion given in lemma 6 that increase 
in elasticity of demand increases product differentiation. It further supports our intuition that 
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increase in elasticity drives the equilibrium advertising levels down, something we could not 
prove analytically. 
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Figure 3: Location and advertising effects for 16ε = .  
 
By inspecting Figure 3 we see that advertising is virtually zero at very small values of 
ζ , and is dominated by negative location effect which makes the overall effect negative. 
However, as ζ  rises, advertising effect shoots up and then reduces back to zero again while 
location effect remains positive and essentially unchanged. Therefore, the total effect 
becomes positive. 
4.2. The effect of subsidies and taxes on consumption of domestic programming 
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 2ε =  16ε =  32ε =  
ζ  y∆  yα  
( )2
1
2
1
j
j
j
j
D t
D
=
=
∂ ∂∑
∑
 
y∆  yα  
( )2
1
2
1
j
j
j
j
D t
D
=
=
∂ ∂∑
∑
 
y∆  yα  
( )2
1
2
1
j
j
j
j
D t
D
=
=
∂ ∂∑
∑
 
0.20 NE NE NE 9.02E-01 3.14E-19 1.79E+00 8.39E-01 5.01E-09 1.54E+00 
0.30 NE NE NE 1.28E+00 1.99E-03 2.08E+00 1.95E+00 3.40E-02 2.99E+00 
0.40 NE NE NE 1.63E+00 2.25E-01 2.63E+00 1.53E+00 3.92E-01 2.65E+00 
0.50 NE NE NE 1.27E+00 6.68E-01 2.14E+00 1.22E+00 7.48E-01 2.12E+00 
0.60 NE NE NE 1.12E+00 1.05E+00 1.86E+00 1.07E+00 9.89E-01 1.78E+00 
0.70 NE NE NE 1.05E+00 1.34E+00 1.70E+00 1.02E+00 1.18E+00 1.62E+00 
0.80 8.99E-01 6.34E-01 1.63E+00 1.03E+00 1.57E+00 1.60E+00 1.04E+00 1.36E+00 1.58E+00 
0.90 6.28E-01 1.12E+00 1.13E+00 1.03E+00 1.75E+00 1.56E+00 1.08E+00 1.54E+00 1.60E+00 
1.00 4.38E-01 1.51E+00 7.79E-01 1.04E+00 1.90E+00 1.55E+00 1.15E+00 1.72E+00 1.68E+00 
1.00 4.80E-01 2.81E+00 7.05E-01 7.94E-01 2.50E+00 8.51E-01 1.02E+00 2.64E+00 1.06E+00 
2.00 4.01E-01 4.90E+00 3.49E-01 4.60E-01 2.99E+00 1.98E-02 6.92E-01 3.73E+00 -2.40E-02 
3.00 1.90E-01 7.38E+00 -2.13E-01 3.92E-01 5.41E+00 -8.63E-01 1.08E+00 1.22E+01 -2.47E+00 
4.00 1.06E-01 9.40E+00 -5.40E-01 7.07E-01 1.75E+01 -3.95E+00 6.42E+00 1.28E+02 -3.60E+01 
5.00 8.57E-02 1.19E+01 -7.91E-01 2.95E+00 1.05E+02 -2.62E+01 1.61E+02 4.59E+03 -1.42E+03 
6.00 8.99E-02 1.58E+01 -1.10E+00 2.23E+01 9.85E+02 -2.57E+02 1.15E+04 4.05E+05 -1.31E+05 
7.00 1.07E-01 2.17E+01 -1.56E+00 2.44E+02 1.25E+04 -3.36E+03 1.59E+06 6.57E+07 -2.18E+07 
8.00 1.34E-01 3.07E+01 -2.24E+00 3.45E+03 2.00E+05 -5.45E+04 3.58E+08 1.67E+10 -5.65E+09 
9.00 1.75E-01 4.44E+01 -3.29E+00 5.95E+04 3.85E+06 -1.06E+06 1.19E+11 6.20E+12 -2.12E+12 
10.0 2.36E-01 6.57E+01 -4.91E+00 1.23E+06 8.74E+07 -2.44E+07 5.57E+13 3.20E+15 -1.10E+15 
 
Table 4: The effects of taxes/subsidies on the consumption of the domestic programs. 
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Figure 4: Effect of tax-cum-subsidy policy on consumption of domestic programs for 
16ε = . 
 
As predicted by Proposition 2, the effects of tax-cum-subsidy policies have positive 
impact on the consumption of the domestic content for societies with low sensitivity to 
domestic content ratio and negative impact in societies with high sensitivity to domestic 
content ratio.  
4.3. The effect of regulation of advertising on consumption of domestic 
programs 
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 2ε =  16ε =  32ε =  
ζ  
2
1
2
1
j
j
j
j
D
D
α
=
=
 
∂ ∂ 
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 
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∑
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 
∂ ∂ 
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 
 
 
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∑
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1
2
1
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j
j
j
D
D
α
=
=
 
∂ ∂ 
 
 
 
 
∑
∑
 
0.20 NE -17.0000 -32.9707 
0.30 NE -14.2414 -27.4337 
0.40 NE -11.5077 -25.6518 
0.50 NE -10.9036 -25.2773 
0.60 NE -10.6829 -25.1803 
0.70 NE -10.5842 -25.1542 
0.80 -0.8332 -10.5355 -25.1467 
0.90 -0.7694 -10.5097 -25.1443 
1.00 -0.7347 -10.4951 -25.1435 
1.00 -0.7347 -10.4951 -25.1435 
2.00 -0.6657 -10.4695 -25.1429 
3.00 -0.6608 -10.4703 -25.1429 
4.00 -0.6581 -10.4749 -25.1429 
5.00 -0.6537 -10.4826 -25.1429 
6.00 -0.6473 -10.4932 -25.1429 
7.00 -0.6395 -10.5061 -25.1429 
8.00 -0.6305 -10.5206 -25.1430 
9.00 -0.6207 -10.5358 -25.1432 
10.00 -0.6104 -10.5512 -25.1435 
 
Table 5:   The effects of regulation of advertising on the consumption of the domestic 
programs. 
 
By inspecting Table 5 we notice that the effect of regulation of advertising on the 
consumption of the domestic content is always negative and is monotonically decreasing in 
absolute value as sensitivity to content rises. This supports analytical results of proposition 3. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed three policy instruments used by governments to increase 
consumption of the domestic content, - direct quota on proportion of foreign content under 
unconstrained and constrained choice of advertising, tax-cum-subsidy schemes, and 
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regulation of proportion of advertising.  We show that the effectiveness of marginal content 
restrictions depends on sensitivity of the public to domestic programs. In societies in which 
public is very sensitive to domestic content the effectiveness of quotas on foreign content has 
very small impact on the overall consumption of domestic content. On the other hand, in 
societies in which the public is not very sensitive to proportion of domestic content that is 
devoted to domestic or foreign programs government policies may even become 
counterproductive.  However, the latter result holds only under extreme parameters,- 
moderate to large elasticity of demand and small sensitivity to domestic content ratio.  It can 
be argued that developed countries have high opportunity cost of time (not explicitly modeled 
here) as such we expect to observe high elasticity of demand. On the other hand, many of 
these countries do not have high language barrier, as such, likely to have low sensitivity to 
domestic content ratio. An example of such counties is western European countries where 
population is highly educated and is fluent in several languages. There we might have a 
situation where domestic content requirement has an adverse effect on consumption of 
domestic content. In other developed countries which have high opportunity cost (as 
expressed in our model in high elasticity of demand) yet with significant language barrier, 
such as French-speaking provinces of Canada or aboriginal parts of Australia, marginal 
domestic content requirement has positive effect, yet small in absolute value, on the 
consumption of the domestic content. In developing countries with small opportunity costs of 
time, domestic content protection might be an effective policy instrument for both countries 
with and without the language barrier. Moreover, when station find themselves constrained in 
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terms of the choice of advertising level, marginal domestic content requirement always raises 
the consumption of domestic programs. 
The above result is in stark contrast to findings in the 1st essay where it is shown that 
marginal domestic content requirement policies in radio broadcasting have positive effects in 
European Union, Australia and France, and negative effect where in countries with 
significant language barrier, such as countries of former USSR.  Those results were driven by 
both the sensitivity of demand and distribution of preferences over genres.  This implies that 
the choice of market structure and the choice of preferences are paramount to the analysis of 
domestic content requirement policies. 
The effect of tax-cum-subsidy policies also depends on the sensitivity of preferences 
to the domestic content ratio. When sensitivity is high such a policy may have an adverse 
effect on the consumption of domestic programs. When sensitivity is low such a policy may 
have little, if any, effect on consumption of domestic content. 
Advertising, being a nuisance, always increases consumption of both foreign and 
domestic programs, and the larger the sensitivity to content the smaller is the effect of 
advertising on the consumption of domestic programs. 
The cornerstone of the analysis was the finding that, (i) given the public good nature 
of consumption of broadcasting, production of broadcasting is not tantamount to its 
consumption, and that (ii) relative proportion of domestic programs is not equivalent to the 
absolute value of domestic programs. Therefore, the policy of achieving the goal of 
increasing absolute value of consumption of domestic programs through regulation of 
production via imposing domestic content requirement on the proportion of domestic 
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programs in the total volume of broadcasting may be not necessarily be effective. The 
importance of the above finding is that some devices used to protect domestic cultural goods 
around the world may be inappropriate, if not counterproductive. To make a judgment about 
the effectiveness of certain polices of cultural protection government has to have a good 
picture of the sensitivity of individuals to domestic content. 
Although, while have not explicitly discussed, domestic content restriction reduces 
product differentiation between stations, and therefore, reduces the aggregate satisfaction 
with broadcasting. Since there exist one to one mapping between welfare and the aggregate 
satisfaction, domestic content policies also reduces welfare of individuals. 
The limitation of the above analysis is in the use of marginal content requirement. We 
might expect that discrete domestic content restrictions have negative effects even for 
societies with high sensitivity to domestic content, however, current setup does not allow us 
to address this question. This is because any large content restriction leads to a breakdown of 
symmetry assumption of already complicated model. The limitation in the analysis of the tax-
cum-subsidy policies is the assumption that both stations generate revenues by selling 
advertising. In the real world, however, stations that broadcast high domestic content are 
often public ones and raise money through donations or subsidies.  
 
6. References 
Andersen L., Swimmer G., Suen W., (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of Viewer Demand for 
U.S. Programming and the Effect of Canadian Broadcasting Regulations”, Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management Vol. 16, No. 4, 525-540. 
d’Aspremont C., Gabszewicz J., Thisse J.-F. (1979), “On Hotelling’s Stability in 
Competition”. Econometrica 17, 1145-1150. 
Dasgupta P., Maskin E. (1986), “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic 
86  
Games, II: Applications”. Review of Economic Studies 53, 1-26. 
Dixit A., (1986), “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly”, International Economic Review, Vol. 
27, No 1., February, 1986. 
General Agreement on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization. 
Globerman S., (1983), “Cultural regulation in Canada”, Montréal. Institute of Research on 
Public Policy, 60. 
Krattenmaker T., Powe L. Jr, (1994),. “Regulating Broadcast Programming. AEI studies in 
Telecommunications Deregulation”. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT press; 
Washington , D.C.: AIE press. 
Lancaster K. (1979), “Variety, Equity, and Efficiency”, Columbia University Press, New 
York. 
Tirole J., (1997), “The Theory of Industrial Organization”, The MIT press, Cambridge, 115, 
289. 
 
7. Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Proof of Lemma 1: Our assumption on preferences imply that the market is always 
covered. Therefore, for corner market a movement away from the boundary increases the 
distance to the boundary by the exactly same amount. Therefore, we have 1 21 2 1u u
∆ ∆= − = .  For 
the interior markets, the size of the market for each station is determined by the distance from 
the choice of domestic content ratio to the indifferent consumer. The indifference condition is 
given by 1 2ˆ ˆα α=  so that person is indifferent whenever he faces the same normalized prices. 
By defining 2 1 1 2m u u≡ ∆ −∆ = +  to be the distance between the domestic content ratios of 
station 1 and station 2 (hereunder referred to as degree of product differentiation) it can be 
rewritten as ( ) ( )1 1 2 1h u h m uα α= −  or ( ) ( )1 2 2 12h m u h uα α− = . Properties of m  are 1 2 0m mα α= =  and 
1 2 1m m∆ ∆= − = − . For brevity we refer to the first and the second derivative of compensation 
function with respect to the distance between the available and the most-preferred content as 
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prime and double prime respectively. By differentiating indifference condition with respect to 
its arguments we obtain: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 11 1 2 2 1 1 2 2u u h u h u h uα α α
−∆ ∆ ′ ′ ′− = = +  (32), 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 12 1 1 1 1 1 2 2u u h u h u h uα α α
−∆ ∆ ′ ′ ′= − = +  (33), 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 2 1 1 1 2 2u u h u h u h uα α α α
−
′ ′ ′= − = − +  (34), 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 11 2 2 1 1 2 2u u h u h u h uα α α α
−
′ ′ ′= − = +  (35), 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2 2 1 1 1
1
1 1 2 2
h u u h u u
u
h u h u
α α
α α
∆ ∆
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′′ ′′−
=
′ ′+
 (36), 
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1 1 1 2 2 2
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1 1 2 2
h u u h u u
u
h u h u
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=
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 (37), 
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2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
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2h u u h u u h u u
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h u h u
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 (38), 
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′′ ′′ ′− −
=
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 (39), 
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1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1 2 2
h u u u h u u u
u u
h u h u
α α
α α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
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′′ ′′−
= − =
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 (40), 
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1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 2 2
h u u u h u u u h u u
u
h u h u
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∆ ∆
∆
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 (41), 
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h u u u h u u u h u u
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 (42), 
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 (43), 
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1 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
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h u u u h u u u h u u
u u
h u h u
α α
α α α α
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∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
′′ ′′ ′− +
= − =
′ ′+
 (44), 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 2
1 1 2 2
h u u u h u u u h u u h u u
u u
h u h u
α α α α α α
α α α α α α
α α
′′ ′′ ′ ′− + −
= − =
′ ′+
 (45). 
When 1 2u u=  then we have 1 2α α= , then, the above equations reduce to 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2u u u u
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆− = − = = = , ( )1 1 2 2 11 2 1 2 2 0u u u u h hα α α α α
−′= − = − = = − ≤ , 1 1 2 21 2 0u u
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆= = , 
( )1 1 2 2 121 2 2 0u u h hα α α α α
−
′= = ≥ , 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21 2 1 2 0u u u u
α α α α ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆= = = = , 
( )( )1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 11 2 1 2 1 2 1 4 0u u u u u u rα α α α α α α
−∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆− = = = − = = − = − ≥ ■ 
Appendix 2 
Proof of Lemma 2: We concentrate on firm 1. When 1 2u u= , firm’s 2 functions are 
mirror-symmetric. Aggregate satisfaction is given by ( ) ( )
0 0
i iu u
iH h v dv h v dv
ε ε− −
≡ +∫ ∫ , therefore, 
( ) ( )i i ii i i i iH u h u u h u
ε ε− −∆ ∆ ∆= + . Differentiating with respect to its arguments and imposing 
symmetry:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 111 1 1 1 14 0H h u h u h u h uε εε − −∆ ∆ −′ ′= − + ≤  (46), 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 1 112 1 2 2 24 0H h u h u h u h uε εε − −∆ ∆ − ′ ′= − + ≤  (47). 
Since corner markets depend only on own choice of domestic content ration we focus 
on a symmetric case where both stations enjoy equal interior markets. Therefore, 
differentiating and using lemma 1 yields:  
 ( )2 2 11 1 1 2 0H u h u h
ε ε−∆ ∆ − −= = ≥  (48), 
 ( )1 1 12 2 2 2 0H u h u h
ε ε−∆ ∆ − −= = − ≤  (49), 
 ( ) ( )1 1 111 1 1 2 0H u h u h h
εα α ε α− −− ′= = − ≤  (50), 
 ( ) ( )2 2 111 1 1 2 0H u h u h h
εα α ε α− −− ′= = ≥  (51), 
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 ( ) ( )2 2 112 2 2 2 0H u h u h h
εα α ε α− −− ′= = − ≤  (52), 
 ( ) ( )1 1 112 2 2 2 0H u h u h h
εα α ε α− −− ′= = ≥  (53). 
Since 1 2u u=  and arguments of compensating function of all the second derivatives of 
iH  below are in terms of interior market sizes we suppress arguments of the compensating 
function.  
 ( )1 2 1 2 1 21 11 1 1 1
1
4
H u h u h h u h h
ε ε εε ε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆− − − − −′ ′= + − =  (54), 
 ( )2 1 1 2 1 21 12 2 2 2
1
4
H u h u h h u h h
ε ε εε ε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆− − − − −′ ′= + − =  (55), 
 ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 4 0H h h u u u h h rα α αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − − + ≤  (56), 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 111 1 1 1 1 4 0H h h u u u h h rα α αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − + ≥  (57), 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 12 11 1 21 1 1 2 4 0aH h h u u h h hα α α αε ε εε ε α
−− − − − −′ ′= − + = − − ≤  (58), 
 ( )( )1 2 1 2 1 2 111 1 1 1 1 4 0aH h h u u u h h rα αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − + ≥  (59), 
 ( )( )2 1 1 2 2 1 112 2 2 2 1 4 0H h h u u u h h rα α αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − − + ≤  (60), 
 ( )( )2 2 2 2 2 2 112 2 2 2 1 4 0H h h u u u h h rα α αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − + ≥  (61), 
 ( )( )2 1 2 1 1 2 112 2 2 2 1 4 0H h h u u u h h rα α αε ε εε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆− − − −′= − + = − − + ≤  (62), 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 22 11 1 22 2 2 2 4 0H h h u u h h hα α α α αε ε εε ε α
−− − − − −′ ′= − + = − − ≤  (63). 
Therefore, in symmetric equilibrium we have 1 21 2 0H H
∆ ∆= = , 1 1 2 21 2 0H H
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆= ≤ , 
2 1 1
1 2 2H H h
ε∆ ∆ − −= − = , ( )1 2 1 2 111 2 2 1 2H H H H h hα α α α ε α
−− ′= = − = − = − , 1 2 2 2 1 11 2 4H H h h
εε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ − − − ′= = , 
( )( )1 1 2 2 11 21 2 2 4H H h hα α α α ε ε α
−− − ′= = − − , ( )( )1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 1 2 2 1 4H H H H h rα α α α ε ε α
−∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ −− = = − = = − + ■ 
Appendix 3 
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Proof of Lemma 3: Differentiating ( )mξ  with respect to m  gives 
( ) ( )
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Further, taking limits yields ( ) ( )
0
lim 1 2
m
m hξ
→
= , and ( )
1 2
lim 1
m
mξ
→
= because ( )0 1h = ■ 
Appendix 4 
Proof of Lemma 4: The elasticity of the aggregate satisfaction with respect to 
advertising is defined as 1 0ii i i iH H
αη α −≡ − ≥ . Straight differentiation and imposition of 
symmetry yields 
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−
= − +
 
= − + ′ ′ 
+
= − ≤
′
 (69), 
 
( )
( )
2 2 2 21
2 2 2 2 2
1
0
4
H H H
h r
H
α
ε
η α η
ε
∆ ∆ ∆−
−
= − +
− +
= − ≤
 (70), 
 
( )
( )
( )
1 2 1 11
2 2 2 2 2
11
4 2
1 2 0
4
H H H
h r h
H
h
r
H
α
ε ε
ε
η α η
ε
η
ε η
∆ ∆ ∆−
− −
−
= − +
 − +
= +  
 
= − + + ≥
 (71). 
Therefore, ( )( )1 2 2 1 111 1 2 2 2 4h Hhα α α α εη η η η ε η α
−− ′= − = = − = + , ( )( )1 2 11 2 1 4h r Hα α εη η ε
−−= − = − + , 
and ( ) ( )2 1 11 2 4 1 2h H rεη η ε η
−∆ ∆ −= − = − − + + . 
Appendix 5 
Proof of Lemma 5: Since in our model all important effects take place around 
indifferent consumer, then in symmetric equilibrium we denote compensation function for an 
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interior market without subscript while for corner market with subscript c . Differentiating 
the set of first-order conditions, imposing symmetry and evaluating at 0t =  yields: 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1 1 2
4
1
1 1 2 0
4
c c
c c
p H
h hh
p h
h h h
h hph h
H h h h
ε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆−
− −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′  ′   ′= − − +      ′      
 ′  ′   = − − + ≤      ′      
 (72), 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
4
1
1 0
4
p H
h
p h
h
ph h
H h
ε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆−
− −
−
 ′= − 
 
  ′ ′= −   
  
  ′ = − ≥   
  
 (73), 
 ( )
( )
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
4
1 1
1 1 0
4
p H
p h r
ph
r
H
α αε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α α
∆ ∆−
− − −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′= − − − + 
 
  = − − − + ≤  
  
 (74), 
 ( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
4
1 1
1 1 0
4
p H
p h r
ph
r
H
α αε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α α
∆ ∆−
− − −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′= − − + 
 
  = − − + ≥  
  
 (75), 
 
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 12
2
2
2
1
1
1 2
4
41 1
1 2
4 1
21 1
1 2 0
4 1
p
p h h
H h
Hph h h
H h hh
ph h
H h
α α α
ε
ε
ε
ε
β
pi ε η α η
α
β
ε η ε η
αα
ε η αβ
ε η
α α α
ε η αβ
ε η
α η αα
−
−
−
−
= − + + −
   = − + + − +   ′   
 + ′     = − − + +       ′ −      
 +   = − − + + ≤     ′ −    
 (76), 
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( )
( )
1 2 2
1 12
2
1
1 1
1 2 0
4
p
p h h
H h
α α α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β
ε η
α α
−
−
= −
   = − + ≥   ′   
 (77), 
 
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 12
1
1 1
1 0
4
p
p h r
H
α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β ε
α α
∆ ∆
−
−
= −
− +  = − − ≤ 
 
 (78), 
 
( )
1 2 2
1 12
1
1 1 2
1 0
4
p
p h r
H
α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β ε η
α α
∆ ∆
−
−
= −
− + +  = − ≥  
  
 (79), 
 
2 2 2 2
2 2
1
1
1 1
1 1 2
4
1
1 1 2 0
4
c c
c c
p H
h hh
p h
h h h
h hph h
H h h h
ε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆−
− −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′  ′   ′= − − +      ′      
 ′  ′   = − − + ≤      ′      
 (80), 
 
1 2 1 2
2 2
1
1
1 1
1
4
1
1 0
4
p H
h
p h
h
ph h
H h
ε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆−
− −
−
 ′= − 
 
  ′ ′= −   
  
  ′ = − ≥   
  
 (81), 
 ( )
( )
2 2 2 2
2 2
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
4
1 1
1 1 0
4
p H
p h r
ph
r
H
α αε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α α
∆ ∆−
− − −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′= − − + 
 
  = − − + ≥  
  
 (82), 
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 ( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
4
1 1
1 1 0
4
p H
p h r
ph
r
H
α αε
ε ε
ε
pi α
α
α ε
α
β
ε
α α
∆ ∆−
− − −
−
 ′= − 
 
 ′= − − + 
 
  = − − + ≥  
  
 (83), 
 
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 2
1 22
2
2
2
1
1
1 2
4
41 1
1 2
4 1
21 1
1 2 0
4 1
p
p h h
H h
Hph h h
H h hh
ph h
H h
α α α
ε
ε
ε
ε
β
pi ε η α η
α
β
ε η ε η
αα
ε η αβ
ε η
α α α
ε η αβ
ε η
α η αα
−
−
−
−
= − + + −
   = − + + − +   ′   
 + ′     = − − + +       ′ −      
 +   = − − + + ≤     ′ −    
 (84), 
 
( )
( )
1 2 1
2 22
2
1
1 1
1 2 0
4
p
p h h
H h
α α α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β
ε η
α α
−
−
= −
   = − + ≥   ′   
 (85), 
 
( )
( )
2 2 2
2 22
1
1 1
1 0
4
p
p h r
H
α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β ε
α α
∆ ∆
−
−
= −
− +  = − ≥ 
 
 (86), 
 
( )
2 1 1
2 22
1
1 1 2
1 0
4
p
p h r
H
α
ε
β α
pi η
α
β ε η
α α
∆ ∆
−
−
= −
− + +  = − − ≤  
  
 (87). 
Define 0
1 1
1 0
4
p h r
H
εβ ε
λ
α α
− − +  ≡ − ≥  
  
, 1 1 2 01
c ch hh
h h h r
εα
λ
ε
 ′′   ≡ + ≥    ′ − +    
, 
2 01
h
h r
εα
λ
ε
′ ≡ ≥  − + 
, ( )
( )3
21 1
2 0
1 1
h
h r
ε η α
λ ε η
α η α ε
 +  ≡ + + ≥    ′ − − +   
, 4
1 2
0
1
h
h r
ε η
λ
α ε
+  ≡ ≥  ′ − +  
, 
5
2
0
1r
η
λ
ε
≡ ≥
− +
. We then can write the stability matrix as 
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1 2
2 1
0
5 3 4
5 4 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
S
λ λ
λ λ
λ
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
− − 
 − − =
 − + −
 
− − − 
 (88). 
The stability condition requires that eigenroots of S  have negative real parts for 
which the sufficient condition is negative trace and positive determinant. Trace is negative 
because each diagonal element is non-positive. Determinant of S  is given 
by ( )( ) ( )( )( )40 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 52λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − + + . ( )3 4 1 2,λ λ λ λ≥ ≥  imply that S is positive■ 
Appendix 6 
Proof of Lemma 6: Differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to ζ  and 
evaluating at 0t =  yields 
 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
0
0
ζ α αζ ζ ζ ζ
α ζ α α α α α αζ ζ ζ ζ
pi pi pi pi α pi α
pi pi pi pi α pi α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + + =
+ ∆ + ∆ + + =
 (89). 
In the symmetric equilibrium we have 1 2
ζ ζ∆ = −∆  and 1 2
ζ ζ ζα α α= ≡ . Define 
( )1 10 1p Hε ζλ λ α α− − − ∆∆ ′≡ −  and ( )1 20 1p ζαλ λ β α α η− −= − − . Then, the solution to (89) is 
( ) 11 22mζ λ λ λ
−
∆= − +  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1
1 2 5 3 4 1 22
ζ
αα λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
−
∆= + − + − +  where we used 
2 1m = ∆ −∆ . ( )12 c cH h h h h hζ ε ζ ζε∆ − −= − − . Since ( ) ( )h v h vζ  is increasing in v  by assumption on 
the properties of the compensation function, ( )1 1 0 0 0u u H mζ λ ζ∆ ∆≥ ⇒ ≤ ⇒ ≤ ⇒ ∂ ∂ ≥ . A 
sufficient condition for 0ζα ≥  is 0ζη ≤ . ( ) ( )Sign Sign ζαλ η∝ − .  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
2
, , , ,
, , ,
, , , ,
2
, ,
2 ,
u u
v
v
h u h v h v h u
h u H h v dv h v dv
h u h v h v h u
H
h u h u
H h u
ζ ζ ζ
ε ε ε
ζ
ε
ζ ζ ζ ζ
ε ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ
η
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
− − −
−
  
  − −
  
  = −
 ∂
 +
 ∂  
∫ ∫
(90). 
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Applying the mean value theorem for integrals we get 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
2
, , , ,
, ,
, , , ,
,2
,,
, ,
2 ,
u u
v
v
h u h u h u h u
h v dv h v dv
h u h u h u h u
h uH
h uh u
h u h u
H h u
ζ ζ ζ ζ
ε ε
ζ
ε
ε
ζ ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ
η
ζ
ζε ζ
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
− −
−
−
      
   − + −            =
 ∂
 +
 ∂  
∫ ∫




 (91), 
where 0 u u≤ ≤ and 0 u u≤ ≤

. The first term is negative because 
( ) ( )
0 0
, ,
u u
h v dv h v dv
ε εζ ζ− −≥∫ ∫  and 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
h u h u
h u h u
ζ ζζ ζ
ζ ζ
≤




. The second term 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
, , ,
0
,, ,
v v
h u h u h u
v h uh u h u
ζζ ζ ζ
ζ ζζ ζ
    ∂ ∂
    = − ≤
    ∂ ∂    
 by assumption. Therefore, 0 0ζ ζη α≤ ⇒ ≥ . Both 
( ) 0m ζ∂ ∂ ≥  and ( ) 0α ζ∂ ∂ ≥  sound reasonable,- for large sensitivity to content a movement 
away from the center of the market means the fall of aggregate demand for all people in the 
interior market and the loss of indifferent consumer. However, the first decrease in aggregate 
demand is exactly offset by the increase in demand by individuals at the distance int erior
iu  
towards the end of the market while the latter term is overwhelmingly smaller than increase 
in demand at the distance int 0corner eriori iu u− ≥  from the end of the market. Similarly, rising 
sensitivity to content gives the ability to stations to raise advertising rates because the 
propensity of the indifferent consumer to switch to another station is fall.   
Appendix 7 
Proof of Lemma 7: By differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to ε  and 
evaluating at 0t =  we have 
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1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
0
0
ε α αε ε ε ε
α ε α α α α α αε ε ε ε
pi pi pi pi α pi α
pi pi pi pi α pi α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + + =
+ ∆ + ∆ + + =
 (92). 
In the symmetric equilibrium we have 1 2
ε ε∆ = −∆  and 1 2
ε ε εα α α= ≡ . Define 
0
1 1
1p Hε εκ α
λ α
− ∆
∆
   ′≡ −   
  
 and
( ) ( )2
0
11
1
p ε
α
β α
κ η
λ α
− 
= − + 
 
. Then the solution to the system of 
equations (92) is ( ) 11 22mε κ λ λ
−
∆= − +  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1
1 2 5 3 4 1 22
ε
αα κ λ λ κ λ λ λ λ λ
−
∆= + − + − +  where 
we’ve used 2 1m = ∆ −∆ . ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 2 1 2 1 2H h h h h hε ε ε εε ε∆ − − − − −= − − = − − . 0 0u u H ε κ∆ ∆≥ ⇒ ≤ ⇒ ≤ . 
The sign of ακ is ambiguous as is the sign of 
εα  
Appendix 8 
Proof of Lemma 8: The first-order conditions with respect to location is independent 
of β  therefore the equilibrium locations is independent of advertising pricing parameter. 
Further, since, by assumption, β is constant then ( )2 1 11 2 1 0pα β α β α α β− −∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = − − ≤ ■ 
Appendix 9 
Proof of Lemma 9: We have 1 2 0λ λ≥ ≥ , 3 4 0λ λ≥ ≥  and 5 0λ ≥ , however, 
( ) ( )5 3 4 3 5 41 1λ λ λ λ λ λ+ + ≥ + + which implies that the sign of ( )( ) ( )( )2 5 3 4 1 3 5 41 1λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ− + + + + + , 
hence, the sign of 
1α
χ  are ambiguous. Similarly, 1 2 0λ λ≥ ≥ , 3 4 0λ λ≥ ≥ , 5 0λ ≥  imply 
that ( ) ( )5 3 4 3 5 41 1λ λ λ λ λ λ+ + ≥ + + , hence, 2 0αχ ≤ . 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )1 2
5 5 1 2 3 4
5 1 3 4 3 4
2 2
0α α
λ λ λ λ λ λ
χ χ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
+ + − +
+ ∝ − ≤
+ + −
.  
Turning to limiting cases, we know that as ζ  increases stations move away from each 
other as far as possible. In the limit we have 1lim 1 4ζ →∞∆ = . Therefore, we will 
have ( )
( )
1
1
1 2 ,
lim 0
1 2 ,v
h
hζ
ζ
ζ→∞
 − ∆
=  − ∆ 
, ( )
( )
1
1 1
1 2 ,
lim 0
2 ,1 2 ,
h
H
ε
ζ
ζ
ζ
−
→∞
 − ∆
  =
 ∆ −∆ 
, hence, ( )1 1lim ,1 2 , 0ζ η ζ→∞ ∆ −∆ = . By using 
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the fact that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 2 , 1 2 ,
lim 1 2 3
, ,
h h
h hζ
ζ ζ
ζ ζ→∞
 ′ − ∆ −∆
+ =    ′ ∆ ∆  
 we can simplify
jλ , 1,2,3, 4,5,6j =  as 
follows: 1
3 1 βε
λ
η βε
 +
=  
 
, ( )1 1 1lim ,1 2 , 0 limζ ζη ζ λ→∞ →∞∆ −∆ = ⇒ = ∞ , 2
1 1 βε
λ
η βε
 +
=  
 
, 
( )1 1 2lim ,1 2 , 0 limζ ζη ζ λ→∞ →∞∆ −∆ = ⇒ = ∞ , 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
2
3
2 1 22 1 2 1
1 1 1
ηβ ε η εβ εβ ε η η β β βε ε η
λ
ε β ε η ε β ε η β ε η
+ + ++ + + +
= + +
+ + + + + +
, where we used the fact that 
lim 1r
ζ →∞
=  and ( )lim h h
ζ
η
→∞
′ = . Now, ( )1 1 3lim ,1 2 , 0 lim 2ζ ζη ζ λ βε→∞ →∞∆ −∆ = ⇒ = . 
( ) ( )
( )( )4
2
1
β ε η η ε η
λ
ε β ε η
+ +
=
+ +
. ( )1 1 4lim ,1 2 , 0 lim 0ζ ζη ζ λ→∞ →∞∆ −∆ = ⇒ = . 5
2η
λ
ε
= . 
( )1 1 5lim ,1 2 , 0 lim 0ζ ζη ζ λ→∞ →∞∆ −∆ = ⇒ = . 
The elasticities of best-responses contain the following expressions. 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
2
5 2 3 4
2 2 1 2 2 12 1 1
1 1 1
β ε η η β ε η εβ ε η η β βε ε ηη βε
λ λ λ λ
ε η βε ε β ε η ε β ε η β ε η
 + + + + + + + +
− + = − + +   + + + + + +  
. 
Since lim 0
ζ
η
→∞
=  the first term in the second brackets drops out while the second term 
can be written as ( )
( )
2 1 2
1
β εβ ε η
βε
+ +
+
. Therefore, 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )5 2 3 4
2 1 2 2 11
1 1
β εβ ε β βε ε ηβε
λ λ λ λ
βε βε β ε η η
 + + + + +
− + = − +   + + +  
. 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )5 1 3 4
2 1 2 2 11
3
1 1
β εβ ε β βε ε ηβε
λ λ λ λ
βε βε β ε η η
 + + + + +
+ + = +   + + +  
. ( )5 3 41 2λ λ λ βε+ + = . 
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( )3 5 41 2λ λ λ βε+ + = . Therefore, we obtain 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2 5 3 4 1 3 5 4
4 1
1 1
βε
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
η
+
− + + + + + = , 
( )( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
2
5 1 3 4 3 4
2 1 2 2 16 1
1 1
β εβ ε β βε ε ηβε
λ λ λ λ λ λ
η βε βε β ε η η
 + + + + +
+ + − = +    + + +   
. Combining expressions 
yields 2
1
1
lim
3
d
dζ →∞
∆
=
∆
 and 
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
1
2
1
3 1 1 2 1
1 1
d
d
βε εβ ε βε ε ηα
βεβε β ε η η
−
  + + + + +
 = + 
  ∆ + + +  
. Since 
( )( )
( )( )
1
lim
1ζ
βε ε η
ε
β ε η→∞
+ +
=
+ +
 and 1lim
ζ η→∞
= ∞ , 1
1
lim 0
d
dζ
α
→∞
=
∆
. Similarly,  
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
2
2
1
3 1 1 2 1
1 1
d
d
βε εβ ε βε ε ηα
βεβε β ε η η
−
  + + + + +
 = − + 
  ∆ + + +  
 and 2
1
lim 0
d
dζ
α
→∞
=
∆
. When ζ  falls to zero 
then 1
0
lim 1 2
ζ →
∆ = , therefore, 
( )
( )
1
0
1
1 2 ,
lim
1 2 ,v
h
hζ
ζ
ζ→
 − ∆
= ∞  −∆ 
, 
( )
( )
1
0
1 1
1 2 ,
lim 1
2 ,1 2 ,
h
H
ε
ζ
ζ
ζ
−
→
 − ∆
  =
 ∆ − ∆ 
 and 
( )1 1
0
lim ,1 2 ,
ζ
η ζ
→
∆ −∆ = ∞ .  Since 
( )
( )
1
0
1 1
1 2 ,
lim 1
2 ,1 2 ,
h
H
ε
ζ
ζ
ζ
−
→
 − ∆
  =
 ∆ − ∆ 
 at 
0
lim 1
ζ
α
→
=  then as 0ζ →  we 
have h
h
η  → ′ 
, therefore we can write
jλ , 1,2,3, 4,5j =  as: ( )1 1r
εψ
λ
η ε
=
− +
, where 1 2 h h
h h
ψ
′ 
≡ +  ′ 
 
with
0
lim
ζ
ψ
→
= ∞  (please note that ( )
0
lim 1
ζ
ψ η
→
=  while ( )
0
lim 0r
ζ
ψ
→
= ; we also have 
0
lim
ζ
η
→
= ∞ , 
0
lim r
ζ →
= ∞ , ( )
0
lim 0r
ζ
η
→
=  and ( )2
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
= ∞ ), 
( )2 1r
ε
λ
η ε
=
− +
 ( 2
0 0
lim lim 0
ζ ζ
η λ
→ →
= ∞⇒ = ), 
( ) ( ) ( )2
3
2 2 2
1 1 1r r r
ε η β ε η η ε η
λ
ε ε ε
+ + +
= + +
− + − + − +
 (generally, the limit of this expression as 0ζ →  is 
ambiguous and depends on the functional form of the compensation function; for functional 
form of compensation function ( )
1
1
, 1 ,0 1, 1
J j
j
h v v Jζζ ζ
+
=
= + ≤ ≤ ≥∑  we have ( )2
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
− = ∞ , 
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( )
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
− = −∞  in which case 
( )
0
2
lim 0
1rζ
ε η
ε→
+
=
− +
, ( )
2
0
2
lim
1rζ
β ε η
ε→
+
= ∞
− +
, ( )
0
2
lim
1rζ
η ε η
ε→
+
= ∞
− +
; on the other 
hand, when 1r ≤  and is a constant then all the terms of go to infinity, thus, 3
0
lim
ζ
λ
→
= ∞ ), 
( )
4
2
1r
η ε η
λ
ε
+
≡
− +
 (again, for examples of functional forms mentioned above we have 4
0
lim
ζ
λ
→
= ∞ ), 
5
2
1r
η
λ
ε
=
− +
 (when r  is a finite constant then the limit of 5λ  as 0ζ →  is ambiguous; however, 
when r →∞  then 5
0
lim 0
ζ
λ
→
= ). In order to sign elasticities of best response functions we need to 
sign the following expressions: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
22
5 2 3 4 2
2 1 2
1
r
r
η ε ε ε η β ε η η ε η
λ λ λ λ
η ε
− + − + + + + +
− + =
− +
 , which, in the limiting 
case where 0ζ → , is dominated by the term ( )1rη ε− + , 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
22
5 1 3 4 2
2 1 2
1
r
r
η ε εψ ε η β ε η η ε η
λ λ λ λ
η ε
− + + + + + + +
+ + =
− +
, that is dominated by the term 
( )21rεψη ε− + ,  
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2
1 5 3 4 3
2 1 2 1 2 2 2
1
1
r r
r
εψη ε η ε εψ η ε ε η β ε η η ε η
λ λ λ λ
η ε
+ − + + + − + + + + + +
+ + =
− +
, 
which is dominated by the term ( )21rψη ε− + ,  
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2
2 5 3 4 3
2 1 2 1 2 2 2
1
1
r r
r
εη ε η ε ε η ε ε η β ε η η ε η
λ λ λ λ
η ε
+ − + + + − + + + + + +
+ + =
− +
, 
which can be approximated ( )21rη ε− + ,  
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( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1 3 5 4 3
2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1
1
r r
r
εψ ε η β ε η η ε η ε εψη ε η η ε
λ λ λ λ
η ε
+ + + + + − + + + + − +
+ + =
− +
, 
which is dominated by ( )21rψη ε− + , 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )
2
2 3 5 4 3
2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1
1
r r
r
ε ε η β ε η η ε η ε εη ε η η ε
λ λ λ λ
η ε
+ + + + + − + + + + − +
+ + =
− +
, which is 
approximated by ( )21rη ε− + , and ( ) ( )
( )
5 5 2
2 2 1
2
1
r
r
η η ε
λ λ
ε
+ − +
+ =
− +
, which can be approximated by 
( ) ( )221 1r rη ε η ε− + + − + . 
Then 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
2
2
1
2
2 2
2
1 1
2 2
2
1 1
r rd
d
r r
η ε
ε η β ε η η ε η
ε η ε
η ψε
ε η β ε η η ε η
ε η ε
− + + + + +
− + − +∆
= −
∆ + + + + + +
− + − +
. In order to find the limit 
of this expression as ζ  approaches zero we need to know whether ( )5 2 3 4λ λ λ λ− +  is smaller 
or greater than zero.  
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 1 2
1 11r rr
η ε ε
ε η β ε η η ε η ε η β ε η η ε η
ε η εη ε
− + + + + + ∝ − + + + + +
− + − +− +
. Since ( )2
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
= ∞ , ( )
0
lim 0r
ζ
η
→
=  we can observe that 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
20
2
lim 0
1rζ
ε ε η β ε η η ε η
η ε→
+ + + + +
=
− +
, 
thus, we have 2
0
1
lim 1
d
dζ →
∆
= −
∆
. Similarly, 1
1
d
d
α
∆
, in the limiting case of 0ζ → , can be 
approximated by ( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2
01
3
1
3
1 1 1 1
1
r r r rd
d
r
ζ
η η η ψη
ε ε ε εα
η ψ
ε
→
 + − + − + − +  − + − +
→−
∆
− +
. Since 
( )
0
lim 1 0r
ζ
η ε
→
− + =  and ( )
0
lim 1 0r
ζ
ψ ε
→
− + =  then the last three terms in the numerator approaches 
zero faster than the first, as such, can be dropped out. Therefore, it can be restated as 
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( )21
2
1
1rd
d
εα
η ψ
− +
= −
∆
. Similarly, it can be shown that 
( )22
2
1
1rd
d
εα
η ψ
− +
= −
∆
. These two limits 
depends on the form of the compensation function. For compensating function 
( )
( )( ) ( )
0
1
1
1 , 1, 1, 0
,
1 0 , 1, 1, 0
J
j
j
J j
j
j v J
h v
v J
σ ζ
σ
ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ σ
ζ
ζ ζ ζ σ
+
=
 
+ 
 
=

+ + ≥ ≥ > >

= 
 + ≤ ≤ ≥ < >

∑
∑
 
( )2 1 2
20 0 0
1 1
1
lim 0 lim lim 0
r d d
d dζ ζ ζ
ε α α
η ψ→ → →
− +
− = ⇒ = =
∆ ∆
. 
For compensation functions of the form ( ) ( )
2
, 1 , 2, 0
J
j
j
h v v J
σζ ζ σ
=
= + ≥ ≥∑  or 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
, exp
J J
j j
j j
h v v v
σ σζ ζ ζ
= =
 
= − 
 
∑ ∑ for 0 1, 1, 0Jζ σ≤ ≤ ≥ >  
( )2 1 2
20 0 0
1 1
1
lim lim lim
r d d
d dζ ζ ζ
ε α α
η ψ→ → →
− +
− = −∞⇒ = = −∞
∆ ∆
. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
2
2
2
1
1 1 2
1 1 2
rd
d r
η ε ε ε η β ε η η ε η
η ε εψ ε η β ε η η ε η
− + − + + + + +∆
∝ −
∆ − + + + + + + +
 where 1 2 h h
h h
ψ
 ′ 
≡ +   ′  
. The 
sign of this expression is ambiguous, however, more light can be shed on it by considering 
two limiting cases: (i)ζ →∞ , where sensitivity of compensation function to content is very 
large and (ii) 0ζ → , where individuals are essentially indifferent to domestic content. 
(i) ζ →∞  
By lemma 1 increase in sensitivity to content induces stations to locate as far as 
possible. Since the first-order conditions with respect to location require that the inner market 
of each station be smaller than the outer market, in the limit, we have 1lim 1 4ζ →∞∆ =  and 
2lim 3 4ζ →∞
∆ = . Further, we showed above that ( )2 1lim 1 3d dζ →∞ ∆ ∆ = . 
Therefore, ( ) ( )1 2 2 1lim 1 9d dζ →∞ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ = . 
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(ii) 0ζ →  
By lemma 1 1 2
0 0
lim lim 1 2
ζ ζ→ →
∆ = ∆ = . In Appendix 5 we show that ( )2 1lim 1d dζ →∞ ∆ ∆ = − , 
therefore, ( ) ( )1 2 2 1lim 1d dζ →∞ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ = − ■ 
Appendix 10 
Proof of Lemma 10: We showed in Appendix 9 that 1lim 1 4ζ →∞∆ = . By symmetry the 
indifferent consumer locates in the middle of the unit domestic content ratio interval, 
therefore, we have ( ) ( )( )1 1 1lim 1 2 , 2 ,1 2 , 0h Hζ ζ ζ→∞ − ∆ ∆ −∆ = . This implies that lim 0ζ ω→∞ = . 
Applying lemma 9 yields ( )1 4lim 1 0 0 3
9 3ζ ∆→∞
Σ = − + + = . When 0ζ →  then 
( ) ( )( )1 1 1
0
lim 1 2 , 2 ,1 2 , 1h H
ε
ζ
ζ ζ−
→
− ∆ ∆ −∆ =  which implies that 
0
lim 1 2
ζ
ω
→
=  and ( )2 1
0
lim 1
ζ →
∆ ∆ = . 
Applying lemma 9 yields ( )
0
1 1
lim 1 1 1 1
2 2ζ ∆→
 Σ = − + − + = − 
 
■ 
Appendix 11 
Proof of Lemma 11: ( ) ( )
1 2
2 2
1 1
1 1α α αχ η ε η χ η ε η
   ∆ ∆
Σ = − + + + + − + + +   
∆ ∆   
. We know that 
1 2α α
χ χ≤  and that
2
0αχ ≤ . Further, we know that these two inequalities 
( ) ( )2 2
1 1
1 1η ε η η ε η
∆ ∆
− + + + ≤ − + + +
∆ ∆
 and ( )2
1
1 0η ε η
∆
− + + + ≤
∆
 always hold. Therefore, we 
always have 0αΣ ≥ . Further, when preference are highly sensitive to domestic content ratio 
then, by lemma 9, both 
1α
χ and 
2α
χ converges to zero, therefore, αΣ converges to zero as well. 
When preferences are insensitive to domestic content ratio then, by lemma 2, both 
1α
χ and 
2α
χ  
become zero. Moreover, we know that that ( )2 1
0
lim 1
ζ →
∆ ∆ =  therefore we have 
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( ) ( ) ( )2 2
0 0 0
1 1
lim 1 lim 1 lim 1
ζ ζ ζ
η ε η η ε η ε
→ → →
   ∆ ∆
− + + + = − + + + = − − = −∞   
∆ ∆   
. However, since both 
1α
χ and 
2α
χ  converge to zero much faster than ε  approaches infinity we have αΣ converge to zero ■ 
Appendix 12 
Proof of Lemma 12: 1 2λ λ≥  and 0jλ ≥ , 1,2,3, 4,5,6j = , the result directly follows. 
When sensitivity to domestic content ratio approaches infinity then we have lim 1r
ζ →∞
= , 
( )lim h h
ζ
η
→∞
′ =  and lim 3
ζ
ψ
→∞
= . Substituting these expressions into # yields 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
12
2 2
H
y
ph ε
ε η β ε ηε η
ε η η
η
−
∆ −
  + + ++  = + + +      
, therefore, lim 0
ζ
η
→∞
=  and 
lim 2 limHh yε
ζ ζ ∆→∞ →∞
= ∞⇒ = ∞ . When sensitivity to domestic content ratio approaches zero then we 
have ( )
0
lim h h
ζ
η
→
′ = , both 
0
lim r
ζ →
= ∞  and 
0
lim
ζ
η
→
= ∞  but ( )2
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
− = ∞ , ( )
0
lim r
ζ
η
→
− = −∞ . Then, using 
the fact that 
0
lim 1
ζ
α
→
=  we can write # as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
11
2
1
y
p r
ε η β ε ηε ψε η
ε η η
ε η
−
∆
   + + +−+   = + + +   − +     
. 
Again, we have ( )
0
lim r
ζ
ψη
→
= ∞  while ( )
0
lim 0r
ζ
η
→
= . Since price of advertising is monotonic 
function of broadcasting demand then ( )lim 0 lim 0B p B
ζ ζ→∞ →∞
= ⇒ = . Therefore we have 
0
lim 1y
ζ ∆→
= ■ 
Appendix 13 
Proof of Lemma 13: Since 1 2λ λ≥  and 0jλ ≥ , 1,2,3, 4,5,6j = , the result directly 
follows. Similarly to the proof of lemma 8 it can be shown for high sensitivity to content 
( ) 1lim 0 lim 2y pαζ ζη βε
−
→∞ →∞
= ⇒ = . When sensitivity to domestic content ratio approaches zero then 
0
lim
ζ
η
→
= ∞ ⇒  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1
0 0
0 0
11 1
lim lim 2
2 1 1
1
lim lim
2 1
0 0
0
y
p r r
y
r
αζ ζ
ζ ζ
ε η β ε ηε η ψ ε ψεα
ε η η
η ε ε η
ψ εα
η ε
−
→ →
∆→ →
  + + ++ − − 
= + + +   − + − +   
−
= ∗
− +
= ∗
=
■ 
Appendix 14 
Proof of Proposition 2: As ζ →∞  we have lim 0
ζ
η
→∞
= , therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
1
2
1
1
1
lim 2
2
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1 2
4
2 1
1
2 2
1
1
j
j
j
j
D t
y y
D
H
p h
h
h
p
p
αζ
ε
α
ε η β ε ηε η ψ
ψ ε η η
η η
ε η
ε η β ε η
η ε η η
η
β ε
=
∆→∞
=
−
−
 
∂ ∂ 
  = −
  + + ++ −   
= − − + + +         
 + − ′ =
  + + +
+ + +      
= −
+
= −∞
∑
∑
.  
We used the fact that ( )lim 0 lim 0B p B
ζ ζ→∞ →∞
= ⇒ = . When 0ζ →  then  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1
2 120 0 0
1
2 10 0 0
lim lim lim 1
1 1
lim lim lim
2 1
0*0*0
0
j
j
j
j
D t
y
D
y
r
αζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ
η
ψ η εα
η ε
=
→ → →
=
∆→ → →
 
∂ ∂ 
  = ∆ −∆ −
− −
= ∆ −∆
− +
=
=
∑
∑
■ 
Appendix 15 
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Proof of Proposition 3: Setting 1 2α α α= =  and differentiating the set of first-order 
conditions yields 1 2 0α α∂∆ ∂ = ∂∆ ∂ = . Substituting this into (31) and rearranging gives 
( )
2
1
2
1
1
0
j
j
j
j
D
D
α
ε
α
=
=
 
∂ ∂ 
+  = − <
∑
∑
■ 
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CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF CULTURAL TARIFF ON TRADE IN MOVIES 
A paper to be submitted to The Journal of Cultural Economics 
Mukhtar Bekkali45 
Iowa State University 
Abstract 
Despite the fact that Hollywood dominates worldwide box offices (likely for the 
reason that moviegoers actually like its movies), some foreign governments view Hollywood 
movies as void of any artistic value. As a result, governments engage in various protectionist 
policies to mitigate Hollywood’s negative influence on domestic culture. We build a two-
country (the US and France) monopolistic competition model with two types of traded 
movies--blockbuster and auteur movies. We assume that the US has a comparative advantage 
in producing blockbusters while the French excel in production of auteur movies. All movies 
of each type are assumed to be perfect substitutes, while blockbuster and auteur movies are 
imperfect substitutes. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their cost structure and derive 
revenue from sales in both markets and movies are an excludable public. Movies can be sold 
in both markets at no extra charge. We solve for a symmetric Cournot Nash equilibrium and 
analyze the effects of the introduction of a cultural tariff at the margin. We find that the most 
efficient firms produce both types of movies while less efficient firms specialize in the 
production of movies where their country has a comparative advantage. The introduction of a 
small tariff increases the number of French producers willing to enter the blockbuster market 
and reduces the number of French producers specializing in production of artistic movies. 
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This is caused by the cultural tariff which introduces a distortion into the relative price of 
movies. Notwithstanding the choice of market for French producers, the blockbusterness of 
the market falls. Aggregate consumption of auteur French-made movies and the self-
sufficiency ratio of French producers increase with the introduction of a small cultural tariff. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many countries view Hollywood dominance in movie production and distribution not 
just as a threat to their domestic movie industry but also as a threat to their cultural 
sovereignty and national identity. During the 1994 G.A.T.T. negotiations, the majority of 
W.T.O.-member countries refused to bow to US pressure and lift restrictions on importation 
of Hollywood movies. The well-known director Claude Berri (Jean de Florette) reflected a 
popular attitude when he warned that "if the G.A.T.T. deal goes through as proposed, 
European culture is finished." French officials condemned Steven Spielberg's Jurassic Park 
as a "…threat to [French] national identity." After the French won the G.A.T.T. battle, French 
director Jean Jacques claimed: "We removed the threat that European culture would be 
completely eliminated."  
Despite the fact that cultural protection barriers remained intact, the latest numbers 
show that the Hollywood market share in the world still exceeds 80%46 and climbs to upper 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
45 I would like to thank Harvey Lapan for his valuable comments and recommendations and John Beghin for his 
financial support in writing this paper. All errors are mine. 
46 A little known fact is that Bollywood (Indian movie industry) makes more movies than Hollywood, but most 
are made with small budget and rarely reach the international arena. 
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nineties in some markets47. There are many factors that helped such proliferation48. Quoted 
among the most significant are the size of the US market (in terms of per capita GDP). as 
well as English language49. Foreign governments see two big problems with Hollywood-
made movies.  First, they have low cultural content yet occupy the lion’s share of the movie 
market. Hollywood movies are priced uncompetitively, which damages domestic filmmakers. 
The intuition for the former argument is that in an attempt to have as large an appeal as 
possible, Hollywood makes generic movies that are “safe” from a commercial point of view, 
therefore, it does not venture into the production of artistic movies50. The second reason 
stems from the relative size of the US market in comparison with most of its export markets. 
It is argued that US filmmakers recoup most of their production costs at home, and, given the 
public nature of the cinema industry where the greatest expense is the first-copy production, 
they can afford to sell movies in the international market at low prices. Worse than that, it is 
argued that American producers resort to dumping (defined here as total viewings over total 
production costs), as long as extra revenue is sufficient to cover minor incremental costs, 
such as dubbing. Therefore, foreign filmmakers, restricted by language and limited market 
reach, cannot compete with an “enormous [commercial] machine designed to pulverize.” For 
these two reasons, foreign governments engage in protectionist policies, which vary in 
                                                          
47 In the first half of 2006, of the top 12 studios, 11 Hollywood and Bueno Vista that caters to a Spanish-
speaking audience, shared 92.8% of the world movie market. Moreover, in 2005, the top 25 movies based on 
gross receipts were made in Hollywood. The share of European movies in the US market rarely exceeds 5%. 
48 For a detailed history of international trade in movies, expansion of Hollywood and contraction of European 
cinema, please refer to Cowen (2002). 
49 Jayakar and Waterman (2000) and Lee (2002) find that language is not a significant predictor of the self-
sufficiency ratio. At the same time, the British have the largest movie exports among all European countries, and 
their success is primarily attributed to their language (the British export to France is several times larger than 
that of France to UK).  
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severity beginning from production subsidies, cultural tariffs on sales of foreign movies, and 
ending with compulsory screen quotas imposed on domestic exhibitors. It is believed that 
such policies will create some breathing room for local studios. Given that domestic studios 
tend to specialize in artistic movies, as opposed to dumbed-down Hollywood blockbusters, 
the cultural value of the local movie market will increase as well.  
Naturally, the United States, being the largest exporter of movies, opposes such 
measures. Prominent filmmakers, like Scorcese and Spielberg51, pressure the US government 
to bully its French counterpart to liberalize one of the last bastions of trade. The French 
government fiercely resists and, as we mentioned earlier, has led the offensive against the 
United States during the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. However, the consensus is that 
if France does not adapt to a new world order, it will lose this war. The numbers for the past 
several decades are not inspiring; the French market share is dwindling, the system of cultural 
tariffs and subsidies is overused52, and French contribution to the global market becomes 
internationally insignificant. However, despite these alarming statistics, there are a few signs 
of French recovery. For example, as of April 2006, the French movie Les Bronzés 3 - amis 
pour la vie trailed behind Hollywood blockbuster Ice Age, The Meltdown with the former 
commanding over $80 million in gross receipts (over 80% of which came from France), 
while Russian-made Night Watch and Day Watch grossed together just over $60 million 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
50 The auteur theory, introduced by the French filmmakers Godard and Truffaut in the fifties, postulates that true 
artistic films bear the mark of their director-the-king and that everything else, including the audience, is 
secondary. 
51 Perhaps there exists some hypocrisy in the remarks of Gerard Depardieu and Jackie Chan, both of whom refer 
to Hollywood movies as dumbed-down and call their nations to unite against Hollywood yet, apparently, do not 
mind starring in the same dumbed-down Hollywood movies as long as they bring them hefty paychecks. 
52 It is estimated that over 50% of all production costs in France are covered, either directly or indirectly, by the 
government. 
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(over 50% was collected from Russian audience). Some movie critics attribute these 
successes to artistic values but even more so to local industries taking lessons from 
Hollywood and filming commercially viable movies53--a straightforward and easy to 
understand storyline for Les Bronzés 3 - amis pour la vie and extensive visual effects on par 
with the best Hollywood can offer for Russian Night Watch and Day Watch.  
Recently actress Kristin Scott Thomas has said that the resurgence in French cinema 
is down to a new approach amongst film-makers - who are no longer scared of 
commercial movies. She told … that a few years ago, such a film would have been 
shunned in France - but Arsene Lupin is typical of a new approach to movies in 
France. "I think it's very exciting, because for a long time in France 'commercial' was 
a dirty word," the Paris-based British actress added. "Now it's OK to make a lot of 
money with the films that you're making54." 
These above examples illustrate that some domestic producers no longer view production of 
purely artistic movies as the sole option and that commercial aspect, including reaching out to 
international audience, ought to be considered the driving force behind production. More 
often than not, a new crop of French filmmakers are willing to dumb-down cultural content, 
to a certain extent, in exchange for acceptance by wider audiences and commercial appeal.  
Although G.A.T.S. requires that countries remove impediments to trade and treat all 
W.T.O. members equally, countries that turn to protectionist policies often cite an exemption 
clause where governments may exempt goods and services it deems vital to its national 
identity. This clause is invoked not only for trade in movies, but also trade in theater, radio 
broadcasting and television, as well as trade in books and magazines. 
                                                          
53 “The success of the French film Amelie signals a new direction in French cinema. National Public Radio's 
Nick Spicer reports that the French are starting to see bigger box office receipts thanks to some lessons learned 
from Hollywood.” NPR (2002). 
54 BBC Entertainment News (2005). 
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In this paper, we investigate the claim that protection of domestic industries from 
foreign competition leads to new entry of domestic producers, and, given that domestic 
producers are more skilled in production of auteur movies, they produce auteur movies that 
are deemed rich in cultural content. This, it is alleged, gives a boost to the Hollywood-abused 
domestic culture55.  
We build a model of international trade between two countries, for example, the US 
and France, in two types of movies--blockbuster, which are viewed as low in cultural content, 
and auteur movies, which are viewed as rich in cultural content. Both markets are 
oligopolistic, and players play a quantity game where studios supply their movies to perfectly 
competitive exhibitors’ clearing houses. All studios differ in their production efficiency but 
otherwise are identical and have no sunk and dubbing costs. Each country has a fixed number 
of identical consumers whose preference ordering is blockbusters, auteur movies and leisure. 
All movies within each genre are assumed to be perfect substitutes while genres themselves 
are imperfect substitutes. Preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear so that leisure absorbs 
all of the income effect. We assume that the parameters of the model are such that in the 
unconstrained equilibrium, some firms fully specialize while others cater to both auteur and 
blockbuster markets (necessary restrictions on the parameter space follow). We show that 
cultural tariff may induce entry of fresh French filmmakers into the auteur market. However, 
established French producers enter the wrong (blockbuster) market or genre, in the mind of 
French policymakers, who view the blockbuster genre as void of cultural value. Even though 
the average blockbusterness of the market falls, the fact that established players now favor 
                                                          
55 There is some support for the dumbed-down argument in Chung and Song (2006) who find that Korean 
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production of junk movies over auteur movies may come as a surprise to a policymaker. 
Aggregate consumption of French-made auteur movies rises in response to a tariff--a 
welcome result for a domestic regulator.  
Our paper is an extension of the analysis done by Francois and van Ypersele (2002) 
who show that restrictions on trade in the movie industry, characterized by increasing returns 
to scale technologies where individuals have discrete valuations of domestic (cultural genres) 
and foreign movies, may help resurrect production of valuable cultural genres for both the 
exporter and importer, which subsequently may increase welfare in both countries. However, 
Francois and van Ypersele focused on the welfare effects of cultural policies. The reason 
governments imposes tariffs on foreign movies in the first place is because they either have 
non-economic objectives they want to reach or they perceive that auteur movies bring 
positive externalities that the free market fails to take into account. Therefore, performing a 
welfare analysis while ignoring the policymakers’ underlying rationale to engage in 
protectionism weakens welfare conclusions. In this paper, we shy away from welfare 
analysis. Instead, we concentrate on the question of whether the cultural tariff is a justified 
policy to either increase cultural value of the movie market or revenue share of domestic 
producers.  
There exists empirical literature, Lee and Bae (2004), Lee (2002), regarding the 
impact of cultural protectionist polices on the self-sufficiency ratio56. These studies find that 
the quota system is not a significant predictor of the self-sufficiency ratio, suggesting that the 
quantitative restrictions on imports are not an effective mechanism to limit the number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
moviegoers are willing to pay a premium for domestic movies. 
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foreign films shown in local cinema. We, however, find that in a symmetric environment 
with two types of movies supplied by heterogeneous studios, marginal import restrictions in 
the form of the small cultural tariff increase the self-sufficiency ratio. 
Our paper also makes a contribution to the literature regarding quasi-competitiveness 
of the Cournot games (Frank and Quandt (1963), Novshek (1985), Okuguchi (1974), and 
Ruffin (1971)). We show that for quasi-linear preferences and heterogeneous producers 
facing no entry costs and producing two types of public goods, equilibrium is not quasi-
competitive--prices increase with entry. 
 
2. The Model 
 The US and French consumers have utility functions over auteur movies, ,
a
k im , 
blockbusters, ,
b
k im  and leisure, kl , given by:  
( )( )( ), , , ,, ,1 11 a US a FR b US b FRn n n na bk k i k i ki iU m m l
η
η
+ +
= =
≡ +∑ ∑        (1), 
where 0η <  (assumption A1) and ,h jn  refers to the number of firms in country j  producing 
movies of type h  (it is customary in economic literature to refer “ h− ” as a type other than h  
and a country j−  as a country other than j ). Subscript k  refers to a country where sales take 
place. Hereunder, we refer to η  as concavity parameter.  
All movies within each genre (auteur and blockbuster) are assumed to be perfect substitutes, 
while the genres themselves are imperfect substitutes by virtue of assumption on parameter 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
56 Self-sufficiency ratio is defined as the proportion of revenues collected by domestic filmmakers. 
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space of the concavity parameter η 57. The budget constraint for unitary income endowment 
is given by 
{ }{ }
,
, ,
1h h jk k kh a b j US FR p M l= = = −∑ ∑ , where 
,
,
,1
h jnh j h
k k ii
M m
=
≡∑ , is demand for movies 
of type h  produced by firm i  based on country j  and sold in country k . Solving for demand 
yields ( ) ( )
1
1 2 1 2h h h
k k kM p p
η η
η η
−
−−− −= .  The elasticity of demand with respect to own price is given 
by 
1
1 2
η
η
−
−
, which belongs to ( )1 2,1  interval. Even though the range of admissible elasticities 
is rather limited, it proves to be sufficient for our analysis. We refer to demands with 
elasticity of demand closer to lower boundary as not responsive to price changes while 
calling demands with elasticity in the vicinity of the unitary elasticity as responsive demands.  
We normalize sizes of both countries to unity. Further, we assume that the US 
producers have a comparative advantage in producing blockbuster movies, where the French 
had such an advantage in producing auteur movies. Firms have a constant marginal cost of 
movie production given by i  when produced using technology in which the firm has a 
comparative advantage and ic , 
3
1
1
c
η
η
−
< <
−
 (assumption (A2)).  Assumption (A2) 
guarantees that in an equilibrium, firms produce both types of movies.  
Parameter i  is an integer greater than one, and we assume that all firms have unique 
efficiency parameters and can be ranked in the ascending order of i . We further assume that 
firms incur no additional costs in selling movies abroad58. Further, heterogeneity of firms 
                                                          
57 Please note that 1 2η ≤  is required for utility maximization problem. Further restrictions, that 0η < , 
guarantees that blockbusters and auteur movies are substitutes. 
58 The direct extra costs of selling abroad are dubbing costs, however, small marginal dubbing costs do not 
change the qualitative results. Moreover, in the real world, dubbing costs are small in comparison with 
production costs, therefore, we ignore them.  
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allows us to derive monopolistic competition equilibrium even when sunk costs are not 
present. Therefore, we assume fixed costs are zero. We assume studios make their production 
and sales decisions simultaneously. Movies are sold in a perfectly competitive exhibitors’ 
market. We assume there exist a large number of studios in the market and the market prices 
are determined by free entry--firms enter until marginal profits are exhausted. Firms export 
all their movies. Domestic sales and foreign sales are identical, therefore, foreign and 
domestic prices for each type of movie are identical as well. 
We define τ  as a cultural tariff imposed by France on US sales. Then the profit 
functions are given by: 
 ( )( ) ( )( ), ,2 2US a a US b b USi i ip ic m p i mpi τ τ= − − + − −      (2), 
 ( ) ( ), ,2 2FR a a FR b b FRi i ip i m p ic mpi = − + −        (3), 
where prices are marginal utilities given by 
{ }( ) { }( )
1
, ,
, ,
h h j h j
j US FR j US FR
p M M
η η−
−
= =
≡ ∑ ∑ . 
Define ,h jif  as the market share of firm i  of country j  of movie type h . Our preferences 
allow us to write the first-order conditions for an interior solution as: 
( ) ( )( ), , ,2 1 1 , 1,2,...,a a US b US a USi ip f f ic i nτ η η− + − + = =       (4), 
( ) ( )( ), , ,2 1 1 , 1,2,...,b b US a US b USi ip f f i i nτ η η− + − + = =       (5), 
( )( ), , ,2 1 1 , 1,2,...,a a FR b FR a FRi ip f f i i nη η+ − + = =       (6), 
( )( ), , ,2 1 1 , 1,2,...,b b FR a FR b FRi ip f f ic i nη η+ − + = =       (7). 
Lemma 1: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in the neighborhood of zero cultural tariff, 
the symmetric equilibrium where most efficient firms enter both markets (or diversify),  
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while least efficient firms enter only the market in which the country has comparative 
advantage (or specialize), exists and is unique. All firms can be ranked in terms of 
efficiency and the least efficient US and French firms make zero profit.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Solving the equilibrium and evaluating at the symmetric equilibrium in the vicinity of 
zero cultural tariff yields 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
3 2
, , , ,
1 1 2 2 1 1 4 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
b US a US a FR b FR
c c
n n n n
c c
η η η η η
η η η η η
− − − − + + − +
− = − =
− + − + − − + − +
 and 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
3 2
, ,
2 2 1 1 4 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
a US b FR
c
n n
c c
η η η η
η η η η η
− − + + − +
= =
− + − + − − + − +
.  The former is the equilibrium 
number of firms that fully specialize. The latter is the number of firms that produce both 
types of movies.  
Lemma 2: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in the symmetric equilibrium, there are more 
(less) firms that diversify (specialize) than those that specialize (diversify) if and only if 
( ) 2
1
c
η
η
−
≤ ≥
−
. As difference in technologies vanishes, the number of firms that fully 
specialized lessens. 
Proof: More (less) US firms diversify (specialize) means that ( ), , ,b US a US a USn n n− ≤ ≥ . By free 
entry condition, we have ( )( ), , 1b US a USn n cη η= − + , therefore ( ) ( )( ), , 1 1 1b US a USn n cη− = − −  
which yields the result. Similarly, ( ), , ,a FR b FR b FRn n n− ≤ ≥ and ( )( ), , 1a FR b FRn n cη η= − + imply 
that there are more (less) French firms that diversify. Taking the limit of 
( ) ( ), , , ,b US a US a FR b FRn n n n− = −  as 1c →   yields the result. 
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The conclusions of Lemma 2 are not surprising--when the technology difference is 
large, only the most efficient domestic firms can afford to enter the market where their 
country has a comparative disadvantage. In our particular case, it amounts to the American 
firms producing blockbusters while French firms produce auteur movies. This is in line with 
the spirit of Ricardian gains from international trade; firms specialize in the production of 
goods where they have a comparative advantage. This result is driven purely by the 
assumption that American (French) firms are more skilled in the production of blockbuster 
(auteur) movies. Therefore, abstracting from the dynamic aspects of the real world, one of the 
reasons why Hollywood dominates the blockbuster niche (France was chosen to be a proxy 
for EU, and the EU and US markets are approximately of the same size) while the French are 
famous for their artistic movies is that Hollywood and French movie industries have sizable 
differences in technologies. Some of the properties of the symmetric equilibrium solutions 
are given in Lemma 3 below. 
Lemma 3: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in the symmetric equilibrium around small 
cultural tariff, the equilibrium number of firms that produce either one or two types of 
movies (i) decreases in concavity parameter and (ii) increases in the technology parameter.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Recall that the elasticity of substitution is an increasing monotonic transformation of 
the concavity parameter. Therefore, the higher the elasticity of demand, the smaller the 
number of firms on the market. This is the standard result for Cournot games for either 
homogenous or heterogeneous firms; higher elasticity of demand means that consumers are 
less willing to put up with higher prices. In our model, equilibrium numbers of firms are 
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proportional to prices. Therefore, when people have a relatively high elasticity of demand, the 
number of firms on the market is relatively small. 
Responses of the equilibrium number of firms to changes in the technology parameter 
are driven by the structure of the model—the absence of entry costs makes the equilibrium 
number of firms strictly increase with new entry. Given that higher costs correspond to higher 
prices, they, by extension, contribute to a higher number of firms in the market. This implies 
that consumption of movies is inversely related to the technology parameter, a standard result 
of economic theory. 
 
3. Government policy 
In the real world, Hollywood makes movies of both genres. However, the Hollywood 
movies that are mostly shown on foreign screens are blockbusters. The sheer size of the US 
market means that blockbusters capture the lion’s share of foreign screens, which leaves little 
room for auteur movies. It is argued that the latter are rich in cultural content while 
blockbusters have a dumbing-down effect on domestic culture. Hence, foreign governments 
justify intervention into the movie market based on a rationale of domestic culture 
preservation. Policymakers believe that domestic producers excel in the production and 
marketing of auteur movies, therefore, protection allows new domestic producers to enter the 
movie industry and create artistic movies.   
We investigate the effects of government cultural tariff on the production decisions of 
French producers. More specifically, we want to know if these two policies lead not only to 
entry of new French producers but also entry in the correct (auteur) market. We also 
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investigate the effects of cultural tariff on self-sufficiency ratio and the average cultural 
content of French markets. 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in the symmetric equilibrium under 
free trade, the introduction of a marginal cultural tariff, leads to:  
(i) entry of French producers into the blockbuster market, 
(ii) entry of specialized American producers into the blockbuster market, 
(iii) exit of French fully specialized producers from the auteur market, and 
(iv) exit of diversified American producers from the auteur market.  
Further, the total number of firms serving the auteur market shrinks while the total 
number of firms serving the blockbuster market increases. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Since responses of the equilibrium number of firms to changes in cultural tariff are 
closely tied to changes in equilibrium prices, we state the following corollary to Proposition 
1. 
Corollary to Proposition 1: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in the symmetric 
equilibrium around zero cultural tariff, marginal changes in cultural tariff: 
(i) increase prices of auteur movies,   
(ii) increase prices of blockbuster movies, and 
(iii) reduce the relative price of auteur movies. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The choice of market is determined by the interaction between changes in relative 
prices and technology differences between the two countries. Prices are determined by Nash 
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behavior of all market participants; however, given differences in technology, the blockbuster 
market is dominated by American producers while the auteur market is dominated by French 
producers. Thus, the key determinants of blockbuster prices are American firms while key 
determinants of auteur prices are French firms. Further, changes in cultural tariff affect 
American firms through changes in prices while changes in tariff level affect French 
producers only indirectly. This implies that the tariffs are likely to have larger effects on 
American firms than French firms, and consequently, changes in American behavior are 
likely to play a dominant role in determining equilibrium prices.  
American firms excel in production of blockbusters and find production of artistic 
movies costly, therefore, an indiscriminate tariff (i.e. a tariff imposed on all American 
imports irrespective of the type of the movie) makes American firms less willing to produce a 
movie type which they already find costly. Hence, such a tariff skews production of 
American firms away from artistic movies towards blockbusters. Given that American firms 
drive changes in the blockbuster price (both by virtue of having larger share of the 
blockbuster market and by virtue of being affected both directly and indirectly) and that 
prices increase with new entry, American firms move away from production of auteur movies 
towards production of blockbusters. Once tariff is introduced, French producers find the 
blockbuster market more attractive and switch from production of artistic movies towards 
production of blockbusters. Switching production to the movie type in which ones’ country 
has technological disadvantage may be costly. Blockbuster and auteur movies are substitutes, 
therefore, higher blockbuster prices have a positive effect on auteur prices. Since blockbuster 
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prices increase faster than auteur prices, the net effect is that the relative price of auteur 
movies to blockbusters falls. 
An alternative explanation for marginal changes in prices and numbers of firms is that 
the rising French cultural tariff rate leaves less room for American firms to operate, and given 
that firms recoup their costs from sales on both markets, the least efficient US firms that 
produced both types of movies now resort to complete specialization. Furthermore, given that 
relative prices of blockbusters rise, new entry of American studios in the blockbuster market 
occurs. French firms also observe higher blockbuster prices and reallocate their resources 
towards the sector that guarantees higher profit margins. Existence of profit causes new entry 
into the blockbuster market by already existing French studios, i.e. studios that fully 
specialized before the policy was implemented now find it profitable to cater to both markets.  
Regarding total number of firms, American firms leave the auteur market because 
producing auteur is too costly. At the same time, having an advantage in production of auteur 
movies, French producers are not so keen to leave the auteur market.  The relative price of 
blockbuster movies is increasing, therefore, they have higher incentives to enter the 
blockbuster market as well. Since firms can cater to both markets at once, the end result is 
that the total number of firms serving the auteur market falls, mostly at the expense of 
American producers leaving the auteur market. Similar intuition applies to the total number 
of firms that service the blockbuster market; higher relative prices of blockbusters attract new 
French entry. As for American studios, on the one hand, they are pushed out of the French 
market, and, given that they derive revenue from sales in both US and French markets, their 
ranks shrink. On the other hand, because the relative price of blockbuster movies is 
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increasing in cultural tariff, they are not as willing to leave the blockbuster market as to leave 
auteur market. 
We investigate a common belief that tariffs assist French firms in entering the movie 
market (or swell French firms’ market share) and also raise cultural content of the market, 
given that the French are known for producing quality artistic movies. We choose proportion 
of blockbuster movies (deemed low in cultural content) in the total volume of movie 
consumption as a proxy for the blockbusterness of the French market. Response of 
blockbusterness to changes in cultural tariff is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in a symmetric equilibrium around 
free trade the introduction of a marginal cultural tariff reduces blockbusterness of the 
market.  
Proof: The ratio of aggregate demand for blockbusters consumed by French consumer over 
the aggregate French consumer demand for auteur movies is given by 
{ }
{ }{ }
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. By corollary to Proposition 1, relative price of auteur 
movies falls, therefore, so does the blockbusterness. 
This result may seem unusual at the first glance. After all, cultural tariff leads to new 
entry of both American and French producers into the blockbuster market. However, because 
our equilibrium does not have quasi-competitiveness property, new entry into blockbuster 
market raises prices. This means that consumers reshuffle their consumption basket away 
from blockbusters, which leads to a drop in blockbusterness. This is the response French 
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policymakers supposedly want to achieve. Of course, the cost of achieving this goal is that 
French producers focusing more attention on blockbusters. 
The second question of interest is what happens to aggregate consumption of French 
auteur movies given by a aF M . 
Proposition 3: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in a symmetric equilibrium around 
free trade the introduction of a marginal cultural tariff increases aggregate 
consumption of French-made auteur movies. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Lastly, to investigate the effect of the cultural tariff on the self-sufficiency ratio 
defined as { }
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Proposition 4: Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), in a symmetric equilibrium around 
free trade, the introduction of a marginal cultural tariff increases the self-sufficiency 
ratio.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
The market share of French firms in the blockbuster market is increasing since US 
firms may or may not leave the blockbuster market depending on cost structure and 
preferences. The share of French firms in the auteur market may either fall or rise depending 
on the parameters; however, the overall effect is that cultural tariff increases the share of 
revenue collected by domestic producers. The above conclusion does not contradict the 
empirical findings that trade barriers are weak predictors for self-sufficiency ratio. 
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 4. Conclusion 
It is believed that Hollywood, in an attempt to have as wide an appeal as possible, 
sacrifices artistic quality. Little empirical literature that exists supports this belief by finding 
that domestic consumers are willing to pay a premium for domestic movies. Pursuant to this 
belief, governments around the world engage in protectionist policies. They believe that by 
imposing barriers to entry on Hollywood movies (and it is assumed that Hollywood is better 
at producing blockbusters), a new crop of domestic artists and cinematoFigures will fill the 
gap left by American studios. Moreover, it is believed that these new producers and artists 
would produce works of high artistic value. Therefore, restriction on Hollywood’s sales not 
only increases market share of domestic producers and self-sufficiency of the domestic 
market but also increases cultural level of the movie industry. In this paper, we address these 
questions.  
In the unconstrained equilibrium, more efficient firms produce both types of movies, 
while less efficient firms fully specialize in production of movies in which their country has 
the comparative advantage. Once cultural tariff on Hollywood imports is imposed, contrary to 
the intuition of the policymakers, Hollywood leaves the auteur market more aggressively than 
the blockbuster market, if Hollywood leaves the blockbuster market at all, while French 
producers increase production of blockbusters. The relative price of auteur movies falls, and 
French consumers pay premium for the opportunity to watch blockbusters.  
Notwithstanding the choice of market of French producers, the blockbusterness of the 
market falls. This result stems from the fact that the relative price of blockbusters increases, 
which implies that people consume less blockbuster and more auteur movies.  
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Aggregate consumption of French-made auteur movies increases in cultural tariff. If the 
ultimate goal of the regulator is to increase consumption of domestic movies, then certainly 
the policy in question is the right tool to use. 
We also found that the self-sufficiency ratio of French producers increases with 
marginal cultural tariff. This implies that the demands of local producers for protection from 
perceived unfair Hollywood competition are not left unmet. 
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6. Appendices 
Proof of Lemma 1: To show that firms enter markets in the order of efficiency, we consider 
the first-order conditions around zero cultural tax for firms i  and 1i +  of country j  for 
movie types h .  
( )( ), , , , , ,2 1 1 0, 0, 0h j h h j h j h h j h j h ji i i i i iFOC p f f ic f FOC fη η− − −≡ + − + − ≤ ≥ =    (8), 
( )( ) ( ), , , , , ,1 1 1 1 1 12 1 1 1 , 0, 0h j h h j h j h h j h j h ji i i i i iFOC p f f i c f FOC fη η− − −+ + + + + +≡ + − + − + ≥ =    (9). 
Assume that the less efficient firm, 1i + , enters the market but the more efficient firm, i , 
stays out. To investigate whether such equilibrium exists, we consider the following cases: (i) 
the case where firm i  does not enter either market but firm 1i +  enters one market, (ii) firm i  
does not enter either market but firm 1i +  enters both markets, (iii) firm i  enters one market 
and firm 1i +  enters another market, (iv) firm i  enters one market but firm 1i +  enters both 
markets. 
(i) Solving the equilibrium under the assumption that , 0h jif =  yields 
, ,
1 0
h j h j
i if f
−
+= =  
and 
( ) ( ),
1
2 2
1
h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p
f
η
− − − −
−
+
−
=
−
. Substituting into the first-order conditions 
yields ,
2
h
h j
i h
ic
FOC
p
− = , 
( ) ( )( ),
1
2 2
2 1
h h h h
h
h j
i h
c p ic pic
FOC
p
η
η
− − − −
−
+
−
= +
−
, 
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,
2
h
h j
i h
ic
FOC
p
−
−
−
= . This cannot be an equilibrium because profit function of firm i  
from sales on either market is strictly increasing in the market share. 
(ii) Setting , 0h jif =  yields 
, 0h jif
− = , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 2 1 2 2
2 1
h h h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p ic p
f
η η η
η
− − − −+ − −
=
−
, and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), 1 2 1 2 2
2 1
h h h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p ic p
f
η η η
η
− − − −
−
− + − −
=
−
. Plugging these 
solutions into the first-order conditions yields , 2h j h hiFOC ic p=  and 
, 2h j h hiFOC ic p
− − −= , both of which are strictly positive. Therefore, such 
equilibrium does not exist. 
(iii) Setting , 0h jif =  yields 
,
1 0
h j
if
−
+ =  and solving for optimal market shares yields 
( ) ( ),
1
2 2
1
h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p
f
η+
−
=
−
 and ,1
2
1
h h
h j
i
ic p
f
η
− −
+ = − −
. Substituting into the first-
order conditions yields ( ) ( ),
2
2
1
h h
h j h h
i
ic p
FOC ic p
η
η
− −
= +
−
 and 
( )
( ) ( )( ),
1
2 2
2
1
h h h h
h j h h
i
c p ic p
FOC ic p
η
η
− − −
+
−
= +
−
.  Simple manipulations show 
that it cannot be the case that , 0h jiFOC ≤  and 
,
1 0
h j
iFOC
−
+ ≤ , therefore, such 
equilibrium does not exist. 
(iv) In the usual manner, we set , 0h jif =  and solve the first-order conditions for the 
equilibrium market shares. We obtain 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
h h h h h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p ic p c p
f
η η
η
− − − −
−
− − + −
=
−
, 
( ),
1
2
1
h h
h j
i
ic p
f
η
− −
+ = −
, and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ),
1
1 2 2 2 2
1 2
h h h h h h h h
h j
i
c p ic p ic p c p
f
η η
η
− − − −
−
+
− − + −
=
−
. Substituting 
these solutions in the first-order conditions and rearranging yields 
( ) ( ),
2
2
1
h h
h j h h
i
ic p
FOC ic p
η
η
− −
= +
−
. This expression is non-negative, therefore, 
such equilibrium does not exist. 
Therefore, it cannot be the case that more efficient firms abstain from entry while their less 
efficient competitors do not. Given ordering of firms, we can define 
, ,
, ,
1 1
1
a FR a USn na a FR a US
i ii i
F f f
= =
≡ = −∑ ∑  and 
, ,
, ,
1 1
1
b US b FRn nb b US b FR
i ii i
F f f
= =
≡ = −∑ ∑   as aggregate 
market shares of, correspondingly, the French and the US firms over auteur movies and 
blockbusters. Aggregating the first-order conditions over firms yields: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), ,,, ,1 12 1 1 b US a USa USn na a US a b b USii n ip n F F f c iτ η η = + =− + − − + − =∑ ∑    (10), 
( ) ( )( ), ,, ,, , ,1 12 1 b US b USa US a USn nb b US a US b USii n i np n n f iτ η = + = +− − + − =∑ ∑     (11), 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
,
1
2 1 1
b USnb b US b a
i
p n F F iτ η η
=
− + − + − =∑      (12), 
( )( ) ( )( ), ,,, ,1 12 1 1 a FR b FRb FRn nb b FR b a a FRii n ip n F F f c iη η = + =+ − − + − =∑ ∑     (13), 
( )( ), ,, ,, , ,1 12 1 a FR a FRb FR b FRn na a FR b FR a FRii n i np n n f iη = + = +− + − =∑ ∑      (14). 
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( ) ( )( )
,
,
1
2 1 1
a FRna a FR a b
i
p n F F iη η
=
+ − + − =∑       (15). 
Equations (10) and (13) refer to, correspondingly, aggregation of the first-order conditions 
over the US and the French firms that diversify, equations (11) and (14) refer to, 
correspondingly, aggregations of the first-order conditions over the US and the French firms 
that enter the market in which their respective countries have comparative advantage (in other 
words, such firms fully specialize), and equations (12) and (15) refer to, correspondingly, 
aggregation of the first-order conditions over all US and French firms. The system of 
equations (10)-(15) implicitly defines prices and shares of both US and French firms that 
diversify or specialize.  
In the absence of fixed costs, firms enter the market until marginal profits are driven 
to zero (we assume that the equilibrium number of firms is large so that setting marginal 
profits equal to zero serves as an approximation to having a least profitable firm that stays out 
of the market deriving negative profits while a least profitable firm entering the market 
deriving marginal profits barely above zero). For firms that fully specialize, this condition 
reduces to ( ) ,2 b b USp nτ− =  and ,2 a a FRp n= . For firms that diversify, we set marginal profits 
of a firm that produces no movies of a genre in which its country has comparative 
disadvantage equal to zero. Solving equations ( ) ( ),2 1 0a b USip f icτ η− + − =  and 
( ) ( )( ),2 1 1 0b b USip f iτ η− + − − =  for ,b USif , and equations ( ),2 1 0b a FRip f icη+ − =  and 
( )( ),2 1 1 0a a FRip f iη+ − − =  for ,a FRif  yields the remaining entry conditions-
( ) ( )( ),2 1a b a US b ap p n cp pτ η η− = − +  and ( )( ),2 1a b b FR a bp p n cp pη η= − + .  
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The system of equations given by (10)-(15) and four entry conditions implicitly define 
equilibrium prices, the number of specialized and diversified US and French firms, and the 
shares of firms as a function of cultural tariff. Defining , ,a FR b USn n n= = , , ,a US b FRn n n= = , 
a bF F F= =  , and a bp p p= =  and imposing symmetry by evaluating the equilibrium 
around zero cultural tariff yields  
2p n=           (16), 
( )( )2 1p n cη η= − +          (17), 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), 12 1 1 2
n h j
ii n
cn n
p n F F fη η
=
+
+ − − + − =∑      (18), 
( )( ) ( )( ), 12 1
2
n h j
ii n
n n n n
p n n fη
=
+ + −
− + − =∑      (19), 
( ) ( )
1
2
2
cn n
p n Fη
+
+ − =         (20), 
where ,
n h j
ii n
f
=∑  represents the aggregate market share of specialized firms in which firms do 
not have a comparative advantage. 
We can solve the above system of equations for 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
3 22 2 1 1 4 2
1 1 2 1 2
c
n
c
η η η η
η η η
− − + + − +
=
− + − − + − +
, 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
3 22 2 1 1 4 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
c
n
c c
η η η η
η η η η η
− − + + − +
=
− + − + − − + − +
, 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
3 22 1 1 4 2
1 1 2 1 2
c
p
c
η η η η
η η η
− − + + − +
=
− + − − + − +
, and 
( )
( ) ( )( )
2 21 3 4 3 7 4
2 1 1 2 1 2
c
F
c
η η η η
η η η
− + − + − +
=
− + − − + − +
. 
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Please note that these solutions are unique. We require that 
( ) ( ), ,1 0n nb US a FRi ii n i nF f f= => > = >∑ ∑  which is equivalent to 31 1c
η
η
−
< <
−
■ 
Proof of Lemma 3. Differentiating the equilibrium number of diversified and specialized 
firms with respect to η  and evaluating at symmetric equilibrium yields 
∂na,FR
∂η
=
∂nb,US
∂η
= −2 +
2
H−3 + cL H−1 + ηL2
+
2 H−7 + cL H−1 +cL2
H−3 +cL H1 + c+ 2 η− 2 c ηL2 ,  
∂na,FR
∂η
−
∂nb,FR
∂η
=
∂nb,US
∂η
−
∂na,US
∂η
= −2 +
2 H−7 + cL H−1 +cL
H1 +c +2 η − 2 c ηL2
+
2 c
Hc + η −c ηL2 . 
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), both of these expressions are negative. Similarly, 
differentiating the equilibrium number of firms with respect to c  and evaluating at the 
symmetric equilibrium yields 
∂na,FR
∂c
=
∂nb,US
∂c
=
−4 +6 η
H−1 +ηL H1 + c + 2 η −2 c ηL2  and 
∂na,FR
∂η
−
∂nb,FR
∂η
=
∂nb,US
∂η
−
∂na,US
∂η
=
H8 c2 − 2 H1+ 3 c H−2 + 5 cLL η+ 2 H1 +3 c H−6+ 7 cLL η2 − 4 H−1 + cL H−3 +7 cL η3 +
8 H−1 +cL2 η4Lë HH1 + c + 2 η −2 c ηL2 Hc + η− c ηL2L  
Both of these expressions are positive. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Fully differentiating the system of equations given by (10)-(15) with 
respect to cultural tariff and evaluating at the symmetric equilibrium yields:  
∂na,FR
∂τ
= −
∂nb,US
∂c
= −Hc H−2 + 3 ηL H2 c H−1 +ηL3 +η H−1 + 4 η −2 η2LLLë
HH−1 +ηL H2 c3 H−1 + ηL3 H−1 +2 ηL + η H−1 +2 η + 6 η2 − 4 η3L+
c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 − 12 η4L+ 2 c H1 + 2 η −η2 − 13 η3 + 6 η4LLL, 
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∂na,FR
∂τ
−
∂nb,FR
∂τ
= −
i
k
jj
∂nb,US
∂τ
−
∂na,US
∂τ
y
{
zz =
−
c H−1 + ηL η H2 c2 H−1 +ηL3 + η H1 − 4 η + 2 η2L +c H2 − 7 η+ 10 η2 −4 η3LL
Hc + η− c ηL2 H2 c2 H−1 +ηL3 + η H1 − 4 η +2 η2L −c H2 + η− 10 η2 + 4 η3LL . 
Then, assumptions (A1) and (A2) guarantee that  
∂na,FR
∂τ
−
∂nb,FR
∂τ
< 0
, 
∂nb,FR
∂τ
>  0
, 
∂nb,US
∂τ
−
∂na,US
∂τ
> 0
, and 
∂na,US
∂τ
< 0
 .  Further, 
we obtain 
∂na,FR
∂τ
+
∂na,US
∂τ
= −
i
k
jj
∂nb,US
∂τ
+
∂nb,FR
∂τ
y
{
zz < 0
■ 
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1: Differentiating equations (10)-(15) with respect to τ  
and evaluating at 0τ =  yields  
∂pa 
∂τ
= −Hc H−2 + 3 ηL H2 c H−1 + ηL3 + η H−1 + 4 η− 2 η2LLLë
H2 H−1 +ηL H2 c3 H−1 + ηL3 H−1 +2 ηL + η H−1 +2 η + 6 η2 − 4 η3L+
c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 − 12 η4L+ 2 c H1 + 2 η −η2 − 13 η3 + 6 η4LLL, 
∂pb 
∂τ
=
−HH2 c H−1 + ηL3 + η H−1 +4 η − 2 η2LL
H2 c2 H−1 +ηL3 −2 c η H2 − 5 η+ 2 η2L +η H1 −4 η + 2 η2LLLë
H2 H−1 +ηL H2 c3 H−1 + ηL3 H−1 +2 ηL + η H−1 +2 η + 6 η2 − 4 η3L+
c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 − 12 η4L+ 2 c H1 + 2 η −η2 − 13 η3 + 6 η4LLL. 
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), both prices are increasing in cultural tariff. Further, 
differentiating the relative (to blockbuster) price of auteur movies with respect to cultural 
tariff and evaluating at the symmetric equilibrium yields  
 
∂Hpa êpbL 
∂τ
∝ IH−1 + cL H2 c H−1 + ηL3 + η H−1 + 4 η− 2 η2LL2Më
H2 H−1 +ηL H2 c3 H−1 + ηL3 H−1 +2 ηL + η H−1 +2 η + 6 η2 − 4 η3L+
c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 − 12 η4L+ 2 c H1 + 2 η −η2 − 13 η3 + 6 η4LLL. 
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The relative price of auteur movies is falling in cultural tariff for all values of ( ),c η  that 
satisfy assumptions (A1) and (A2). 
Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiating a aF M  with respect to the cultural tariff yields 
( )
( )1
1 2
a a a a a b
a
F M F F P P
p
η η
τ τ η τ τ
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + − − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ 
. Substituting for 
aF
τ
∂
∂
,
aP
τ
∂
∂
, and 
bP
τ
∂
∂
, 
and evaluating at 0τ =  yields  
∂Fa Ma
∂τ
=
I12 c4 H−1 +ηL7 η H−3 + 4 ηL+ η3 H1 −4 η + 2 η2L2 H2 − 11 η+ 12 η2L −
2 c3 H−1 +ηL4 H10 −25 η − 46 η2 + 246 η3 −292 η4 +96 η5L −
2 c η H2 − 20 η+ 83 η2 −248 η3 + 667 η4 − 1194 η5 + 1154 η6 −540 η7 + 96 η8L+
c2 H−8 +54 η − 125 η2 + 344 η3 − 1545 η4 +4148 η5 −5936 η6 + 4604 η7 − 1824 η8 +
288 η9LMë
H4 H−1 +ηL H−1 + 2 ηL Hη H−3 +14 η − 8 η2L+ c H−7 + 21 η− 22 η2 + 8 η3LL
H2 c3 H−1 +ηL3 H−1 + 2 ηL+ η H−1 + 2 η+ 6 η2 −4 η3L +c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 −12 η4L +
2 c H1 + 2 η− η2 −13 η3 + 6 η4LLL  
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), this expression is strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Self-sufficiency ratio is given by  
{ }
{ }{ }
( )
,
,
,
, ,
1
1
2
h h FR
h a b a b
h h j
h a b j US FR
p M
E F F
p M
=
= =
≡ = + −
∑
∑ ∑
. Differentiating it with respect to cultural 
tariff and evaluating at zero tariff yields 
∂E 
∂τ
= Hc H−2 + 3 ηL H2 c H−1 +ηL3 + η H−1 +4 η −2 η2LLLë
HH1 − 3 η+ 2 η2L
H2 c3 H−1 +ηL3 H−1 + 2 ηL+ η H−1 + 2 η+ 6 η2 −4 η3L +c2 H4 − 5 η− 18 η2 +34 η3 −12 η4L +
2 c H1 + 2 η− η2 −13 η3 + 6 η4LLL  
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), 0
E
τ
∂
>
∂
. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
General discussion 
My first essay considers the impact of cultural quota imposed on radio stations in 
increasing consumption of domestic programs. Domestic content requirement may reduce 
(increase) consumption of domestic programs when consumer’s demand is highly elastic 
(inelastic), the degree of preference for foreign content over domestic content is high (low) 
and opportunity cost of listening time is high (low). The reduction occurs because the 
consumer reshuffles her consumption bundle towards leisure away from high domestic-
content stations thereby reducing the overall aggregate consumption of broadcasting, and 
subsequently, the overall aggregate consumption of domestic programs. The model assumes 
that individuals have one-to-one mapping from preference ordering over the types of music to 
preference ordering over the mix of domestic and foreign content. One of the possible 
extensions is to develop a model of trade in cultural goods where this limitation is removed. 
Secondly, I assume Cobb-Douglas specification for the sub-utility of radio consumption. This 
restriction imposes constraints on the range of the conclusions we reach with respect to 
government policy regulations. Perhaps a promising extension would be to assume CES 
specification. This may yield a richer model and wider range of policy recommendations. 
Further, I consider marginal changes in the discrete level of the content ratio. Another fruitful 
approach to tackle the same issue is to consider the impact of discrete changes in the level of 
content requirement. 
My second essay analyzes regulation of television broadcasting via two policy 
vehicles,- direct regulation of the proportion of the domestic programs in the total volume of 
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broadcasting and tax-cum-subsidy policies. Marginal changes in content requirement increase 
(decrease) consumption of domestic shows when individuals are sensitive (insensitive) to the 
provided content. Tax-cum-subsidy polices have negative (no) effect on consumption of the 
domestic content when preferences of individuals of the country subject to regulation are 
highly sensitive (insensitive). Finally, I find that capping advertising increases consumption 
of domestic programs. 
One of the limitation of our analysis is the assumption on the duopolistic structure of 
the market in which only the firm located on the lower domestic content scale is directly 
affected by the government regulation. This assumption allows us to derive symmetric 
equilibrium and reach analytical results. A possible extension would be to consider an 
environment in which the assumption of the structure of the market is relaxed. I feel that this 
may render the model intractable, however, numerical analysis may yield richer results. For 
one, with just two firms on the market, one of the driving components of our model is a 
strategic interaction between these firms. When market is competitive then the weight of this 
strategic effect would be diminished and new, even unexpected results, can be obtained. In 
addition, I consider the effects of policies on terrestrial broadcasting only and completely 
abstain from cable television,- sector with different revenue structure. However, in many 
countries cable television dominated the television market, therefore, some of the conclusions 
arrived at in this paper are weakened in such markets. It may be interesting to consider the 
impact of domestic content policy regulations on cable television. One of the most widely 
used policy is called “carry-on”, where, instead of regulating proportion of domestic 
programs in the total volume of broadcasting for every station, as is done in this paper, 
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governments instead require that cable operators reserve slots for domestic or public 
channels. This is one of the directions for further research that I plan to proceed with. 
The last essay addresses the question of whether a cultural tariff is a proper policy to 
raise consumption of domestic movies, especially artistic ones, as opposed to foreign 
blockbuster movies. “Hollywood” blockbuster movies allegedly have low-cultural value and 
cultural tariff intends to increase the average cultural level in the country implementing the 
policy. Starting from free trade, a small cultural tariff decreases the average blockbusterness 
of the domestic market as intended although the number of local producers willing to enter 
the blockbuster market increases and reduces the number of local producers specializing in 
the production of artistic movies. The cultural tariff introduces a distortion into the relative 
price of movies. Aggregate consumption of artistic movies that are locally made increases 
and so does the self-sufficiency ratio of local producers. 
I build a model where equilibrium is determined through quantitative interaction 
among movie producers. An alternative specification would be to build a model where firms 
instead compete in prices. Due to the fact that fixed costs comprise a large chunk of final 
movie production costs, such model has to introduce either exogenous or endogenous product 
differentiation. I feel that the latter has a great potential for it may shed light on the formation 
of the cultural component of cultural goods. In addition, all movies are of the same quality. 
This is not necessarily the case in the real world. It is believed that one of the reasons why 
Hollywood dominated the movie market is because its domestic market is large, therefore, 
studios are able to recoup even large investment of capital. Since there exist a monotonic 
relationship between the movie budget and movie quality, it is said that Hollywood has 
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movies of higher quality. Given that all movies are sold at approximately the same prices, 
consumers naturally favor movies of higher quality. Therefore, the aspect of difference in 
quality, which we ignore, may have a sizable impact on policy analysis. 
All of the models above consider the impact of government policies on trade in 
cultural goods in a static environment. This assumption gives little credit to the strategic 
interaction among firms and evolution of firms’ behavior in response to policy instruments. 
In order to incorporate the strategic effect it is necessary to frame models in a dynamic 
setting. I, however, shined away from dynamic approach since static environment proved to 
be sufficient to arrive at the main conclusions.  
 Lastly, all the models are theoretical in nature. I believe that it is equally important to 
assess the empirical validity of my policy conclusions and recommendations. This is the route 
which I plan to take next. 
